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SUMMARY 
This research involved an investigation of the alignrmnt between performance 
measurement and strategy in central government agencies. A review of the literature 
suggested tha4 although the topic is of great interest and importance, it has been 
undeffesearched. The context of the existing studies appears to be based primarily on 
for-profit/business rather than not-for-profit/public sector domain. Moreover, the existing 
research is mainly normative lacking supporting empirical evidence. 
The objectives of this research were to (1) develop greater understanding of performance 
measurement in the public sector, and (2) provide supporting empirical evidence in place 
of the normative arguments regarding the alignment between performance measurement 
and strategy. 
This research aimed to answer the question, 'how, in central government agencies, is the 
alignment between performance measurement and strategy managecP' 
This interpretive multiple-case research comprised of the studies of four central 
government agencies in Thailand. The primary data source was interview data supported 
by documentation. The interpretational analyses were conducted both at intra-case and 
inter-case levels. 
This research found that public officials often regarded, 'stratee as equivalent to 'policy' 
and that these terms were used interchangeably. The research also found that the existing 
definitions of fundamental performance measurement/management terminologies did not 
fit comfortably with public sector management owing mainly to their lack of practical 
perspectives. This research proposed refined terminologies. 
Additionally, the research found eight advantages of strategy-misaligned performance 
measurement despite the absence of their recognition in the existing literature As a result 
misalignment could be preferable in some circumstances. However, public managers were 
under pressure to demonstrate alignment between performance measurement and strategy 
thus 'alignment tensions' occurred in practice. 
In order to deal with these tensions, three strategies were identified including 
(1) neg, lecting the tensions (as in 'do-nothing stratee), (2) attempting to realign 
performance measurement with strategy (as in 'realigning strategy', and (3) directing 
attention from the alignment issue (as in 'distracting strategy'). 
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CHAPTER1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Over the past decades, public authorities in Thailand have witnessed a loss of trust and 
confidence from Thai citizens and society due in part to unsatisfactory public performance. 
TIlis author-as a Thai citizen and now as a Thai civil servant-has also shared this Thai 
public-wide perception. However, it is interesting that the phenomenon is not uncommon 
among the public sector in other countries, including those in the more developed countries 
such as the US and the UK (see, for example, De Lancer Julnes and Holzer, 2001; 
Ghobadian and Ashworth, 1994; and Osbome et al., 1995). It would appear that there is a 
need to improve public sector performance in order to regain trust and confidence from 
citizens and society in many countries. 
This need to improve public sector performance has driven public authorities to adopt 
management practices, for example, the New Public Management-NPM (see, for 
example, Hood, 1995), which includes performance-oriented management (see, for 
example, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000), and the rise of the audit society (see, for example, 
Power, 1999). These trends have in common greater emphasis on performance 
measurement/management (e. g. Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003; and Wholey and Hatry, 
1992). In the Thai public sector, for example, the adoption of NPM, of which performance. 
1 
measurement/management is an integral part, is aimed at improving public sector 
performance with management methods from the field of management and the private 
sector (Bowomwathana, 2000). 
Performance measurement has been regarded as a critical activity for organisational 
management (see, for example, Amaratunga et al., 2001; Leandri, 2001; Lebas, 1995; 
White, 1996; and Wholey and Hatry, 1992) in both for-profit/business sector and not-for- 
profit/public sector. However, reviews of performance measurement literature suggest that 
disproportionate attention has been paid to researching perforn-ance measurement in the 
private sector. As a result there appears to be a significant gap in the body of knowledge in 
the not-for-profit/public sector performance measurement. 
In addition, performance measurement has been argued to hold a position in the strategic 
management context (see, for examPle, Bititci et al., 1997; and Neely et al., 1994). Yet, 
there is a lack of understanding of the link between performance measurement and 
strategy. For example, a common notion is that strategy-aligned performance measurement 
can facilitate and support the implementation of strategy (Kaplan, 2001; Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996a; Neely, 1999; Parker, 2000; Simons, 2000; and Skinner 1971). However, 
other than normative arguments derived mainly from intuition, there has been little 
empirical evidence underpinning the notion of the alignment between performance 
measurement and strategy. 
Considering that public sector organisations' strategy tends to be highly volatileý learning 
from these organisations the way in which they manage the alignment between 
2 
performance measurement and strategy might yield considerable benefits to management 
practice. The knowledge learned from the public sector organisations not only helps in 
gaining greater understanding of strategic performance measurement in. the public 
organisations subject to strategy instability, it n-ýight also help to shed light on the private 
sector organisations as well. In this sense, the studies of the aligrunent between 
performance measurement and strategy in public sector organisations seem to have the 
potential to highlight managerial implications both for public sector and business 
management. 
1.2 Objectives 
Following a review of literature in fields of performance management and management 
strategy, two significant gaps emerged: (1) underdevelopment in performance 
measurement in not-for-profit/public sector and (2) lack of understanding of performance 
measurement in strategic management context. 
Therefore the objectives of this research are to: 
Contribute to the body of knowledge on performance measurement in the not-for- 
profit/public sector by investigating the alignment between performance 
measurement and stratejy in the public sector context 
e Supplement normative arguments regarding the alignment between performance 
measurement and strategy with empirical evidence from a practitioner's perspective. 
3 
1.3 Structure of this Thesis 
This thesis is structured into ten chapters It begins with literature reviews, from Chapter 2 
to Chapter 5, the purpose of which is to identify ýaps in the body of knowledge to ensure 
the original nature of the contribution of this research. After the literature reviews, the 
research question is established. 
The reviewing of research methodology in Chapter, 6 details the appropriate research 
methods explained in Chapter 7. Results from the application of the specified research 
methods are presented and discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. Finally, Chapter 10 provides the 
conclusions of this research. 
The structure of this thesis can be summarised in the following diagrarn. 
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I Chapter 1: Introduction I 
LITERATURE REVIEWS 
Chapter 2: Performance Measurement 
Chapter 3: Strategic Manageme 
Chapter 4: The Alignment between Performance Measurement and Strategy 
Chapter 5: Strategic Performance Measurement in the Public Sector 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
I Chapter 6: Research Methodology 
L Chapter 7: Research Methods 
Chapter 8: Case-Site Descriptions and Analysis 
Case I Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Descriptions Descriptions Descriptions Descriptions 
and and and and 
Intra-Case Intra-Case Intra-Case Intra-Case 
Analysis Analysis Analysis 
L 
Analysis 
____j I 
Chapter 9: Findings and Discussions 
Inter-Case 
Analysis 
Findings 
and 
Discussions 
Chapter 10: Conclusions 
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The objective of each chapter is described as follows. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This introductory chapter ainis to explain the background and objectives of this research. 
The chapter also provides an overview of the structure of the thesis, as well as the 
objectives of each chapter. 
Chapter 2: Performance Measurement 
The objective of this chapter is to review performance measurement literature, in order to 
identify gaps in the body of knowledge. 
Chapter 3: Strategic Management , 
This chapter aims to review strategic management literature especially relevant to 
performance measurement. The purpose is not to cover all areas of strategic management, 
but to explore the link between, performance measurement and strategy from the strategic 
management perspective. 
Chapter 4: The Alignment betnten Performance Measurement and 
Strategy 
This chapter sets out to review the literattre pertaining to organisational alignment in 
general, and to the alignment between performance measurement and strategy in particular, 
to identify the gaps in the body of knowledge. 
6 
Chapter 5: Strategic Performance Measurement in the Public Sector 
The objectives of this chapter are to review literature pertaining to strategic perfonnance 
measurement in the public sector and to propose research question for this study. 
Chapter 6: Research Methodology 
The objectives of this chapter are to review social science research methodology and to 
assess the available research methods, in order to identify the appropriate methods for this 
study. 
Chapter 7: Research Methods 
This chapter aims to explain and justify the research methods for this study. 
Chapter 8: Case-Site Descriptions and Analysis 
The objectives of this chapter are to provide case descriptions and to discuss in-case 
analysis results from each case site. 
Chapter 9: Findings and Discussions 
The objectives of this chapter are to report and discuss the findings of this research 
Chapter 10: Conclusions 
The objectives of this final chapter are to (1) answer the research question, (2) identify the 
contributions of this research, (3) identify research limitations, and (4) note additional 
issues raised by the research and suggest areas of future research. 
7 
CHAPTER2 
Performance Measurement 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to review performance measurement literature, in order to 
identify gaps in the body of knowledge. This chapter explores five main issues in the 
performance measurement literature, including: 
* Definitions of key ternis 
* Why do organisations measure performance? 
9 Types of performance measures 
o Fundamentals of the effective performance measurement 
* Notable performance measurement frameworks 
2.2 Definitions of Key Terms 
Performance measurement is discussed extensively; however, surprisingly, there appears to 
be limited consensus on the definitions of performance measurement and other related 
terms (see, for example, Black, 2001; and Neely et al., 1996). This section reviews 
different definitions of five key terms in the study of performance measurement proposed 
8 
by different authors. These terms are (1) performance, (2) performance management, (3) 
performance measurement, (4) performance measurement system, and (5) performance 
measure. 
After reviewing the definitions of these tem-is, a summary of the definitions will be given 
in order to provide consistency in the use of these terms throughout this research. 
2.2.1 Performance 
Lebas, (1995) noted that few people agree on what performance really means. Its meaning . 
can vary from efficiency, to robustness, resistance or return on investment, or other 
definitions never fully specified. 
In a business context Neely et al. (1996) regarded performance as the efficiency and 
effectiveness of action. In terms of operations, Slack et al. (1995) stressed the importance 
of customers to a business organisation by defining performance as the degree to which an 
operation fulfils ihe objectives at any point in time, in order to satisfy its customers. 
However, Lebas (1995) commented that perforniance is not so much about past 
achievements-as generally accepted-but about the future and the capacity for the unit to 
be evaluated. That is performance is the potential for future successful implementation of 
actions in order to reach the objectives and targets. The author, therefore, defined 
performance as the deploying and good management of the components of the causal 
9 
model(s) that lead to the attaimnent of the objectives contingent to organisational contexts 
and situations. 
2.2.2 Performance management and performance measurement 
Bititci et al. (1997) defined performance management as the process by which the 
organisation integrates its perforniance with its corporate and functional strategies and 
objectives. AdditionallY, Lebas (1995) maintained that performance management is a 
philosophy, which is supported by performance measurement. 
While performance management can be defined as the organisation's integration of its 
performance with strategies and objectives, Evangefidis (1992) regarded performance 
measurement as the process of determining how successful organisations or individuals 
have been in attaining their objectives. However, this definition of perforniance 
measurement seems to be less specific conipared with those of other authors. For example, 
Marshall et al. (1999) referred to performance measurement in a more specific manner as 
the development of indicators and collection of data necessary to describe, report on and 
analyse perfonnance. These authors also pointed out that the perfonnance data and 
indicators can have a role in detenmining success. 
Other authors have defined performance measurement even more specifically. Neely et al. 
(1996), for example, defined performance measurement as the process of quantifying 
action correlates with perforniance. The authors suggested 'that in order to measure 
10 
performance, actions should be quantified in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. More 
recently, Amaratunga et al. (2001) described performance measurement as a process of 
assessing progress towards achieving predetermined goals, including information on the 
efficiency with which resources are transformed into goods and s6rvices, the quality of 
those outputs and outcomes, and the effectiveness of organisational operations in terms of 
their specific contributions to organisational objectives 
In a study of performance measurement in the public sector, Nyhan and Martin (1999) 
regarded performance measurement as the regular collection and reporting of information 
about the efficiency, quality, and effectiveness of government programmes. In comparison 
to that of Neely et al. (1996), Nyhan and Martin's (1999) definition appears to be more 
relaxed, for not only does it focus on the quarAification of measurement, but it also 
includes the qualitative aspects of the measurement. Moreover, Nyhan and Martin's (1999) 
definition includes the need for constancy of measurement. 
Collectively, performance measurement may be seen as a critical activity in a larger effort 
to develop an underlying system around the performance management that uses 
perfonnance data to assess how an organisation is perfonning, and to chart its course 
(Kates et al., 2001). , 
11 
2.2.3 Performance measurement system and performance measure 
Lockamy III and Smith (1997) defined a performance measurement system as a systematic 
way of evaluating the inputs, outputs, transformation and productivity in a manufacturing 
or non-manufacturing operation. The authors noted that a performance measure is the 
actual value of the performance action. 
Performance measures are more often considered in quantitative form. For example, 
Pritchard et al. (1991) regarded performance measures as the numerical or quantitative 
indicators that show how well each objective is being met. Sorber (1993) defined a 
measure as a quantified description of a component of a production process. 
To depict the interrelatedness among the entities within a performance measurement 
system, Neely et aL (1996) suggested an examination of three different levels of a 
performance measurement systern. The first level is the individual performance measures 
within a performance measurement system. The second level is the system as an entity. 
The third level is the relationship between performance measurement system and the 
environment within which it operates. All levels of such a system seem not to be separable 
(Lebas, 1995). 
In a similar manner, performance management precedes and follows performance 
measurement in a virtuous spiraL with the former creating the context for the latter. 
Performance measurement and performance measures are closely interrelated. Thus, as 
12 
Lebas (1995) noted, any attempt at separating the two processes is bound to be 
unsuccessful. 
2.2.4 Summary of the existing definitions of the ley terms 
Even though the meanings of the key terms in the performance measurement/management 
'literature have yet to be settled, for the purpose of this research, -the following definitions 
will be used: 
Performance is 'how actions lead to the accomplishment ofthe objectives. 
Performance measure is 'the quantification ofa particular variable'. 
I+ 
Performance measurement system'is 'a set ofperformance measures and how they are 
measured'. 
+ 
Performance measurement is 'a process of determining how the performance 
measurement systems lead to the accomplishment of the objectives'. 
Performance management is 'the use of performance measurement to assess the 
organisation in orderfor improvemenildevelopment'. 
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The purpose of listing these definitions is to ensure consistency when using these tern-is 
throughout this research. The following figure summarises the interrclationship of these 
terms. 
ý Perfonnance Measure 
................................................... ................................................................. ............. .. ............ ........ Performance Measurement System ............. ............ ........ .... ............. ............... ......... .......... 
Performance Measurement 
................... ......................................... ... 
......................................................................... .................................................................. 
Performance Management 
Figure 2a: Interrelationship of Key Terms 
(Source: the author) 
Figure 2a highlights the focus of this thesis, namely, performance measurement, which 
includes performance measurement system(s) and performance measure(s). Moreover, this 
set of definitions provides a structure for case-site analyses in Chapter 8. 
14 
2.3 Why Do Organisations Mea'sure Performance? 
Performance measurement, as an important management tool (see, for example, 
Amaratunga et al., 200 1; Leandri, 200 1; Lebas, 1995; White, 1996; and Wholey and Hatry, 
1992), has been used perhaps mainly to provide information about the success of 
organisations in progressing towards accomplishment of the current goals, compared with 
previous success in this respect (Lebas, 1995). 
However, the literature suggests that there are several other reasons why organisations 
measure performance according to their purposes, including (1) control and evaluation, (2) 
improvement, (3) decision-making and judgement, (4) communication, (5) resource 
allocation, (6) influencing and motivating behaviours, (7) support for long-term focus, and 
(8) managing change. Each of these eight different performance measurement purposes 
will be reviewed in turn. 
2.3.1 Control and evaluation 
Control and evaluation would seem to be the most common purpose of performance 
measurement. The concept of control and evaluation was claimed to originate from the 
engineering sciences, such as mechanical and electrical engineering (e. g. De Hass and 
Kleingeld, 1999). However, in contrast to engineering science, control in management 
science relates to social rather than to technical systems. Control may be described as the 
process of detecting and correcting adverse change (Juran, 1964). 
is 
In management science, performance measurement has been claimed to be an element of 
organisations' management control systems (e. g. Neely et al., 1994). The field of 
performance measurement has also been dominated by the concept of management control 
systems (Sinclair and Zairi, 1995a). Anthony (1988) defined management control as the 
process utilised by managers to ensure that resources are used effectively and efficiently in 
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the accomplishment of the organisation's objectives. 
However, Langfield-Sniith (1997) argued that this definition not only restricts subsequent 
researchers to envisaging management control systems as encompassing the largely 
accounting-based controls of planning, monitoring of activities, measuring performance 
and integrative mechanisn-4 but it also serves to artificially separate management control 
from strategic control and operational control. 
Johnson (1992) and Johnson and Kaplan (1987), in addition, noted that the definition of 
management control relied heavily on responsibility accounting has lost its relevance for 
control purposes in today's rapidly changing business environment. 
Alternatively, a management control system has also been described as a process for 
influencing behaviours (Flamholtz el al., 1985). The system provides a means for gaining 
co-operation among collectives of individuals or organisational units who may share only 
partially congruent objectives, and channelling the efforts towards a specified set of 
organisational goals (Flamholtz, 1983; and Ouchi, 1979). The phenomenon resulting from 
the lack of such co-operation is often referred to as sub-optimisation-the pursuit by 
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managers of their own narrow objectives, at the expense of strategic coordination (Smith, 
1995). 
Controls have been categorised in many ways, for example, administrative and social 
controls (Hopwood, 1976); results, action, and personnel controls (Merchant, 1985); output 
and behaviour controls (Ouchi, 1977); and strategic and operational control (Langfield- 
Smith, 1997). 'However, controls can also be categorised, perhaps more visibly, into formal 
and informal controls (Anthony et al., 1989; and Langfield-Smith, 1997). 
Formal controls include rules, standard operating procedures, budgeting systems and 
performance measurement. Empirical research into management control systems and 
strategy has focused primarily on formal controls. These types of control are more visible, 
objective components of the control system, and thus, easier to research (Langfield-Smith, 
1997). Langfield-Smith (1997) claimed that formal controls could be categorised into two 
types, being either feedback or feedforward in nature. 
On the one hand, outputs or results controls are of a feedback nature, and often financially 
oriented. They include controls which aim to ensure that specific outcomes will be 
achieved, and involve monitoring, measuring and taking corrective actions. On the other 
hand, controls that are of a feedforward nature (ex-ante controls) include administrative 
controls (e. g. standard operating procedures and rules), personnel controls (e. g. human 
resource management policies) and behaviour controls (e. g. ongoing monitoring of 
activities and decisions). 
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While fonnal controls are usually stated clearly in the form of rules or standards, informal 
controls are not always consciously designed (Langfield-Smith, 1997). Informal controls 
include the unwritten policies of the organisation often derived from the organisational 
culture. An example of informal control is clan (social) control, described by Ouchi (1979) 
as derived from the shared values and norms, or the culture of the organisation. 
Langfield-Smith (1997) noted that although clan controls are more often informal, some 
formal controls are also derived from the organisational culture. For example, the formal 
organisational mission or objectives may reflect the values and beliefs of the dominant 
culture. Flamholtz (1983) and Otley (1980) noted that informal controls are as important 
aspects of management control system as the formal controls because the effectiveness of 
formal controls may be dependent on the nature of the informal controls that are also in 
place. 
Performance measurement is used primarily to monitor performance (Waggoner et al., 
1999). Traditionally, it has been developed as a means of monitoring and maintaining 
organisational control to ensure the achievement of overall goals and objectives (Nanni et 
al., 1990). Oakland (1993) and Parker (2000) concurred on the notion that organisations 
measure performance to identify success. In addition, Parker (2000) noted that input 
measures have been widely used for the purpose of control. The main benefit of the input 
measures is that when they are compared to outputs, efficiency and/or productivity can be 
known. However, performance measurement based solely on input measures is unlikely to 
be of strategic benefit 
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This notion is consistent with that of Letza (1996), who claimed that the main function of 
performance measurement in a strategic context is to provide the means of control to 
achieve the strategic objectives required to fulfil the organisation's mission/strategy. 
Therefore, measures that are simply capable of measuring efficiency and/or productivity 
are unlikely to yield much benefit to the overall organisational. strategy accomplishment. 
Wholey and Hatry (1992) also agreed that the major beneficiary of the performance data 
should be the management. That is, if the data are used solely for external accountability 
controlling purposes and not for helping managers to improve their performance, the 
results may not be worth the measurement costs: 
However, criticism of the use of performance measurement for controlling purpose is, 
nevertheless, not uncommon. For example, Smith (1995) questioned whether performance 
data is a neutral reporting device. The author claimed that, to some extent, most of the data 
could be controlled by operational managers. If this argument is true, the use of 
performance data for management control purposes can be seriously undermined. 
Even though performance measurement has its roots perhaps in the management control 
systems and is likely to be regarded as a management control tool, characteristics other 
than control seem to be of merit as well. For this reason, there has been a recent shift away 
from the use of performance measurement mainly for controlling purposes. Performance 
measurement has increasingly been regarded as a management tool that can be used for 
other purposes as well. 
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An additional shifý from the treating of financial data as the foundation for performance 
measurement to one among a broader set of measures, has also occurred (Eccles, 1991). 
Hanna et al. (2000) pointed out that a performance measurement system could enable 
organisations to develop a consistent pattern of behaviour on the part of individuals 
making decisions, which, in turn, makes the organisation strategy realisable. 
Other than being used as a tool to realise the organisation strategy, performance 
measurement is capable of having great influence on the implementation of strategy, partly 
because of its capacity to influence behaviours (Hanna et al., 2000; Neely et al., 1994; and 
Neely et al., 1995). Given that inappropriate performance measures encourage 
inappropriate behaviours, a performance measurement system is a fundamental activity for 
organisations. Overall, the use of performance measures mainly as a management control 
mechanism appears to be increasingly anachronistic due to their focus on 'control' as 
opposed to 'improvement' (Sinclair and Zairi, 1995a, 1995b, and 1995c). 
2.3.2 Improvement 
Performance measurement can also facilitate organisational learning and improvement 
(Lebas, 1995). Sink and Tuttle (1989) emphasised that perhaps the only valid reason for 
measuring performance is to support and enhance improvement. Harrington (1991) stated 
that measurement is the beginning of improvement, because if you cannot measure the 
activity, you cannot improve it. Parker (2000) and Waggoner et al. (1999) suggested that 
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performance measurement can help in identifying where problems exist, where 
improvements are necessary, and if improvement plans and effort actually happened. 
The measuring of performance provides information on how well the improvement effort 
is working, thus making it an integral part that stimulates and supports continuous 
improvement (Hudson et al., 2001; Miller, 1992; and Oakland, 1993). T11or (1991) added. 
that the measurement provides data supporting the re-directing of the organisations' scarce 
resources to the most attractive. improvement activities. 
2.3.3 Decision-making and judgement 
Performance measurement is also an important aid to the making of judgements and to 
decisions (Parker, 2000). Performance data provide standards for establishing comparisons 
(Oakland, 1993), thus ensuring decisions are based on evidenc6, not on supposition, 
emotion, faith, or intuition. 
2.3.4 Communication 
Good communication demands a clear message (Lingle and Schiemann, 1996). Juran 
(1992) suggested, vague terminology Js unable to provide precise communication It 
becomes necessary to say it in numbers. Performance measurement can serve 
management's need for precise communication. By quantifying the efficiency and 
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effectiveness of actions (Neely et al., 1996), management is able to communicate the 
performance of each sub-unit in the sub-organisational levels that convey common 
understanding. In so doing, performance measurement can improve organisational 
communication (Waggoner et al., 1999) 
2.3.5 Resource allocation 
Parker (2000) suggested that by measuring performance, the substantiveness of the 
organisationa processes may be validated. When the processes are validated, the task 
requirements for each activity become obvious (Miles and Snow, 1984), especially where 
performance measurement systems are being used to reflect performance drivers as well as 
performance results. This is because management can reallocate resources to the activities 
detennined as the drivers in cause-and-effect relationships (see Kaplan and Norton, 
1996a). 
Thor (199 1) stated that measurement helps an organisation direct its scarce resources to the 
most attractive improvement activities. Moreover, it can provide a direct stimulus to 
action, which, according to Oakland (1993), is a way ofjustifying the use of organisation's 
resources. 
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2.3.6 Influencing and motivating behaviours 
Leandri (2001), Sinclair and Zairi (1995a), and Willis (2001) noted that performance 
measurement can profoundly affect the motivation of individuals because the individuals 
react to the way they are measured. Therefore, relating a performance measure to an 
organisational goal helps individuals better understand the purpose of the measure and why 
it is important. As a result, performance measurement can be used as a motivation- 
enhancing tool (Waggoner et al., 1999). White and Flores (1987) indicated that 
performance improves if individuals are given targets, and is maximised if targets are seen 
as challenging but achievable. Moreover, inappropriate measures can also dernotivate or 
steer off course the individual's perforrnance. 
2.3.7 Supporting long-term focus 
Managers are often criticised for excessive focus on short-term results (Smith, 1995). In 
Smith's (1995) terminology, this can be seen as 'management myopia', caused partly by 
lack of congruence between the time horizon of the managers and the time horizon of the 
projects for which she or he is responsible. 
For example, if managers' remuneration and employment prospects are closely tied to their 
'short-term performance, it is more likely that they will give projects with long-time 
horizons low priority. Appropriate performance measurement (e. g. measurement 
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incorporated with longer-term measures) can help ensure that managers adopt a long-term 
perspective (Goold and Quinn, 1990a; and Schuler et al., 1991). 
2.3.8 Managing change 
In the current dynamic environment, organisations tend to encounter uncertainties both 
internally and externally. Internal to the organisations, there might be changes in 
ob ectives, cultures, working processes and human resources. These internal changes j 
require modification to management activities appropriate to the new circumstances. 
Maisel (1992) and Sieger (1992) suggested that performance measures must support these 
changes and management initiatives. This is especially important since the adoption of new 
management initiatives becomes common for many organisations. 
In addition to the changes from within, most organisations operate in a context in which 
uncertainty, risk and complexity in the external environment may place more constraints 
on them than ever before (Dence, 1996). These constraints include an increase in market 
globalisation, pressures of international competition, and better-informed and more 
demanding constituents. Changes of this nature will force the organisations to adapt their 
internal capabilities, including the measurement systems supporting those changes. 
For instance, Brignall (1992) suggested that performance measurement is a key agent of 
change in an attempt to change organisations' focus. Lingle and Schiernann (1996) noted 
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that performance measurement provides individuals within the organisation clear 
organisational objectives for focusing on organisation culture change more supportive of 
strategy. 
In summary, the literature-based discussions in section 2.3 suggest that performance 
measurement can and should be used for various purposes, and should not be lin-Ated only 
to traditional controlling purposes. 
2.4 Types of Performance Measures 
Performance measures have been classified into many different types, including qualitative 
or quantitative (e. g. Ghobadian and Ashworth, 1994), short- or long-term (e. g. Amaratunga 
et al., 2001; and Kaplan and Norton, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d), internal or external 
(e. g. Keegan et al., 1989), perforrnance outcomes or performance drivers (e. g. Fitzgerald et 
al., 1991), leading or lagging (e. g. McAdam and O'Neil, 1999), and tangible or intangible 
(e. g. Dangayach and Deshmukh, 2001; and Light 1998). 
However, performance measures may be more simply classified into financial and non- 
financial measures. In'this section, therefore, the characteristics of both financial and non- 
financial measures, including their advantages- and disadvantages, will be reviewed. This 
section will also demonstrate a movement away from emphasis upon the use of financial 
measures to those of a non-financial nature. 
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2.4.1 Financial measures 
Traditionally, performance measures primarily have been based on management 
accounting systems (see, for example, Ghalayini and Noble, 1996; Johnson and Kaplan, 
1987; and Willis, 2001). This has resulted in most traditional performance measures 
focusing on financial data (e. g. return on investment, return on sales, sales per employee, 
productivity, and profit per unit production). Eccles (1991) noted that one possible reason 
for financial measures carrying such weight in the period prior to the late 1980s was an 
assumption about their uniformed metric, comparable across sub-units within an 
organisation and also across organisations. 
Even though traditional financial measures are assumed to be precise and objective 
(Parker, 2000), their downsides have been put forward by a number of authors both 
academics (see, for example, Eccles, 1991; Fawcett et al., 1997; Fry and Cox (1989); 
Ghalayini and Noble, 1996; Kaplan, 1990; Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Lee et al.; 1995; 
Letza, 1996; and Skinner, 1985) and practitioners alike (see, for example, Drucker, 1993; 
Lynch and Cross, 1991; Parker, 2000; and Willis, 2001), including: 
Financial measures have been based primarily on outdated traditional cost 
management accounting systems, which have been criticised for their lack of 
applicability in today's rnarket envirorunent (Ghalayin i and Noble, 1996; Hayes et 
al., 1988; Kaplan, 1990; and Lee et al., 1995). According to Ghalayini and Noble 
(1996), this is perhaps the most significant linitation of traditional financial 
performance measures. 
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e There are hidden costs incurred from using such measures (Kaplan, 1990), including 
the costs of. - 
- tracking less important information such as direct labour cost and inventory cost 
- opportunities missed and resources wasted because of decisions based on 
accounting costs, such as the decision to outsource causing the company to miss 
an opportunity to learn. 
- shunning continuous improvement strategies because they will cut inventory. 
- failing to lower lot sizes for fear that unit costs will rise. 
9 Managing by an overemphasised use of information from such measures impedes 
performance because they are not able to track sources of competitiveness such as 
customer satisfaction, quality, flexibility, and dependability in today's global 
economy (Fawcett et al., 1997; Kaplan, 1990; and Neely; 1999). According to Hayes 
and Abernathy (1980), the emphasised use of accounting-based measures was 
claimed as destroying the competitiveness of US manufacturing industry. It is 
possible for organisations to be misled by the simplistic concepts that promote the 
importance of focusing on financial measures when other criteria are, in fact more 
critical (Skinner, 1985). 
o Standard financial measures are lagging in nature (Drucker, 1993; Ghalayini and 
Noble, 1996; Kaplan and Norton, 2001a; McAdam and Bailie, 2002; Neely, 1999; 
and Parker, 200Q). They were developed for regulatory and financial reporting. 
Therefore, these measures focus on reporting what has happened in the past and do 
not address strategy (McAdam and Bailie, 2002). 
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* Traditional financial measures fail to include less tangible factors (Parker, 2000) (e. g. 
customer relationships, innovative products and services, high-quality and responsive 
operating processes, and organisational climate), which by the end of the twentieth 
century, had become the major source of competitive advantage (Kaplan and Norton, 
2001a). 
*Financial measures encourage short-termism and can be counter-productive 
(Amaratunga et al., 2001; and Neely, 1999). Therefore, exclusive reliance on these 
measures could promote behaviour that sacrifices long-term value creation for short- 
term performance (Porter 1992). 
9 Performance measurement based on traditional cost accounting systems promotes the 
local optimisation of resources rather than optimisation. of the performance of the 
whole organisation (Fry and Cox, 1989). 
o Financial measures lack strategic focus (Ghalayini and Noble, 1996; McAdam and 
Bailie, 2002; and Neely, 1999) because of their inability to link an organisation's 
long-term strategy with its short-term actions (Kaplan and Norton, 1996d). 
* They are inflexible (Ghalayini and Noble, 1996; and Kaplan, 1990). 
4, They are expensive to use (Ghalayini and Noble, 1996). 
e They may contradict continuous improvement initiatives (Ghalayini and Noble, 
1996; Kaplan, 1990; and Neely, 1999). For example, they encourage minimisation of 
performance variance rather than continuous improvement (Johnson and Kaplan, 
1987; and Lynch and Cross, 1991). 
s They create data overload (Neely, 1999). 
* They are internally focused (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). 
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* They are not capable of providing information of performance determinants 
(Ghalayini and Noble, 1996; and Willis, 2001) because performance data derived 
from such measures are the result of management performance, not the determinants 
or causes of it (Drucker, 1993). 
* In practice, financial measures are not comparable because organisations use 
different accounting conventions (Eccles, 199 1). 
To discuss more specifically the limitations of the traditional accounting-based financial 
performance measures, three commonly known financial measures-productivity, cost, 
and profit-will be reviewed next 
Productivity measures 
Productivity measures have been regarded as primary indicators of performance (Ghalayini 
and Noble, 1996). In extreme, authors such as Hayes et al. (1988) and Schmenner (1991) 
suggested the use of productivity by firms only as a measure of their performance. 
However, productivity measures are subject to some imitations. 
Ghalayini and Noble (1996) noted that the limitations of productivity measures can be 
classified into three main categories, i. e. partial productivity, aggregate productivity, and 
productivity paradox. Edosomwan (1985) highlighted, on one hand, the danger of partial 
productivity in that it overemphasises one input and neglects others. On the other hand, 
aggregate productivity measuring can be difficult since inputs are homogeneous and some 
are intangible. In addition, the consideration of all inputs requires significant amounts of 
data that are time-consuming afid costly to obtain. Armitage and Atkinson (1990) 
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maintained that aggregate measures are misdirecteg irrelevant, or too complex to be 
understood and effective in motivating performance. 
Additionally, Skinner (1986) argued that concentrating on improving productivity night 
cause a productivity paradox owing to the overemphasis on direct labour, which is no 
longer a significant portion of cost (Ghalayini and Noble, 1996; Johnson and Kaplan, 
1987; Neely, 1999; and Skinner, 1985). Neely (1999) noted that the increasing use of 
advanced manufacturing technologies has changed percentage of direct labour cost from 
over 50 per cent during the 1950s and 1960s to rarely no more than 5 or 10 per cent of the 
cost of goods sold by the 1980s. 
Direct labour cost now typically accounts for only a fraction of full product cost Thus, 
reducing the cost of direct labour and/or increasing direct labour efficiency do not 
contribute significantly to the overall performance of the company. Therefore, a 
productivity paradox can occur when managers' excessive focus on the efficiency of 
factory workers and departments diverts attention away from improvement of the 
production system itself 
Cost measures 
Reducing cost has always been considered an effective weapon to achieve competitive 
advantage (Ghalayini and Noble, 1996). Despite the realisation that companies do not 
compete solely on cost and price, Porter (1980) suggested that a company can gain 
competitive advantage over other competitors by tightening utilisation ofits resources, thus 
becoming a cost leader in the business. 
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However, customers' demands have changed. Low cost is only one, and no longer the most 
important, factor for competing in most markets. Skinner (1986) argued that to be 
competitive, business should concentrate instead on quality, reliable delivery, short lead 
times, customer service, rapid product introduction, flexible capacity, and efficient capital 
deployment. The author noted that these are not cost reductions per se, but are essential to 
success in the market. 
Even though cost certainly must be kept in check, this should be achieved by controlling 
cost drivers, not by curtailing spending or by controlling cost numbers (Kaplan, 1990). 
Reducing costs at the expense of any of these areas will be more harmful than helpful. 
Neely (1999) and Suwignjo et aL (2000) also concurred with the notion that the ever- 
changing environment has shifted management focus to strategies that include quality, 
flexibility, shorter lead time, delivery reliability as well as cost 
Profit measures 
It is important to realise that when a company is making a profit, this does not necessarily 
imply that its operations, management and control systems are efficient. Profit as a 
performance measure can only reveal that there is a problem, but sheds little light on the 
nature and the reasons for that problem (Ghalayini and Noble, 1996). 
Globerson (1985) countered the claim that profit or rate of return can and should be 
considered a composite indicator of the organisational success, reasoning that such an 
indicator does not help in identifying specific, areas that need improvement. Moreover, 
considering the amount of profit alone as the basis of achievement for different plants may 
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be misleading, since each plant has its own circumstances, even when the plants produce 
identical products. 
Notwithstanding all the above criticisms of the traditional cost accounting-based 
performance measures, Kaplan (1990) argued that although businesses still find it 
necessary to budget and track accounting-based results, they do so to monitor, not to 
control. 
2.4.2 Non-financial measures 
Since it appears that traditional accounting-based financial measures can be 
disadvantageous, businesses began to counterbalance overemphasis on the use of financial 
measures with non-financial measures (see, for example, Eccles, 1991; Ittrier and Larcker, 
1998a, 1998b; and Ittner and Larcker, 2003). 
Ittner and Larcker, (1998b), based on previous case studies, have identified three principal 
forces for businesses to adopt more non-financial measures. 
Perceived limitations in traditional accounting-based financial measures 
There have been claims that traditional financial measures, relative to key non-financial 
indicators: (1) are too historical and backward looking, (2) lack predictive ability to explain 
future performance, (3) reward short-term or incorrect behaviour, (4) are not actionable, 
providing little inforrnation on root causes or solutions to problems, (5) do not capture key 
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business changes until it is too late, (6) are too aggregated and surnmarised to guide 
managerial action, (7) reflect functions, not cross-functional processes, within a company, 
and (8) give inadequate consideration to intangible assets such as intellectual capital and 
goodwill, which are difficult to quantify. 
By incorporating non-financial indicators into their measurement systems, many 
businesses have sought to create a wider set of measures that capture not only firm value, 
but also the factors leading to the creation of value in the business. 
Competitive pressure 
The substantial changes in the nature and irtensity of competition forced businesses to 
determine and measure the non-financial 'value drivers', leading to success in the new 
competitive enviromnent. 
The greater emphasis placed on non-financial measures in businesses facing conipetitive 
pressure is consistent with research which finds positive associations between perceived 
environmental uncertainty and the demand for broad-based information systems 
incorporating non-financial indicators (e. g. Chenhall and Morris, 1986). 
Consequence of other initiatives 
Ittrier and Larcker (1998a) also noted that businesses adopted non-financial measures as a 
consequence of improvement initiatives, for example, the total quality management (TQM) 
programmes, which required new performance indicators. The authors maintained that 
many of these initiatives require greater emphasis on customer requirements and customer 
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satisfaction with the finif s products or services, leading to greater emphasis on non- 
financial customer measures such as complaints, satisfaction and retention. 
Additionally, Ghalayini and Noble (1996) recognised the trend towards more emphasis on 
non-financial measures by identifying two main different phases in the performance 
measurement literature stream. The first phase began in the late 1880s, continuing through 
the 1980s. In this phase, the emphasis was on financial measures such as profit, return on 
investment, and productivity. The second phase started in the late 1980s as a result of 
changes in the world market, coupled with the discovery of the flaws of financial 
measures. 
The authors noted that in order to regain competitive advantage in the world market, 
businesses need not only to shift their straegic priorities from low-cost production to 
quality, flexibility, short lead-time and dependable delivery, but also to implement new 
technologies and philosophies of production management. Measures focusing on financial 
data (e. g. return on investment, return on sales, sales per employee, productivity, and profit 
per unit production) are no longer capable of providing business management with 
information on the source of competitive advantage in the changed market (Kaplan, 1990). 
Other researchers also indicated that traditional financial ly-based performance measures 
have failed to measure and integrate all the factors critical to success of a business (Fisher, 
1992; Ittner and Larcker, 2003; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Haynes et al., 1988; Kaplan, 
1983,1984; and Maskell, 1992). Companies, which strive to become world-class but still 
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maintain the utilisation of financial rwasures based on management accounting systems, 
run the risk of failing (Daniels and Bums, 1997). 
It is also important to recognise the differences between measurement of operating and 
accounting performance. Negative consequences might arise if the companies fail to detach 
their operating control from the accounting control system. Johnson (1992) provided an 
example of such consequence, observing that companies might lose opportunities (e. g. 
learning, redeploying redundant workers) if the outsourcing decisions are based solely on 
costs. In manufacturing in particular, opportunities to cut lot sizes are sometimes passed 
over for fear they will increase costs. 
The organisations in the public sector as well as private firms also witnessed a shift in 
emphasis from the use of financial performance measures to the use of the non-financial 
measures. Kouzmin et al. (1999) observed this trend and noted that whereas in the 1980s 
the focus of performance measurement in the public sector was on the 'three Es'- 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness-in the 1990s the attention was shifted to quality 
and consumer satisfaction. 
Even though this trend has occurred for some time, problems still exist Amaratunga et al. 
(2001) noted that although several approaches to designing and implementing a system to 
provide non-financial measurement have been proposed, the problems of integrating non- 
financial measures with financial measures effectively still remain. 
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More recently, in a field and survey study, Ittner and Larcker (2003) discovered that most 
studied companies seem to have adopted boilerplate versions of a nori-financial 
measurement framework (e. g. Balanced Scorecard). Those companies have made little 
attempt to identify areas of non-financial performance that might advance their chosen 
strategy. Nor have they demonstrated a cause-and-effect link between improvements in 
those non-financial areas and in the companies' long-term objectives (e. g. profit or stock 
price). Instead, they have adopted a measurement framework, mistaking it for an off-the- 
shelf checklist or procedure that is universally applicable and conpletely comprehensive. 
In summary, the adoption of non-financial measures has also been problematic and subject 
to criticism. 
2.5 Fundamentals of the Effective Performance Measurement 
Performance measurement authors maintained that-to be effective-performance 
measurement must have certain fundamental characteristics. Even though different authors 
have different opinions on this matter, seven characteristics regarded as fundamentals of 
the effective performance measurement can be summarised. These include: 
* The aggregation of sub-unit measures into global measures 
*A balanced approach to the measurement 
9 The use of a vital few measures 
e The commitment to the measurement 
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* The capacity for providing feedback 
* The support of both internal and external changes 
* The alignment between performance measurement and strategy 
Each of these seven characteristics will be reviewed in turn. 
2.5.1 The aggregation of sub-unit measures into global measures 
A typical organisation comprises of sub-units that are both hierarchically and functionally 
different; therefore, it needs a series of performance measures designed to meet the 
requirements of different organisational parts (Ghobadian and Ashworth, 1994). 
It is -important that a performance measurement system is designed to relate local or 
functional measures to global measures, to ensure the activity is consistent with goals of 
the organisation. The measures should be integrated throughout the organisation, so that 
various functional areas across organisational levels work together for the good of the 
organisation (Willis, 2001). 
In addition to the consistency of measures across organisational functions and level4 
Parker (2000) suggested that sub-unit measures must aggregate into organisation-wide 
measures. The measurement at sub-unit levels should furnish the raw data for the level of 
aggregation, and no part of the organisation should be left out of the measurement. 
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Although Kaplan and Norton (2001b) appeared to agree that measurements must be linked 
and integrated, the authors argued that measures at sub-unit level do not have to add to 
higher organisational levels. Management at the sub-units should be able to choose local 
measures that influence but are not necessarily identical to the higher organisational levels' 
measures. However, the measures at sub-unit level should support progress against the 
whole organisations' predetermined objectives, without suboptimisation (Amaratunga et 
al., 2001; and_Leandri, 2001). 
2.5.2 A balanced approach to the measurement 
A balanced approach to the measurement of performance is another characteristic that has 
often been referred to as fundamental to effective performance measurement. Kaplan and 
Norton (1996c) argued that a balanced performance measurement is not merely a 
collection of financial and non-financial measures in various categories, but an integrated 
set of measures developed from a 'theory of the business' that explicitly links the 
performance measures in a causal chain of performance drivers and outcomes. 
In order for measurement to have a balance, measures used need not be overemphasised in 
ý any specific types of measure. In other words, to gain a balance of the measurement, a 
performance measurement system should consist of multidimensional measures (e. g. 
Sinclair and Zairi, 1995b). 
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The balance of measures has raised more concerns since the growing realisation of the 
flaws in accounting-based financial measures. As discussed earlier in section 2.4, 
organisations depending solely on financial figures to determine their performance are 
likely to overlook other important aspects omitted by those figures. For this reason, 
organisations have attempted to balance their financial measurement with non-financial 
measurement. 
The concept of a balanced approach to the measurement has also been extended beyond the 
balance of financial and non-financial dimensions of the measurement. This extension is, 
as Nanni et al. (I 992a; and 1992b) described, the moving towards 'integratedperformance 
measurement'. Fawcett et al. (1997) suggested that it is important to establish a 
comprehensive view of performance measures that indicate the overall health of an 
organisation. 
However, in the absence of the agreement on how 'balanced' the balanced approach 
should be, many performance measurement commentators have offered various 
dimensions of the balance, including a balance between: 
* Financial and non-financial measures (Amaratunga et al., 2001; and Keegan et al., 
1989) 
* Qualitative and quantitative measures (Ghobadian and Ashworth, 1994) 
o Short- and long-term measures (Amaratunga et al., 2001; and Kaplan and Norton, 
1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d) 
9 Internal and external measures (Keegan et al., 1989) 
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* Performance outcomes and performance drivers (Fitzgerald et al., 1991; Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996a; and Leandri, 2001) 
o Leading and lagging measures (McAdam and O'Neill, 1999) 
o Tangible and intangible measures (Dangayach and Deshmukh, 2001; and Light, 
1998) 
White (1996) noted that part of the reason for the lack of consensus on what and how many 
dimensions of performance measures constitute the balanced approach of measurement is 
the obvious need for each organisation to use measures which are relevant to its own 
situatiom 
Despite no explicit answers with regard to which conponents are to be balanced within a 
'balanced' performance measurement approach (see, for example, Ittner and Larcker, 
1998b), the concept is useful because it cautions nunagers against overemphasis on 
particular aspect(s) of performance-as many businesses did in the past-by placing an 
emphasis on the financial aspect of performance when other underemphasised aspects 
would be more important. 
2.5.3 The use of a vital few measures 
White (1996) suggested that a common basis for selecting performance measures would 
seem worthwhile because it not only helps management to ensure that important variables 
are being measured correctly, but also avoids an unnecessary proliferation of measures. 
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Since performance measurement requires organisational resources and effort, measuring 
too many aspects of performance may trivialise those resources as well as the exerted 
effort. This can occur in particular when organisations focus on measuring activities, rather 
than the results (Lingle and Schiemann, 1996). Therefore, it is essential for the 
organisations to identify a vital few measures in order to avoid the proliferation of 
performance measures (Johnsen, 2001; Kaplan and Norton, 1992; and Sinclair and Zairi, 
1995c) and to make measures relevant and easy to maintain (Hudson et al., 2001). 
Stainer and Stainer (1998) suggested that the selection of the vital measures should include 
enough measures to ensure completeness but not so many as to lose focus. Too many 
measures will compete for an organisation's attentiorý which ultimately reduces the 
effectiveness of the measures and results in their simply being ignored (Leandri, 2001). 
Additionally, Johnston and Fitzgerald (2001) and Johnston et al. (2002) argued that the 
trend towards a more structured and balanced approach to performance measurement is 
leading managers to become swamped with measures and information to such an extent 
that they spend their time feeding the measurement systems rather than focusing on 
management and action. Ittner and Larcker (1998b) also noted that studies on information 
overload suggest that a large number of measures can reduce performance by exceeding 
managers' processing capabilities when making judgements. 
Johnston and Fitzgerald (2001) suggested that managers should manage their business 
rather than manage performance measurement, and that performance measurement should 
be used as a management facilitator, not merely as the raison d'etre. Johnston et al. (2002), 
therefore, offered a word of caution by proposing a notion of 'good enough' performance 
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measurement. Based on case studies, the authors claimed that the managers are willing to 
trade off performance measurement as an activity against decision-making and action, with 
a focus on improvement rather than control, providing managers with the time and space to 
focus on relevance and action. 
The use of the vital few measures and a balanced approach to the measurement can thus be 
seen as a trade-off. On the one hand, an attempt to introduce additional measures to cover 
more performance dimensions may improve the balance of measurement. However, on the 
other hand, adding more measures can readily lead to performance measures proliferation, 
contradictory to the need for only a vital few measures. 
Managers attempting to gain a balanced coverage of performance measurement are likely 
to encounter the problem of measures proliferation. For this reason, the managers should 
be aware of the possible trade-off between the advantages of the balanced coverage of the 
measures and the disadvantages of measures proliferation. As a result, if managers attempt 
to measure their organisational performance in a 'balanced, way by including a larger 
number of measures, they should not overlook the possible undesirable consequences 
because the benefit of including more measures is unclear (Ittner and Larcker, 1998b). 
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2.5.4 The commitment to the measurement 
As with other management initiatives, in which success depends at least partly on the 
commitment from organisation members, for performance measurement to be effective, it 
should receive commitment throughout the organisation. 
Ghobadian and Ashworth (1994) suggested that everyone in the organisation should regard 
performance measurement as an ongoing and evolving process which requires the full 
support from both top management and other non-management employees (Hudson et al., 
2001). Dence (1996), in addition to highligIting the importance of ongoing commitment to 
performance measurement, added that organisational resources and management effort 
devoted to implementing the measurement regime should not be underestimated. 
Many of the commentators in support of the view that the commitment to measurement is a 
fundamental of effective performance measurement, have addressed the importance of the 
commitment from the senior management in particular (e. g. Parker, 2000; Sinclair and 
Zairi, 1995b; Theurer, 1998; and Waggoner et al., 1999). For example, Parker (2000) 
noted that it is essential that the top rmnagement of the organisation fully support the 
measurement regime because they have an obligation to conununicate the organisation's 
intentions and reasons for implementing such a system (Theurer, 1998). To achieve this, 
the management must communicate the purposes and nature of the measurement regime so 
efficiently that employees at lower levels are able to understand and be committed to the 
measures; they need to know what is expected of them, and why. 
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2.5.5 The capacity for providing feedback 
Strategy itself can be viewed as a set of hypotheses about cause-and-effect relationships 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996c), in which an organisation hypothesises that a set of activities 
in strategy will lead to the accomplishment of the organisation's strategic goals. Therefore, 
it is necessary for the organisation to ensure that the set of hypotheses about cause-and- 
effect relations . ps imp ed in the strategy is valid. 
Kaplan and Norton (1996c) noted that an organisation's strategy can be tested and 
validated by the use of performance measurement. The authors asserted that for 
performance measurement to be effective, it must be capable of providing 'double-loop' 
feedback (see, for example, Argyris, 1982). 
The authors also suggested that to understand the concept of a double-loop feedback 
system, it would be helpful to compare it with a single-loop feedback system, in which the 
ob . ective remains constant and any departure from the planned trajectory is seen as a J 
defect to be remedied. This single-loop process does not require re-examination of either 
the strategy or the techniques used to inplement it in light of current conditions. This 
implies that strategy and its derived objectives are always valid 
However, most organisations today operate in a turbulent environment with complex 
strategies that though valid when they were launched, may lose their validity as conditions 
change. In this kind of environment, organisations must become capable of double-loop 
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learning-the learning that produces a change in organisations' assumptions and theories 
about cause-and-effect relationships. 
In addition to informing of the deviation from the pre-established objectives of 
performance to be remedied (as in the single-loop feedback system), a double-loop 
feedback system can also suggest the validity of the existing strategy, which may need an 
adjustment in light of the change of external environment and internal capabilities. 
In light of this, the ability to give feedback that not only influences performance, but also 
challenges the validity of the organisation's strategy is also regarded as another 
fundamental to the effective performance measurement. As Johnston et al. (2002) 
suggested, performance measurement should focus on management actions by providing 
data facilitating of improvement and organisational learning, not on measurement per se. 
In addition to providing fast and accurate feedback information (Hudson et al., 2001), 
measurement must have an effect on performance. Parker (2000) suggested that 
performance data should be analysed to ensure that they are translated into action and 
behaviour which change the nature of activity and of performance. 
2.5.6 The support of both internal and external changes 
Keegan et al. (1989) noted that performance measurement must support the organisation's 
multidimensional environment, both internal and external. This is what Suwignjo et al. 
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(2000) regarded as the dynamics of the performance measurement system. The dynamic 
nature of the internal and external environment implies that performance measurement 
should be flexible and capable of change as the environment changes. 
Daniels and Bums (1997) highlighted a shift of attention in performance measurement 
systems, away from the prescriptive and highly formalised measuring systems to those that 
are more contingent on the situation of the organisation, including its history, internal 
politics, and management style. The authors asserted that the contingent approach of 
performance measurement provides the facility to identify internal and external forces at 
work and the resulting forms towards which the organisation will be pulled. 
It has long been accepted that performance measurement systems have a life-cycle, and 
that they are only valid as long as the environment remains unchanged, because any 
significant change in the organisational environment may invalidate the systems 
(Suwignjo, et al., 2000). It is, thus, important that a performance measurement system has 
the capacity to recognise these changes as soon as possible so that the system can be 
adapted to reflect better the new environmental situations. 
2.5.7 The alignment between performance measurement and strategy 
A number of commentators have suggested that performance measurement should be 
aligned with organisational strategy (see, for example, Atkinson and McCrindell, 1997; De 
Toni and Tonchia, 2001; Dixon et al, 1990; Goold and Quinn, 1990a, 1990b; Johnsen, 
46 
2001; Kaplan, 1990,2001; Kaplan and Norton, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d; Langfield- 
Smith, 1997; Lingle and Schiernann, 1996; Lockamy III and Smith, 1997; McAdam and 
Bailie, 2002; Mendibil et al., 2002; Neely, 1999; Neely et al., 1995; O'Mara et al., 1998; 
Parker, 2000; Schmenner and Vollmann, 1994; Skinner, 1969; Wheelwright, 1978; and 
Willis, 2001). That is to say, performance measurement should have linkages to 
organisational strategic objectives (e. g. Ghobadian and Ashworth, 1994; and Ittner and 
Larcker, 2003). 
Among a number of authors contending that performance measurement should align and 
support the implementation of these objectives, Lockamy III and Spencer (1998), for 
example, noted that one of the features of performance measurement systems used in 
world-class manufacturing environments is that they must be consistent with the 
manufacturing objectives. The measures used should reinforce the importance of certain 
strategic objectives (Skinner, 1969). The congruence of measures and objectives helps an 
organisation to link its operations to strategic goals (Hudson et al., 200 1). 
According to Ittner and Larcker (2003), a means by which performance measures and 
strategy may be linked is by choosing measures on the basis of causal models (also called 
value driver maps), which lay out the plausible cause-and-effect relationships that may 
exist between the chosen drivers of strategic success and outcomes. In addition, Kaplan 
and Norton (I 996d) suggested that performance measurement linked with strategy also 
influences employees' behaviours. 
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Considering the dynamics of the organisation's strategy, Parker (2000) suggested that 
performance measurement must be reviewed regularly to ensure its alignment with 
strategy; otherwise changes in priorities resulting from changes in strategy may render 
performance measurement irrelevant, or even counterproductive (Wholey and Hatry, 
1992). 
The existence of a substantial amount of literature regarding the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy suggests this issue to be key in perforrvance 
measurement, and yet it is underresearched. 
2.6 Notable Performance Measurement Frameworks 
Academics in the field of performance measurement have proposed many performance 
measurement frameworks/approaches, the most notable being: 
* The balanced scorecard approach (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) 
9 The results and determinants framework (Fitzgerald et aL, 1991) 
e The performance pyramid (Lynch and Cross, 1991; and McNair et al., 1990) 
9 The performance measurement questionnaire (Dixon et al., 1990) 
* Benchmarking (bence, 1996; Fowler and Campbell, 2001; and Kouzinin et al., 1999) 
* The EFQM (European Foundation for Quality Management) business excellence 
model (EFQM, 2001) 
* The Cambridge performance process (Neely et aL, 1996) 
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* SMART-Strategic Management Analysis and Reporting Technique (Lynch and 
Cross, 1991) 
e The performance prism (Kennerley and Neely, 2000; and Neely, 2001) 
* Data envelopment analysis (Norman and Stoker, 1991) 
e The service perfonnance network (Johnston and Clark, 2001) 
e The service profit chain (Heskett et al., 1997) 
e The performance measurement for world-class manufacturers (Maskell, 1992) 
Of all the above, the first three frameworks/approaches appear to have been more 
frequently referred to, and will, thus, be explored respectively. 
2.6.1 The balanced scorecard approach 
Since Kaplan and Norton (1992) introduced a performance measurement approach known 
as the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), many performance measurement commentators have 
paid much attention to the framework. As a result, there is a plethora of balanced scorecard 
literature authored by both academics and practitioners. 
The evolution in the balanced scorecard literature appears to comprise of at least three 
main stages, including (1) the embodiment of non-financial measures, (2) the involvement 
of strategic management, and (3) the application to not-for-profit organisations. Each of 
these stages will be reviewed in turn. 
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The embodiment of non-financial measures 
In its first stage, the balanced scorecard approach was originally introduced on the prernise 
that exclusive reliance on financial measures in a management system was inadequate 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992), its most important purpose being to include more non-financial 
measures to balance the exclusive reliance on financial measures. 
Non-financial measures-it was claimed-were not new phenomena. General Electric, for 
example, made use of non-financial measures in the 1950s (see, for example, Anthony et 
al., 1989; Johnston et al., 2002; and N6rreklit, 2000) by identifying areas of measurement, 
and applied all of them in the assessment of each division. 
N6rreklit (2000) outlined a number of theorists who pointed to the relevance of non- 
financial measures, including Eccles (1991), Hopwood (1976), Maciariello and Kirby 
(1994), Merchant (1985), and Parker (1979). Nevertheless, Kaplan and Norton's (1992) 
article has often been accredited as the introductory writing of the balanced scorecard 
approach. 
In Kaplan and Norton (1992), the authors portrayed a balanced scorecard as a set of 
measures providing top managers with a fast but comprehensive view of the business. The 
authors compared the importance to senior business managers of a balanced scorecard. with 
the importance to a pilot of a set of dials and gauges in an aeroplane cockpit The 
commonality is that both the dials and gauges and the balanced scorecard. provide 
multidimensional data at a glimpse. The former presents flight information to the pilot and 
the latter depicts the overall health of a business to its senior nunagers. 
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The authors maintained that managers should not have to choose between financial and 
operational measures because no single type of measure is capable of providing a clear 
performance target or focus attention on the critical areas of the business. Managers require 
a balanced presentation of both financial and operational measures. 
A balanced scorecard includes financial measures that communicate the results of actions 
already taken, and complements these measures with the operational measures pertaining 
-to customer satisfaction, internal processes, and the organisation's innovation and 
improvement activities. The authors indicated that these operational measures are the 
drivers of future financial performance. 
Kaplan and Norton (1992) explained that a balanced scorecard allows managers to view 
their business from four important perspectives and provides answers to four basic 
ques ions: 
1. Customer perspective: How do customers see us? 
2. Internal business perspective: What must we excel at? 
3. Innovation and learning perspective: Can we continue to improve and create value? 
4. Financial perspective: How do we look to shareholders? 
Even though, in this early stage, the balanced scorecard concept revealed that the measures 
should derive from the company' strategy, the involvement of the measurement approach 
with strategic management became more explicit in the second stage of the balanced 
scorecard literature. 
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The involvement of strategic management 
In the second stage of the balanced scorecard literature, the balanced scorecard approach 
was involved more explicitly with strategic management (Johnston and Fitzgerald, 2001; 
Kaplan and Norton, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d, 2001 a, and 2001b). The framework was 
claimed to go 'beyond measurement *to management'. As Kaplan and Norton (2001a) 
stated: 
Originally, the Balanced Scorecard was thought as performance 
measurement Later the concept evolved from a performance 
measurement system to become the organisingftamework the operating 
system, for a new strategic management system 
Kaplan and Norton (1 996a, and 1996d) also stated that the balanced scorecard prompted 
four strategic management processes: 
1) Translating the vision For people to act on the words in vision and strategy statements, 
those statements must be expressed as an integrated set of objectives and measures, agreed 
upon by all senior executives, that describe the long-term drivers of success. The exercise 
of developing operational measures compels executives to clarify the meaning of the 
strategy statement. The balanced scorecard, forces senior managers to arrive at a consensus 
and then to translate their vision into terrm that had meaning to the people who would 
realise the viSiorL 
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2) Communicating and linking. The balanced scorecard. allows managers to communicate 
their strategy up and down the organisation, and to link it to departmental and individual 
objectives. The scorecard provides managers with a way of ensuring that all levels of the 
organisation understand the long-term strategy and that both departmental and individual 
objectives are aligned with it 
3) Business planning. Once the strategy is defined and the drivers are identified, the 
scorecard influences managers to concentrate on improving or reengineering those 
processes most critical to the organisation's strategic success. That is how the scorecard 
most clearly links and aligns action with strategy. 
4) Feedback and learning. The balanced scorecard also highlights gaps in employees' 
skills and in information systems. The first three management processes-translating the 
vision, communicating and linking, and business planning-are vital for implementing 
strategy, but they are not adequate in an unpredictable world. Together with the feedback 
and learning processes brought about by the balanced scorecard, an organisation's strategy 
can be tested and validated. Therefore, the balanced scorecard may be regarded as capable 
of Providing double-loop feedback, already mentioned in section 2.5.5. 
Kaplan and Norton (I 996a) maintained that the balanced scorecard. is different from 
traditional performance measurement systems in which the main purposes are to control 
behaviour and to evaluate past perforniance. Managers can use the scorecard as a 
communication, information and learning system, not merely as a traditional control 
system. For the balanced scorecard to be used in this way, however, the measures must 
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provide a clear representation of the organisation's long-term strategy for competitive 
success. 
Figure 2b illustrates the four perspectives of a balanced scorecard as a strategic 
management tool. 
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Figure 2b: Four Perspectives of a Balanced Scorecard 
(Source: Adapted from Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 54) 
The application of a Balanced Scorecard to not-for-prorit organisations 
More recently in its third stage, an attempt was made to apply the balanced scorecard 
concept to non-profit organisations (Kaplan, 2001). The authors claimed that even though 
the initial focus and application of the balanced scorecard was in the for-profit sector, the 
I 
opportunity for it to improve the management of nonprofits should be even greater. 
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The framework's features were said to be adaptable to suit the characteristics of the 
non-profit organisations. The adaptable features included the change in priority of the 
measurement perspectives and the expansion of definition for customers. 
For the change in priority of measurement perspective, most non-profit organisations were 
claimed to have difficulty with the original architecture of the balanced scorecard 
approach, which places the financial perspective at the top of the hierarchy. Kaplan (2001) 
suggested that it is appropriate for non-profits to rearrange the perspectives by placing the 
customer. perspective or even an overarching mission objective at the top of their 
scorecard. For a non-profit, however, the agency's mission represents the accountability 
between it and society-the rationale for its existence. The mission should therefore, be 
featured and measured at the highest level of its scorecard. 
Another suggested modification is that non-profit organisations need to expand the 
definition of who their customers are. In a private sector transaction, customers both pay 
for the service and receive the service. The two roles are so complementary that many 
people are not aware that the two are separable. 
In contrast in a non-profit organisation, donors or sponsors provide the financial 
resources-they pay for the service, whereas another group receives the service. Therefore, 
it is difficult to indicate decisively whether the one paying or the one receiving the service 
is the customer. Rather than making such a decision, non-profit organisations can place the 
donor/sponsor perspective and the recipient perspective in parallet at the top of their 
i balanced scorecard. 
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To surnmarise, the balanced scorecard framework appears to have received much attention 
both from academics and practitioners alike, and to be one of the most popular 
performance measurement frameworks to date. The balanced scorecard publication has 
accounted for not a small portion in the body of performance measurement/management 
literature (see, for example, Amaratunga et al., 2001; Butler et al., 1997; Gautreau and 
Kleiner, 2001; Hagigi, 1999; Hudson et al., 2001; Johnsen, 2001; Kaplan and Norton, 
1992,1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d, 2001a, 2001b; Kloot and Martin, 2000; Lawrie and 
Cobbold, 2004; Letza, 1996; Light, 1998; Lingle and Schiernann, 1996; Littlewood, 1999; 
Maisel, 1992; McAdam and Bailie, 2002; McAdam and O'Neil, 1999; and N6rreklit, 
2000). Some of these publications will be reviewed next 
Hudson et al. (2002) noted that the popularity of the balanced scorecard has acted as a 
catalyst for further research into the characteristics ot and approaches for developing, 
strategic performance measurement systems. Sinclair and Zairi (1995a) also considered the 
balanced scorecard. to have been developed for the purpose of strategic perforn-ance 
reporting. 
Johnsen (2001) stated that the balanced scorecard, measurement system comprises an 
acclaimed balance between financial versus non-financial, internal versus external 
stakeholders, and short-run versus long-run performance drivers. According to 
Amaratunga et al. (2001), through this type of system, the organisation monitors both its 
current performance and its efforts to improve processes, motivate and educate employees, 
and enhance information systems-that is, its ability to learn and improve. 
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N6rreklit (2000) maintained that the balanced scorecard is a tool which systenutically 
expands the measurement areas traditionally involved in accountin& It, thus, aims to 
contribute to reducing the problems involved in using only financial measures for the 
purposes of control. It inserts non-financial measurements in a strategic control framework, 
so that they are not merely loosely coupled local systems, but linked together in a causal 
chain, which passes through the entire organisation. For this author, the balanced scorecard 
is not just intended as a measurement system, but also as a control system. 
Many performance measurement commentators have highlighted the strengths of the 
balanced scorecard approach. For example, Johnsen (2001) noted that the balanced view of 
management control and strategy implementation, with emphasis on decision relevance, is 
the main innovation of the approach. N6rTeklit (2000) noted that, central to the balanced 
scorecard is the cause-and-effect chain, which distinguishes the model from other 
performance measurement approaches. Ghalayini and Noble (1996) also highlighted two 
main strengths of the balanced scorecard approach; that it sununarises in one management 
report many seemingly disparate elements of a company's competitive agenda, and it 
prevents sub-optimisation by forcing senior managers to consider all operational measures 
at the same time. 
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There is evidence to suggest that a number of business organisations have implemented the 
balanced scorecard. system which supplements traditional accounting n-rasures with non- 
financial measures focused on at least three other perspectives-customers, internal 
business processes, and learning and growth (Ittner and Larcker, 1998b). An example of 
the evidence of balanced scorecard usage comes from the Hackett Benchmarking 
57 
Solutions, a US management consultancy, which surveyed 1,400 global businesses. The 
study indicated that almost fifty per cent of the companies applied some kinds of the 
balanced scorecard. approach (Littlewood, 1999). 
In spite of its popularity, strengths and widespread adoption within rnany organisations, the 
balanced scorecard approach also has downsides. Shortfalls of the approach have been 
highlighted by several commentators (see, for example, De Hass and Kleingeld, 1999; 
Gautreau and Kleiner, 2001; Johnston and Fitzgerald, 2001; McKenzie and Shilling, 1998; 
Morgan, 1998; N6ffeklit, 2000; and Sinclair and Zairi, 1995a). Criticisms of both 
theoretical and practical aspects of the balanced scorecard approach have been made. 
Perhaps the most severe criticism of this approach is the concem over the validity of the 
assumptions underpinning the approach. De Hass and Kleingeld (1999) questioned the 
approach's assumption of an a priori strategy. These authors viewed that the framework 
takes the processes of strategy formulation and control system designs as sequential and 
linear, while overlooking the parallel and iterative nature of the processes. 
Moreover, N6ffeklit (2000) maintained that since the framework is a high-profile model 
which has attracted much attention from both practitioners and academics, it is important 
to be assured of the model's validity. The author queried the validity of particular 
assumptions in a feedforward control system, which, if invalid, will cause anticipation of 
performance indicators that are faulty, resulting in dysfunctional organisational behaviour 
and sub-optimal performance. The author also noted as problematic the description of the 
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cause-and-effect relationships among measures from the four perspectives in a balanced 
scorecard. 
While some authors (e. g. Ghalayini and Noble, 1996) regarded as a strength of the 
balanced scorecard the attempts to integrate four important performance perspectives in 
one simple and easy-to-use management report, others critiqued it for its over-simplicity 
(e. g. Sinclair and Zairi, 1995a). 
Another frequently raised theoretical concern over this approach is its ornission of some 
measurement perspectives. For example, Neely et aL (1995) noted that the balanced 
scorecard has a serious weakness because it does not inform managers about the activities 
of business competitors. In these authors' view, the competitor perspective is missing from 
the balanced scorecard's measurement perspectives. 
In addition to the balanced scorecard's theoretical shortfalls, commentators pointed to 
some practical shortfalls of the approach. Johnston and Fitzgerald (2001) noted that the 
current fashion for balanced, integrated performance measurement systems has led 
managers to focus on improving the accuracy of the measures used rather. than managing 
the business. The authors also noted that the balanced scorecard approach-to some degree 
-confuses managers about the implementation of the measurement system. Moreover, the 
approach is likely to lead to a prolifendion of performance measures (Gautreau and 
Kleiner, 2001). 
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Although determining performance measures in a scorecard is often more difficult than 
expected (McKenzie and Shilling, 1998), managers also need to focus on the cause-and- 
effect relationships in strategy in order to link measurement with strategy. However, the 
scorecard does not provide guidance as to how to improve performance to achieve the 
desired strategic results (Morgan, 1998). More importantly', the scorecard provides little 
guidance as to how performance measurement can be used in support of strategy, 
especially when strategic changes occur. 
Sinclair and Zairi (1995a) argued that the scorecard itself does not provide a complete 
performance measurement system, but rather a tool for senior managers to monitor 
performance against strategic and operational objectives. Moreover, Ghalayini and Noble 
(1996) also commented that the main weakness of this approach is that it is primarily 
designed for senior managers to provide them with an overall view of performance. Thus, 
it is neither intended for, nor applicable at, the operational level. 
The implementation of a balanced scorecard is also difficult. A typical scorecard may take 
several months to implement. An additional number of months may be needed to fine-tune 
the structure. Total development time is often one year or longer (McKenzie and Shilling, 
1998). Even when the scorecard is already in place, it must be constantly updated. This 
also has a negative impact because it requires considerable time and resources to keep the 
scorecard updated and effective. 
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However, Lawrie and Cobbold (2004) noted that despite empirical evidence of weaknesses 
of the balanced scorecard led to the improvement of the approach throughout its evolution, 
there are still opportunities for further improvement. 
2.6.2 The results and determinants framevmrk 
Fitzgerald et al. (1991) proposed a performance measurement framework, particularly for 
service businesses, known as the results and determinants framework. 
There are two focused areas of measurement within this framework, namely, the 'results' 
and the 'determinants'. The former is the resultant success of the chosen strategy, and the 
latter are the determinants of competitive success (Stainer and Stainer, 1998). This 
framework is similar to the balanced scorecard in that it complements financial measures 
with other non-financial measures. 
The results and determinants framework comprises of six different categories of measures. 
While the 'results' area of measurement comprises of two categories of measures (i. e. 
competitiveness and financial performance), the 'determinants' measurement comprises of 
four categories (i. e. flexibility, resource utilisation, innovation, and quality of service). 
Each category contains various measures. Fitzgerald et aL (1991) argued that the relevance 
and exact nature of the chosen measures are dependent on contingency factors. 
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Figure 2c below diagrammatically summarises the results and determinants framework. 
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Figure 2c: The Results and Determinants Framework 
(Source: Ghobadian and Ashworth, 1994: 38) 
Fitzgerald et al. 's (1991) idea of differentiating the measures of performance results from 
the measures of performance determinants is similar to the concepts proposed by others, 
for example, Kaplan and Norton's (1996b, 1996c, 1996d) 'outcome' versus 'driver' 
measures and McAdam and O'Neill's (1999) 'lagging' versus 'leading' measures. This 
idea is also in accordance with Sinclair and Zairi's (1995b) comment that to be able to 
make changes in the hope of an improving performance, there should be an understanding 
of the drivers of the performance. The drivers of performance refer to the activities, which, 
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if changed, will, in turn, have an expected effect on performance. This concept tends to be 
based on the assumption of cause-and-effect relationships of an activity and its result 
Even though the results and determinants framework appears to be less popular than the 
balanced scorecard approach, there is evidence of the application of the framework. 
Brignall and Ballantine (1996), for instance, offered an example of the successful 
implementation of this framework in not-for-profit local government services. 
2.6.3 The performance pyramid 
Lynch and Cross (1991) described a pyramid of measures, also known as the Strategic 
Management Analysis and Reporting Technique-SMART system, which integrates 
performance through the hierarchy of the organisation. 
Principally, the performance pyramid of the SMART system has the external focus through 
the use of market measures, and the internal focus through the financial measures (White, 
1996). It has been recommended that, in department and business operating system levels, 
more concrete measures should be used. 
The SMART system is presented in the following figure 2d, depicting a four-level pyramid 
of objectives and measures following the organisational vision 
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Business units 
Objectives Market I Financial Measures I 
measures measures 
Business 
Customer Flexibility 'Productivi operating 
satisfaction units 
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ar d work Quality Delivery Process time I Cost C centres 
Operations 
Figure 2d: The Performance Pyramid 
(Source: Adapted from Ghalayini and Noble (1996: 74) 
Cross and Lynch (1989) and Lynch and Cross (1991) noted that it is important for a 
performance measurement system to be dynamic, so that performance measures remain 
relevant and continue to reflect the issues of importance to the business. Therefore, the 
implementation of an appropriate performance measurement system will ensure that 
actions are aligned to strategies and objectives. 
Other authors commented that the SMART system has both strengths and weaknesses. For 
example, Ghalayini and Noble (1996) commented that the main strength of the system is 
its attempt to integrate corporate objectives with operational performance indicators. 
However, one weakness is that it does not provide any mechanism for identifying key 
performance indicators. Additionally, White (1996) argued that the SMART system is a 
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perplexing framework because it requires different measures to be used at different levels 
of the organisational hierarchy. 
2.7 Summary 
Performance measurement has been recognised as an important management tool, having 
roots in the manufacturing sector, where its main use was for controlling purposes. 
However, performance measurement is important and gaining more attention from other 
sectors (i. e. non-manufacturing and public sector). Moreover, performance measurement 
has also been used for wider purposes than that of control. 
Performance measures are more often classified into financial and non-financial measures. 
Traditionally, there appeared to be an overemphasis on financial measures. However, 
owing to the various drawbacks that night be created by these measures, as well as to 
changing organisational competitive environment, non-financial measures have been used 
more. 
Drawbacks related to the unbalanced use of measures have also drawn the attention of 
scholars to other aspects of balance in the performance measurement system, especially the 
balance between measuring performance outcomes and performance drivers. 
There emerged the notions that performance measurement should have a position in the 
strategic management context and that a strategic performance measurement system is 
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capable of supporting organisational long-term focus and objectives. As a result, a number 
of strategic performance measurement frameworks have been put forward, perhaps the 
most famous being the Balanced Scorecard. 
To date, there seem to be five gaps in the performance measurement literature: 
* There is a lack of consensus in operationali sing the key terms in performance 
measurement/management study. 
* Performance measurement frameworks are predominantly for-profit sector oriented, 
or at least developed from that sector. Until recently, there has been a gap in the 
literature on the application of performance measurement frameworks in not-for- 
profit/public sector. 
* The proposed performance measurement frameworks integrating financial and non- 
financial measures appear to be problematic. 
* The meaning of the 'balance' of measures is unclear. 
* Despite the notion that performance measurement should be positioned in a strategic 
management context, there is a limited understanding of the link between 
performance measurement and strategy. 
This final gap is selected to be the focus of this research. It is therefore, important to 
explore the link between performance measurement and strategy in greater detail. While 
this chapter reviews this link from the performance measurement perspective, it is 
appropriate to explore the link from the strategic management perspective in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Strategic Management 
3.1 Introduction 
The review of performance measurement literature in the previous chapter suggested 
several' gaps in the body of literature. The particular gap chosen as the focus of this 
research is the limited understanding of the link between performance measurement and 
strategy. The objectives of this chapter are (1) to review strategic management literature, 
and (2) to review the performance measurement-strategy link from a strategic management 
perspective. 
This chapter does not set out to review all strategic management literature; nor is this 
possible, considering the enormous content to be covered and the limited length of the 
present thesis. Moreover, such a comprehensive review is not necessary in view of the fact 
that this research has a clearly specified focus on the link between perfonmnce 
measurement and strategy. 
This chapter will review six important issues in strategic management literature, including: 
9 Range of definitions of strategy 
* Dimensions of strategy and strategy typology 
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* Strategic management in a dynamic environment 
o Concepts of deliberate and emergent strategy 
* Integration of strategies 
9 Linkages between performance measurement and strategy 
3.2 Range of Derinitions of Strategy 
There appears to be a lack of consensus with regard to the definition of strategy (see, for 
example, Bracker, 1980; and McGee, 2003), for different authors defined the tenn 
differently. Table 3a exhibits an updated chronology of definitions of strategy based partly 
on the work of Bracker (1980). The bold key terms identify common threads in these 
definitions. 
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Authors Definitions of Strategy 
Von Neumann and A series of actions by a firm that arc decided on according to the particular situation. 
Morgenstern (1947)* 
Drucker (1954) An analysis of the present situation, changing it if necessary. Incorporated in this is finding 
out what one's resources are or what they should be. 
Chandler (1962) The determinant of the basic long-term goals of an enterprise, the adoption of courses or 
action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals. 
Ansoff (1965) A rule for making decisions determined by product/market scope, growth vector, competitive 
advantage and synergy. 
Cannon(1968)* The directional action decisions required competitively to achieve the company's purpose. 
Learned et al. (1969) The pattern of objectives, purposes, or goals and major policies and plans for achieving these 
goals, stated in such a way as to define what business the company is in or is to be in and the 
kind of company it is or is to be. 
Newman and Logan (197 1) The forward-looking plans that anticipate change and initiate action to take advantage of 
opportunities that are integrated into the concepts of mission of the company. 
Schendel and Hatten (1972) The basic goals and objectives of the organisation, the major programmes of action chosen 
to reach these goals and objectives, and the major pattern of resource allocation used to 
relate the organisation to its environment. 
Mintzbcrg (1973) A pattern of decisions about the organisation's future. 
Uyterhoeven et al. (1973) * A provision of both direction and cohesion to the enterprise, composed of several steps: 
strategic profile, strategic forecast, resource audit, strategic alternatives explored, tests of 
consistency and, finally strategic choice. 
Ackoff (1974) A concern with long-range objectives and ways of pursuing them that affect a whole system 
Paine and Naurnes (1975) * Specific major actions or patterns of actions for the attainment of the firm's objectives. 
McCarthy et al. (1975) An analysis of the environment and selection of economic alternatives that will match the 
corporate resources and objectives at a risk commensurate with the profit and viability which 
the alternatives offer 
Glueck (1976) A unified, comprehensive, integrated plan designed to ensure the achievement of objectives. 
McNichols (1977) An element in policy formulation, comprising a series of decisions reflecting the determination 
of basic business objectives and the utilisation of skills and resources to attain these goals. 
Steiner and Miner (1977) The forging of company missions, setting objectives for the organisation in light of external 
and internal forces, formulating specific policies and strategies to achieve objectives, and 
ensuring their proper implementation so that the basic purposes and objectives of the 
organisation will be achieved. 
Mintzbcrg (1979) A mediating force between the organisation and its environment: consistent patterns in 
streams of organisational decisions to deal with the environment. 
Schendel and Hofer (1979) The provision of directional cues to the organisation that permit it to achieve its objectives 
while responding to the opportunities and threats in its environment. 
Jauch and Osborn (198 1) The combination of environmental, contextual, and structural elements affecting an 
organisation at any one time. 
Porter (199 1) The creation of a unique and valuable position. 
Wilkinson and Monkhouse The operating rationale of the organisation. 
(1994) 
Bryson (1995) A pattern of purposes, policies, programmes, actions, decisions, and/or resource allocations 
that defines what an organisation is, what it does, and why it does it. 
*Referenced in Bracker (1980) 
Table 3a: A Chronology of Derinitions of Strategy 
(Source: Expanded from Bracker, 1980: 221-2) 
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From the above table, it can be seen that in spite of the range of definitions of strategy, 
they appear to have in common a number of characteristics. The bold key terms represent 
these common characteristics, which include the regarding of strategy as relevant to 
directions, patterns, actions, resources, long-term objectives, and situations. 
Mintzberg et al. (1998) noted that the lack of consensus with regard to defining strategy 
generates inconsistency in the interpretation and the application of strategy. The authors 
noted that a more comprehensive definition of strategy is needed and argued that strategy 
is not only a plan, but requires at least all five aspects of definition inclusively. Thus, they 
proposed that strategy is: 
!pA 'plan' of action into the future 
*A 'pattern' that is consistent in ternis of behaviour over time 
*A 'Position' an organisation wishes to attain within its environment 
*A 'perspective' of an organisation's way of doing things 
9A 'ploy' intended to outwit an opponent or competitor 
Likewise, Neely et al. (1994) and Simons (2000) recognised strategy as more than a plan. 
In comparison to plans, strategy is recognised as much more complex because it evolves as 
decisions are made and courses of actions are pursued (Neely et al., 1994). A strategy, as 
well as being a plan, also represents an organisation's perspective, position, and patterns in 
action. 
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The problem of defining strategy is probably fundamental to the three main areas of 
disagreement with regard to the concept of strategy. Hofer and Schendel (1978) noted that 
the major disagreements in three primary areas of strategy study include the breadth of the 
concept of strategy, the components of strategy, and the inclusiveness of the strategy- 
fonnulating process. 
Bracker (1980) noted that since the arguments regarding the definition of strategy have 
long existed and are likely to continueý researchers may need to move from a concern 
about definitions of the concept to a consolidation of terminology. This would facilitate the 
empirical testing of hypotheses as part of an attempt to validate or reject traditional 
constructs and to develop useful applications to organisational studies. 
However, despite the continuing arguments over the definition of strategy, there exists a 
need for consistent use of the term throughout this research. Therefore-in light of the 
review of the existing definitions-in this research strategy means: 
A set of directions guiding consistent patterns qf an organisation fS 
actions and resource allocation to attain its longterm objectives 
according to the particular situatiom 
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3.3 Dimensions of Strategy and Strategy Typology 
In this section, two dimensions of strategy (i. e. process and content) and three types of 
strategy (i. e. corporate, business, and functional strategy) will be reviewed. 
3.3.1 Dimensions of strategy 
Strategy is typically conceptualised in two ways, i. e. strategy process and strategy content, 
each of which will be explained in turn. 
Strategy process 
Strategy process is the process by wlich strategies are developed, the 'how' of strategy, in 
the sense of how strategy is formulated, implemented and controlled (Hannagan, 2002). 
This may include considering the 'position' of the organisation in its environment, and the 
ways it uses its resources. Grant (1995) suggested that an organisation could also use the 
strategy process as a communications mechanism to establish coordination within the 
organisation. 
Strategy content 
Strategy content is the product of a stratcgy process. It is concerned with the 'what' of 
strategy-what is or will be the strategy for the organisation and its various sections and 
parts? In business organisation, this content is often considered at corporate, business, and 
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functional levels. These three types of strategy will be reviewed in the following section 
3.3.2. 
In addition to strategy process and content Hannagan (2002) noted that each problem that 
arises in strategic management also has context The author maintained that strategy 
context is the set of circumstances under which both the strategy process and content are 
determined-the 'where' of strategy in a particular company and a specific environment. 
At least for this author, strategy is three-dimensional in the sense that it has characteristics 
of process, content and context- the 'how', 'what', and 'where' of strategy. 
3.3.2 Strategy typology 
Authors in the strategic management field have offered a range of different typologies for 
strategy (see, for example, Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984; Miles and Snow, 1984; and 
Porter, 1985). However, it appears to be commonly acknowledged that strategies can be 
realised through consistency of decisioný-making and actions (Mintzberg, 1978; and Neely 
et al., 1994). In order to facilitate the consistency of an organisation's decision-making and 
actions, strategies may exist at different organisational levels as well as in many 
managerial activities (Johnson, 1987). 
Literature on business strategic management typically has distinguished between corporate, 
business, and functional strategy (see, for example, Bowman and Helfat, 2001; Grant, 
1995; and Simons, 2000). These three types of strategy will, thus, be reviewed in turn. 
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Corporate strategy 
Corporate strategy is the pattern of objectives, purposes or goals and essential policies or 
plans for achieving these goals, stated in such a way as to define what business the 
company is in or is to be in, and the kind of company it is or is to be (Hannagan, 2002). 
Corporate strategy deals with the ways in which a corporation manages a group of 
businesses (Grant, 1995). 
In addition, Langfield-Smith (1997) and Simons (2000) noted that corporate strategy 
defines the way that a firm attempts to maximise the value of the resources it controls 
within the business domain it operates. Corporate strategy decisions focus on where 
corporate resources will be invested. Questions such as, 'what businesses should we 
compete in? ' or 'what level of resources should we invest across our portfolio of 
businesses? ' are typical of corporate-level resources allocation decisions. 
Business strategy 
In comparison to corporate strategy, business strategy is narrower in scope. Simons (2000) 
noted that a business strategy deals with the ways in which a single-business firm or an 
individual business unit of a corporate firm competes within a particular industry or market 
by indicating how to create value for customers and differentiate itself from competitors in 
the marketplace. 
Brignall (1993) noted that large and diversified corporate firms operating in uncertain, 
dynamic and competitive environments usually adopt the concept of strategic býisiness unit 
(SBIJ), in order to decentralise decision-making responsibilities. That is because local 
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managers at the business unit levels tend to know their local market better than central 
managers. 
Additionally, Langfield-Sniith (1997) noted that business strategy, also known as 
competitive strategy, relates to each business unit of the organisation. It focuses on how 
individual units compete within their particular industries, and the way that each unit 
positions itself in relation to competitors. 
Functional strategy 
An individual business unit may employ various types of functional strategies, in order to 
facilitate its rmin business strategy. That is to say, business strategy is an integration of 
functional level strategies for a distinct set ofproducts and services that are intended for a 
specific market (Hannagan, 2002). Examples of the functional strategies a business rmy 
use include operations, manufacturing, service, finance, and marketing strategy. 
Figure 3a illustrates the above three types of strategy at different organisational levels and 
in various functional activities. 
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Figure 3a: Different Types of Strategy within a Business Firm 
(Source: Adapted from Simons, 2000: 16) 
It is important that a firm's strategies are integrated and aligned with each other. That is, at 
the corporate level, strategy requires the integration and alignment of the various business 
level strategies and of all other ffinctional strategies being used to facilitate those business 
strategies as well. The integrations of strategies will be explored in detail later in section 
3.6. 
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3.4 Strategic Management in a Dynamic Environment 
Since World War II, the need for the concept of organisational strategy and strategic 
management appears to have increased because organisations have moved from a 
relatively stable environment into one that is more rapidly changing and competitive 
(Bracker, 1980). 
Ansoff (1969) attributed changes in organisational enviromnent to two significant factors: 
(1) marked acceleration in the rate of change within organisations, and (2) accelerated 
application' of science and technology to the process of management. The author 
demonstrated that the accelerated rate of change placed, a premium on the management's 
ability to anticipate change, to take advantage of new opportunities, and to take timely 
action in avoiding threats to the organisation. In addition, new technologies spurred interest 
in, and acceptance of, analytic and explicit approaches to decision-making that enhanced 
management's ability to deal with the increasingly uncertain future. 
However, the extent of the dynamics which organisations have encountered may differ 
considerably. Ansoff (1984) noted that at one extreme, some organisations continue to 
enjoy a relatively placid existence, while others experience a very high degree of 
turbulence. The level of environmental turbulence has become a. driving force which may 
require strategic management and adjustment (Miles and Snow, 1984) and dictate strategic 
resPonses necessary for success (Ansoff and Sullivan, 1990). 
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Neely (1999) noted that strategic change is also affected by other factors, including the 
changing nature of work, increasing competition, specific improvement initiatives, and 
changing external demands. These factors altogether can result in organisations becorring , 
less capable of predicting future changes. 
In the business context an example of the environmental change is that private firms are 
now competing in markets where value rather than cost is the primary driver (see, for 
example, Neely, 1999). Therefore, the required strategies will have changed accordingly in 
order for the finns to deal with the changing enviromnents. Strategic changes, in turn, are 
likely to require changes in organisational structure as well as processes and activities. 
Therefore, the organisations, that are more capable of making a strategic response in a 
timely and proper manner will be more likely to gain competitive advantage over their 
rivals. 
'i In summary, the maj . or importance of strategic management in a dynamic environment is 
that it provides organisations with a framework for developing the capacity to anticipate 
I 
and cope with change. In a dynamic environment, organisations become likely to depend 
more on the emergent strategies and less on the deliberate ones. The concepts of deliberate 
and emergent strategy will be reviewed next 
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3.5 Concepts of Deliberate and Emergent Strategy 
A widely accepted approach in the study of strategy formation process is the differentiation 
between leadership plans and intentions, and what the organisations actually did. The 
former is known as 'Intended stratee, and the latter 'realised stratee. In order to 
understand the differences between intended and realised strategies, it is important to 
explore the concepts of deliberate and emergent strategy. 
3.5.1 Deliberate strategies 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) noted that for a strategy to be perfectly deliberate, the 
following three conditions at least mast be met. Firstly, there must be precisely articulated 
intentions in the organisation to elininate any doubts about what is desired before any 
actions are taken. Secondly, individuals within the organisation must share a common 
understanding about the articulated organisational intentions. Thirdly, the intentions must 
be realised exactly as intended without interfering external forces (e. g. market, 
technological, political). 
These criteria are collectively used rminly to differentiate between perfectly deliberate 
strategies and those that are perfectly emergent. Therefore, in reality, it is unlikely to find 
any perfectly deliberate strategies in organisations. However, some strategies have more of 
the above characteristics than others and can, thus, be considered as being more deliberate 
in nature. 
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Additionally, Grant (1995) noted that the deliberate strategy is a result of rational, top- 
down strategy formulation based on implicit assumptions about the strategy-making 
process (e. g. strategy formulation is the preserve of top management). 
3.5.2 Emergent strategies 
For a strategy to be perfectly emergent, the actions must be consistent over time without. 
being intended. Again, since this criterion is mainly used to distinguish purely emergent 
strategies from other kinds, it is difficult to witness the existing perfectly emergent 
strategies in real-world organisation. s. However, some strategies may be regarded as more 
emergent than others if their characteristics fit better with this criterion 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) noted that it is more likely to expect tendencies towards 
either deliberate or emergent strategies rather than perfect forms of each. In effect, both 
form the poles of a continuum along which real-world strategies are expected to fall. 
Whereas the more deliberate strategies tend to emphasise central direction and hierarchy, 
the more emergent ones open the way for collective action and convergent behaviour. 
Figure 3b illustrates the relationshiPs arrong deliberate, emergent, intended and realised 
strategies. 
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Figure 3b: Deliberate, Emergent, Intended, and Realised Strategy 
(Source: Mintzberg, 1987a: 14) 
From the above figure, it can be seen that not all intended strategies are actually realised 
because the strategies realised can also be emergent without prior intention 
3.6 Integration of Strategies 
Grant (1995) suggested that not only can a strategy help to achieve consistency in 
decisions over time-in complex organisations-a strategy can also serve as a useful 
vehicle for achieving consistency of decision-making across different functions and 
individuals. Since there may exist many strategies within an organisýtional boundary, 
strategies should be nmaged to ensure that a certain degree of integration is ýnaintained- 
Strategic management therefore, can be considered as the central management process that 
integrates all major activities, and fun6tions and directs them towards advancing an 
organisation's strategic agenda (Poister and Streib, 1999). 
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Jenkins et al. (2002) commented that whilst it may be convenient to see strategy from a 
unitary perspective when studying organisational strategy, such a perspective cannot 
adequately explore such complex phenomena. Instead, a range of perspectives on strategy 
is preferred. The authors argued that organisational strategy is concemed with at least three 
perspectives, including (1) the organisational, (2) the environmental, and (3) the individual. 
Each of these strategic perspectives interacts and combines to create a dynamic set of ideas 
that form the basis of strategic management. In these. authors' view, each perspective 
highlights distinct important aspects of different organisational processes. 
The authors further noted that the strategic agenda requires researchers to move between 
these three basic perspectives constantly, and to understand the dynamics between them, as 
well as to explore each one in depth. This complexity arises from the need for questions 
that address different levels of analysis and different dynamics relating to organisations 
and their strategies. 
In addition, Poister and Streib (1999) appeared to concur with the notion that strategic 
management is relevant to organisations at various levels. Strategic management is 
integrative in nature in the sense that it focuses attention across functional divisions and 
throughout organisational levels on common goals; tying internal management processes 
and programme initiatives to desired outcomes in the external environment; and linking 
short-term decisions to long-term objectives. 
Skinner (1985) asserted the importance of the integration of strategies, noting that despite 
the existence of different functional strategies, each key functional area must have the 
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common objectives derived from an organisation's overall strategy. Such congruence can 
produce an organisational system that does the important but limited things well. The lack 
of strategic integration potentially renders execution of strategy problematic (Ballantine 
and Brignall, 1994). 
Even though strategic management seems obvious and straightforward, frequently, the 
interrelationship among strategies and actions, for example, is not easily grasped. The 
notion is simple enough-that strategies place particular demands on any organisational 
actions, and that the actions should, in turn, be specifically designed to fulfil the task 
demanded by strategy. More elusive is the set of cause-and-effect relationships that 
deterrnines the linkage between actions and strategies and among various organisational. 
strategies (Skinner, 1985). Kaplan and Norton (1996a) noted that these cause-and-effect 
relationships are essential, since the strategy itself is a set of hypotheses about cause-and- 
effect. 
Moreover, strategies do not exist in a vacuurn. Johnsen (2001) suggested that strategy is 
the match between an organisation's internal capabilities and external relationships, and 
that strategy implementation is the balancing of internal and external demands. Miles and 
Snow (1984) also observed the relationship between an organisation's strategy, structure, 
and management processes* and environmental factors outside the organisation's control. 
The authors asserted that successful organisations achieve strategy both by designing it to 
fit with the external enviroment and by supporting it with appropriately designed 
structures and management processes. 
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In sununary, not only are an organisation's strategies required to integrate internally with 
other processes and activities, but also externally with the organisation's environment. 
3.7 Linkages between Performance Measurement and 
Strategy 
To facilitate strategy implementation, it is essential f6r an organisation not only to have an 
integration of strategies, but also. coordination between strategies and other organisational 
activities (Lockamy III and Cox, 1995). An organisation can attain the coordination 
between strategies and activities leading to performance by measuring strategic 
performance-the process by which the organisation integrates its performance with 
strategies and objectives (Bititci et al., 1997). Since objectives become actionable only 
when their measurement is added (Simons, 2000), performan ce measurement can facilitate 
strategy implementation because it assists in the translation of strategy into rreasurable 
results (Lingle and Schiemann, 1996). 
Performance measurement has often been regarded as closely related to strategy because it 
assists in: 
Monitoring the implementation of strategy 
Coordinating activities which can result in organisational coherence 
Informing strategic direction 
Communicating priorities 
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* Reducing ambiguity and confusion, and perhaps more importantly 
e Aligning short-term actions with long-term strategy 
In addition, Simons (2000) noted that performance measurement is at the root of effective 
strategy implementation for two reasons. First, it provides the analytic discipline and 
communications channels necessary to formalise the organisation's strategies and to ensure 
that strategic objectives are conununicated throughout. Second, performance measurement 
is the primary vehicle for monitoring the implementation of the strategies because it helps 
evaluate the achievement of strategic objectives (Ittner and Larcker, 1998b), which can be 
made actionable only when measurement is attached to it. 
Kaplan (2001) also noted the effects of performance measurement on the implementation 
of strategy. The author explained that in general, strategy statements lead to diversity in the 
way in which individuals interpret them in their everyday work. Organisational objectives 
and strategies often mask real disagreement about what the organisation is attempting to 
accomplish. By quantifying and measuring the strategy, organisations reduce ambiguity 
and confusion about objectives and methods. By communicating expected performance 
and measures throughout the organisation, individuals are able to align their day-to-day 
actions while helping the organisation achieve its strategic objectives 
Since individuals appear to act responsively to what is measured, performance measures 
can be used to influence behaviour and, thus, affect the implementation of strategy 
(Skinner, 1971). The measures assigned to the individuals will corrununicate a different set 
of pri6rities and allow subordinates to infer the strategic direction that senior management 
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wish to follow. To bring strategies to life, management must use specific objectives and 
measures to communicate the organisational direction to subordinates (Simons, 2000). 
Therefore, performance measurement helps individuals to gain coherence and focus in 
pursuit of organisational objectives. This characteristic of performance measurement 
makes it an important element of a strategic control system (Neely et al., 1994). Otherwise, 
performance measures focus on local operational improvements rather than on whether the 
strategy is being achieved. For this reason, Kaplan (2001) and Simons (2000) asserted that 
the beginning of any performance measurement system has to be a clear strategy statement. 
Performance measurement facilitates strategic management (Neely et al., 1994) by 
assisting managers in tracking the implementation of business strategy through a 
comparison of actual results with strategic goals and objectives (Simons, 2000). In view of 
this, it is essential to keep the performance measurement system consistent with the 
changing strategy. By use of performance measurement, managers may be informed of the 
results of the changing organisational decision-making processes and actions resulting 
from the changes in strategy (Neely et al., 1994). 
This is especially important for the organisation whose environment is highly dynamic 
because for such organisations to achieve their strategic objectives, the strategy may be 
forced to change (Neely, 1999), which, in turn, requires the adaptation of performance 
measurement. Strategic management, together NNrith supporting performance measurement 
systems, enable organisations, even in a turbulent environment, to develop the capacity to 
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deal with uncertain future by defining appropriate procedures and actions for 
accomplishing goals (Bracker, 1980). 
In summary, it appears that an important link between performance measurement and 
strategy is the way in which performance measurement helps to uphold the alignment 
between actions and strategy, which requires an appropriate performance measurement 
system adaptation that accords with any change in the organisation's strategy. 
It is important to note that the reviews of both performance measurement literature in 
Chapter 2 and strategic management in this chapter suggest the iniportance of the 
alignment between performance measurement and strategy. It is therefore appropriate to 
review the literature on the alignment between performance measurement and strategy in 
the next chapter. 
3.8 Summary 
The review of strategic management literature suggested that debate surrounding the 
definition of strategy has long existed and is likely to continua However, among a range of 
definitions of strategy proposed by commentators, various common characteristics of 
strategy can be noted. 
Despite the absence of consensus with regard to the meaning of strategy, it is important to 
be consistent throughout this thesis when referring to the term. In view of this, the 
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characteristics of strategy common to a range of definitions already reviewed have been 
integrated to produce the following definition employed throughout this thesis. For the 
purposes of the present research, strategy means: 
A set of directions guiding consistent patterns of an organisation's 
actions and resource allocation to attain its longterm objectives 
according to the particular situatiom 
Strategy is typically conceptualised in two respects, i. e. strategy process and strategy 
-content. Strategy process is the process in which strategies develop, the 'how' of strategy. 
Strategy content is the product of a strategy process, the 'what' of strategy. 
In the business context strategy has often been classified into corporate strategy, business 
strategy, and functional strategy. Corporate strategy deals with the ways in which a 
corporation manages a set of businesses together. A business strategy deals with the ways 
I 
in which a single-business firm or an individual business unit of a corporate firm competes 
within a particular industry or market. An individual business unit may employ various 
types of functional strategies (e. g. operations, manufacturing, and marketing strategy), in 
order to facilitate its rmin business strategy. 
In today's dynamic environment, strategic management is important for organisations 
because it provides a framework for developing the capacities for anticipating and coping 
with change. Owing to the dynamic environment of organisations, strategies are subject to 
change. It is, thus, important to distinguish between strategic intentions and strategic 
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actions because not all intended strategies are actually realised and at the same time, not 
all strategies realised were intended. While a deliberate strategy is one that is intended and 
realised, an emergent strategy is one that is not intended but realised. 
The integration of strategy is also inportant both in terms of the integration of different 
strategies and in terms of the integration of strategies with other organisational processes, 
especially performance measurement. 
The review of strategic management literature has highlighted three gaps in the formal 
body of knowledge in the following respects: 
9 There is a lack of consensus with regard to the definition of strategy in practice. 
* Despite the notion of the integration of strategies, there is a considerable controversy 
about the practical nature of the integration. 
* The understanding of a link between performance measurement and strategy is still 
limited. 
In accord with the view from the performance measurement literature provided in Chapter 
2, the review of strategic management literature in this chapter appears to confirm that 
performance measurement has a position in the strategic management context, and that 
there is limited understanding of the link bet,, wen performance measurement and strategy. 
Even though performance measurement appears to link with strategy in several aspects, the 
alignment between performance measurement and strategy is central to this thesis. In light 
of this, it is appropriate to review the literature on this alignment in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Alignment between Performance Measurement 
and Strategy 
4.1 Introduction 
A 
Reviews of the literature on performance measurement and strategic management in the 
two previous chapters suggested that performance measurement has a link with strategy. 
Specifically, the literature suggested the importance of the alignment between performance 
measurement and strategy. It is therefore, appropriate to review the alignment literature in 
this chapter. 
The present chapter reviews the literature, pertaining to organisational alignrmnt in general, 
and to the alignment between performance measurement and strategy in particular. The 
objective is to identify some gaps in the body of knowledge. In so doing, this chapter 
explores the following four main issues relevant to the alignment: 
* The concept of organisational fit 
s The conceptualisation and the domain of fit 
e The alignment between performance measurement and strategy 
* Performance measurement frameworks supporting alignment 
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4.2 The Concept of Organisational Fit 
The concept of organisational, fit has its root perhaps in ecology. The population ecology 
theory states that living things, in order to survive in the enviromnent, have to adjust to fit 
into their surroundings. Those who are unable to do so will ultimately be eliminated from 
the enviromnent. This notion is partly proven by evidence that many species unable to 
adjust successfully to their ever-changing environments are now extinct. 
In the field of organisation studies, academics have adopted the above ecological notion, 
and have substituted creatures in -their living enviromnent for organisations within their 
organisational environment. Miles and Snow (1984) defined the concept of ! fIt' as it 
pertains to organisation studies as: 
A dynamic search that seeks to align the organisation with its 
environment and to arrange resources internally in support of that 
alignment. 
Miles and Snow (1984: 10) 
Similar to its application in ecology, the concept, when applied in organisation studies, 
focuses on the adaptation of organisations to survive in an envirorunent full of other 
competitors. The population ecology theory suggests that organisations are affected by 
other similar organisations (e. g. competitors), because they must all extract needed 
resources from the same organisational environment (Getz, 2002). 
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The concept of organisational fit can be viewed, for example, by the agency theory and the 
. contingency theory. 
On the one hand, from the agency theorists' point of view, a close 
alignment of agency incentives with the principal's preferences is important. This is true, 
esPecially when there is asymmetric information, in order to avoid dysfunctional effects 
and unsuccessful implementation (Johnsen, 2001). 
On the other hand, from the perspective of the contingency theorists-who explore the 
linkages between the environmental, organisational and managerial characteristics (White, 
1986)-successful performance is, to some degree, the result of a proper alignment. In this 
view, a successful organisation seeks the alig=ent of endogenous design variables (e. g. 
organisation structure or degree of planning formality) with exogenous context variables 
(e. g. environmental uncertainty or technological advance) (Powell, 1992). The key to the 
contingency theory is that the organisations in an open system have to cope, to a greater or 
lesser degree, with uncertainty. 
Contingency theory is a powerful concept centTing on the enviroment as the principal 
source of uncertainty. However, endogenous variables such as the particular strategy 
chosen can also exert an influence on an organisation's uncertainty, rendering it necessary, 
for them to cope with, uncertainty caused by both endogenous and exogenous variables. 
White (1986) commented that since there are strong linkages between strategy choice and 
environrnental characteristics, it is to be expected that uncertainty inherent in the 
organisation's strategy may be strongly correlated with environmental uncertainty. 
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Additionally, there still exist other concepts of organisational fit which propound different 
points of view. For example, according to Peters and Waterman (1983), the need to 
achieve a close fit means the alignment of the seven 'Ss' namely, strategy, structure, 
skills, systems, style, shared values and staff. Alternatively, Dixon et al. (1990) used the 
term 'alignment' in referring to organisational ! fit'. For these authors, aligmnent refers to 
the extent to which a company's strategy, actions, and measures line up with each other. 
To attain such alignment, these entities must be matched and mutually supportive. 
In addition, Lockamy III and Smith (1997) suggested that the organisation should consider 
alignment in three dimensions: strategy, process, and customer. Only when those three 
dimensions are aligned through good communication (described by the authors as the 
'performance measurement system linkages'), is organisational alignment achievable. In 
other words, the communicative functions of performance measurement can facilitate 
organisational aligmnent. 
Among the proponents of the concept of organisational fit Jemison (1981) and 
Venkatraman and Camillus (1984) suggested that ! fIt' be considered a central concept in 
strategic management because strategic management is, indeed, the process by which the 
senior management of organisations develops and utilises a strategy to co-lalign 
organisations' competencies with their environment. Venkatraman and Camillus (1984) 
regarded fit as fundamental to strategic management for four reasons: 
* The field of strategic management is rooted in the concept of 'matching' or 
galigning' organisational resources to environmental opportunities and threats. 
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Subsequent conceptualisations of strztegy have emphasised the requirement of 
matching various components related to strategy. 
4o The concept of fit is dominant in the parent disciplines, ý especially in organisation 
theory and industrial organisation econornics, in which the significance of fit is 
assumed while developing and testing theories of strategy. 
* Most contingency-theory based studies have generally explored the concept of fit in 
tenns of bi-variate relationships, but recent views argue for the achieving of 
(congruence' among a larger set of elements, as well as for the arriving at 'gestalts'. 
* Fit has been used as a normative concept for many consultants to highlight the 
importance of synchronising complex organisational elements for effective 
implementation of the chosen strategy. 
The authors also noted that the concept still lacks precise definition and support both 
theoretically and empirically. It is necessary to understand the concept of fit as it relates to 
strategy prior to its use as a norrnative concept. 
According to Miles and Snow (1984), the concept may, at first glance, appear to be 
obvious, but while fit is fundamental to organisational success, it is enormously difficult to 
achieve and/or maintain. The authors postulated that even though n-dsfit organisations are 
able to survive in a benign environment, they have little chance of thriving. Organisations 
require at least minimal fit for survival and tight fit to become excellent. 
i 
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However, practical fit is subject to the dynamics that influence an organisation's 
enviromnental conditions, periodically enforcing strategic change (De Hass and Kleingeld, 
1999). Therefore, in a turbulent enviromnent, it is difficult to keep organisational 
components tightly integrated. Although perfect equilibrium can never be attained 
(Thorelli, 1977), organisations strive towards equilibrium due to pressures for congruence 
(Etzioni, 1961; and Nightingale and Toulouse, 1977). Thus, perfect fit is most often a 
condition to strive for, rather than to accomplish (Miles and Snow, 1984). 
Despite the proponents of the concept of organisctional fit there appear to be some-if not 
many-who oppose the concept. For example, the alignment approach is claimed to 
overemphasise organisational structure and enviromnents while neglecting strategic 
positioning (see, for example, Powell, 1992). 
In the discussions regarding organisational fit, two dimensions of the alignment-the 
conceptualisation of fit and the dormin of fit-are often raised. For this reason, these 
dimensions will be reviewed together with thei theoretical and managerial concerns in the 
next section. 
4.3 The Conceptualisation and the Domain of Fit 
Venkatraman and Camillus (1984) noted that the concept of fit appears to be relevant in 
strategic management from a variety of perspectives. Tberefore, the development of a 
scheme to compare and contrast all the differing perspectives may be difficult. However, in 
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viewing the concept of organisational fit the authors proposed a conceptual scheme 
comprising of two dimensions-conceptualisation of fit and domain of fit: 
4.3.1 Conceptualisation of fit 
f 
A fundamental conceptual distinction underlying most strategy conceptualisation is either 
the focus on strategy content (what should be done) or on strategy-making process (how it 
is to be developed). By applying the same idea, 'fit' can then be similarly conceptualised in 
two different ways. 
* Content of rit-the elements to be fitted together to reach the desired configuration 
Process of aligning-the process of arriving at the desired configuration. 
Venkatraman and Camillus (1984) noted that content-of-fit oriented themes have 
dominated this dimension of the conceptual scheme and received the larger share of 
researchers' attention (see, for example, Jernison, 198 1). 
4.3.2 Domain of fit 
Venkatraman and Camillus (1984) highlighted that, typically, strategy researchers focused 
on formulation and/or implementation of strategy. The authors also noted that on one 
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hand, from a formulation perspective, the alignment concern is primarily between strategy 
and extemal variables, such as: 
9 Market opportunities 
o Market enviromnent 
* Customers 
* Product life cycle 
* Market growth rates and re. lative competitive positiorL 
On the other hand, however, an implementation focus requires that strategy be aligned with 
internal variables, such as: 
e Performance measurement systems 
o Structure 
o Management style 
* Management process 
o Organisational culture. 
Additionally, Venkatraman and Camillus (1984) suggested that the first dimension (i. e. 
conceptualisation of fit) of the proposed scheme raises interesting theoretical concerns, 
while the second dimension (i. e. domain of fit) can be used to address a number of relevant 
managerial concerns. Both types of concern will be explained next. 
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4.3.3 Theoretical concerns 
Theoretical concerns focus on how fit is to be measured, recognising that different 
approaches to measurement are needed for the 'content' and 'process' of fit. 
An issue related to measurement is whether fit is a 'static' or 'dynamic' phenomenon, 
especially when measuring it as process (pattern of interaction). Cross-sectional measures 
provide only a static perspective (Kimberly, 1976), which leads to conflicting results in 
some contingency-based studies (Mintzberg, 1979). However, they may represent the 
quickest way of establishing the relevant variables. Because the concept of fit is still in its 
infancy in strategic management research, the identification of critical variables to be fitted 
is essential in the next step of research in the field (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984). 
Although key elements of strategic fit have been normatively listed (see, for example, 
Peters and Waterman, 1983; and Waterman et al., 1980), their roles in different settings 
have to be descriptively validated. Later, a dynamic study may become essential to trace 
the direction of cause-and-effect which goes beyond the identification of interactions 
among elements (Thorelli, 1977). 
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4.3.4 Managerial concerns 
The domain of fit provides a preliminary idea of the scope of the elements to be aligned, in 
order to ensure organisation-environment fit. Venkatraman and Camillus (1984) noted that 
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two managerially relevant issues emerge: one is the extent to which various elements can 
be managerially controlled or influenced in the short-run versus the long-run. The second 
issue relates to the mode of strategic manoeuvring to approach equilibrium. 
Although perfect equilibrium will never be achieved (Thorelli, 1977), organisations strive 
towards it because of pressure for congruence (Etzioni, 1961; and Nightingale and 
Toulouse, 1977). A key issue here is whether organisations should manage such changes in 
a quantum (revolutionary) or incremental (evolutionary) fashion. 
4.4 The Alignment between Performance Measurement and 
Strategy 
The reviews of literature on performance measurement and on strategic management in 
Chapters 2 and 3 suggested that authors in both fields appeared to recognise the linkages 
between performance measurement and strategy. In particular, many of these authors have 
paid attention to the importance of the alignment between performance measurement and 
strategy (see, for example, Atkinson and McCrindell, 1997; Bourne et al., 2002; De Toni 
and Tonchia, 2001; Dixon et al., 1990; Goold and Quinn, 1990a; Johnsen, 2001; Kaplan, 
1990; Kaplan, 2001 a, 2001b; Kaplan and Norton, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d; Langfield- 
Smith, 1997; Lingle and Schiernann, 1996; Lockamy III and Smith, 1997; McAdam and 
Bailie, 2002; Mendibil et al., 2002; Neely, 1999; Neely et al., 1995; O'Mara et al., 1998; 
Parker, 2000; Schmenner and Vollmann, 1994; Skinner, 1969; Wheelwright, 1978; and 
Willis, 2001). 
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However, in spite of an increasing attention to the topic, there still exists a need for more 
formal research in the field. The knowledge on the alignment between performance 
measurement and strategy appears to be underdeveloped, especially in comparison to other 
performance measurement research areas, such as the design and implementation of 
performance measurement, and the multi-dimensional performance measurement systems. 
Since the alignment between performance measurement and strategy is central to this 
research, it is essential to review the existing literature, despite the underdeveloped body of 
knowledge on the issue. 
Reviews of the literature pertaining to the alignment between performance measurement 
and strategy suggested that the proponents (see, for example, De Toni and Tonchia, 2001; 
and Lockamy III and Spencer, 1998) of the notion agreed that performance measurement 
should be integrated and aligned with other organisational. processes, and especially with 
an organisation's strategy. The essence of the alignment between performance 
measurement and strategy lies in the tendency for an organisation's strategy to detemine 
the objectives to be achieved to fulfil the 'Organisation's strategic choice (Slack et al., 
1995). Therefore, the organisation's strategy uniquely defines the elements of its 
performance measurement, both in terms of what is measured, and how it is measured 
(Atkinson and McCrindell, 1997). McAdam and Bailie (2002) claimed that findings from 
their longitudinal study confirm a strategic link as imperative in the creation of measures 
and measurement systems. This is also consistent with the view reflected in De Toni and 
Tonchia (2001), Ittner and Larcker (2003), Kaplan and Norton (1996a, 1996b), and Neely 
et al. (1995). 
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It appears that all of the discussions on the alignment between performance measurement 
and strategy found in the existing literature have been biased towards the arguments for 
advantages of the strategy-aligned performance measurement. However, disadvantages as 
well as advantages of the aligmnent will be reviewed next 
4.4.1 Advantages of strategy-aligned performance measurement 
Authors who have extolled the virtues of the alig=ent between performance measurement 
and strategy have put forward the advantages of the strategy-aligned performance 
measurement. For example, Miles and Snow (1984) asserted that the alignment makes 
visible both goals and means and, in turn, makes obvious the task requirements. Resources 
previously required for co-ordination or troubleshooting can be deployed in the primary 
system, and even tighter organisational alignment may result. These authors also noted that 
organisational. misfits can be protected by a benign environment, but minimal alignment is 
required for an organisation's long-term survival in competitive environments. 
Langfield-Smith (1997) and Lockamy III and Smith (1997) agreed that alignment stands 
alongside industry and strategic positioning as a key source of competitive advantage that 
generates supernormal profits to the firrn(Powell, 1992). 
Neely (1999) and Neely et al. (1994) indicated one benefit of matching measiires and 
strategies, namely, that measures can encourage the implementation of strategy because the 
strategy-aligned measures not only provide information on whether the strategy is being 
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implemented, but also encourage behaviour consistent with the strategy. Since 
organisations are normally comprised of individuals in different sub-units, it is possible for 
each individual or sub-unit to overemphasise its own local objectives at the expense of the 
overall global objectives of the organisation. Linking performance measurement with the 
organisation's overall strategy is a means of minimising such sub-optimising effect. 
For this purpose, Kaplan (1990) and Parker (2000) suggested that conceptual thinking 
should be developed to aggregate all the sub-units' operating measures into appropriate 
measures of organisation-wide performance that encourage the implementation of strategy. 
Kaplan (2001) and Parker (2000) also noted that one of the useful aspects of performance 
measures aligned with strategy is that they provide a means by which individuals or sub- 
units within the organisation can know and assess their contribution to the organisational 
goals. 
Specifically, Kaplan and Norton (I 996d) provided four reasons for the importance of 
having a strategy-aligned performance measurement. First it describes the vision of the 
future for the entire organisation. Second, it can create shared understandings by giving a 
holistic view of strategic requirements that allows all individuals to see how they can 
contribute to organisational success. Third, it focuses change efforts because only when the 
right indicators of perforinance drivers are identified will actions lead to desired long-terin 
strategic objectives. Finally, the strategy-aligned performance measurement permits 
organised leaming by supplying essential strategic feedback. By making dxplicit the 
hypothesis about cause-and-effect relationships between performance drivers and actual 
results, organisations, can track the achievement of pre-determined strategic objectives. 
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Therefore, management can test, validate and modify the hypothesis embedded in the 
organisational. strategy as they learm The author highlighted that without explicit cause- 
and-effect linkages, no strategic learning can occur. 
Just as such a strategy can facilitate the organisation's external alignment with its 
environment (discussed mainly in section 3.4), so performance measurement can facilitate 
internal alignment. Strategy-aligned performance measurement ensures that objectives 
derived from the intended strategy are being carried out. Since organisations often appear 
to fail to turn strategy into effective actions due to inadequate and/or inappropriate 
measures (McAdam and Bailie, 2002), as well as lack of the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy (Bourne et al., 2000), strategy-aligned performance 
measurement can enhance an organisation's internal alignment because it provides insights 
into the success with which objectives are attained in the actions and procesq permitting 
operating actions and process to be improved. 
Although several advantages of the strategy-aligned performance measurement have been 
suggested, eclectically perhaps, it may be summarised that the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy: 
o Creates shared understanding. 
9 Renders both goals and means visible. 
9 Makes clear the links between perfommnce of individuals and sub-units, and sub- 
units and overall organisational. 
* Promotes integration among various organisational processes. 
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op Encourages behaviour consistent with strategy. 
* Limits overemphasis on local objectives, thus reducing sub-optimisation. 
* Focuses change efforts. 
9 Supplies management with essential strategic feedback system. 
* Permits organisational learning. 
With regard to the advantages that stratcgy-aligned performance measurement might yield, 
the - alignment between performance measurement and strategy has been claimed as a 
fundamental of effective performance measurement (see, for example, Kaplan, 1990; Miles 
and Snow, 1984; Parker, 2000; and Willis, 2001). 
4.4.2 Disadvantages of the strategy-aligned performance measurement 
It is surprising that despite the highlighting of several advantages of the strategy-aligned 
performance measurement, its disadvantages appear to have been overlooked. Possible 
reasons for this are that the disadvantages are not as obvious as the advantages, or that they 
are negligible. However, more importantly, the absence of the recognition of these 
disadvantages may have its roots in an underdeveloped body of knowledge on the issue of 
strategy-aligned performance measurement, overwhelmed with normative and intuition- 
based arguments. 
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Nevertheless, possible disadvantages of the alignment between performance measurement 
. and strategy may include the following: 
* The concept is so over-simplified that it is not practicable (e. g. it is much easier to 
state that measures should explicitly link actions and process to strategic objectives 
than to actually identify such measures). 
* There is a lack of guidance on how to facilitate the aligmnent. Therefore, 
management may not know if the effort Put into facilitating the alignment has been 
fruitless (perhaps the only existing practical guidance is Dixon et al. 's (1990) 
Performance Measurement Questionnaire (PMQ) framework, which will be reviewed 
in the next section). 
,b The benefits of the alignment may not be worth the effort put into facilitating it 
* The strategy-aligned performance measurement may be in conflict with short-term 
rewarding and/or personnel career advancement systems (e. g. while strategic 
objectives typically take longer to realise, rewarding systems are still based-for the 
most part-on short-term performance appraisal). 
* The alignment requires management's attention and commitment, which are not 
always available. 
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However, regardless of what advantages or disadvantages the strategy-aligned performance 
measurement might bring, the alignment may deteriorate over time as the result of a 
number of variables. Miles and Snow (1984) noted that environmental factors outside an 
organisation's control are constantly changing and may require strategic adjustment. 
Strategic change, in turn, is likely to require changes in organisation structure and/or 
processes. Thus, strategic change without considering the consequences for the existing 
performance measurement may be detrimental to the alignment between performance 
measurement and strategy (Boume et al., 1999). In view of this, O'Mara et al. (1998) 
suggested that when organisations inplement new strategies, they should ensure that the 
appropriate set of performance measures is in place. 
However, environmental change is not the only cause of alignment deterioration. 
Misalignment may also occur when organisations voluntarily change internal structure and 
process without concern for long-run consequences on strategy. If unchecked, this 
evolution may lead to the performance measures diverging from strategy. Bourne et al. 
(2000) concluded that if strategy and measures are to remain in alignment, processes are 
required to regularly review the measures against the strategy. 
To the extent that the alignment results not from luck, but from managerial expertise, 
alignment skills are one of the essentials in organisation management (Powell, 1992). 
However, O'Mara et al. (1998)-based on their case study research-found that managers 
had no formal recognition of a link between performance measurement and strategy, so 
that key performance measures were seldom linked to strategic decisions. Ittner and 
Larcker (2003) also highlighted the frequent failure of business managers both to link 
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performance measures--on the basis of causal model-to an organisation's strategy and to 
validate the link. 
4.5 Performance Measurement Frameworks Supporting 
Alignmcnt 
There are performance measurement frameworks that articulate the position of 
performance measurement within the organisational strategic management realm. These 
frameworks include the balanced scorecard, the performance pyramid, and the 
performance measurement questionnaire. 
On the one hand, the first two frameworks appear to involve performance measurement 
more with strategic management, and also recognise the relationship between performance 
measurement and strategy (e. g. by linking actions to strategic objectives). However, these 
frameworks do not provide clear guidance with regard to facilitating the alignnient 
between performance measurement and strategy. A performance measurement 
questionnaire (PMQ), on the other hand, not only provides a framework integrating 
measurement with strategic management, but also articulates more clearly the alignment 
between performance measurement and strategy. Since both the balanced scorecard and the 
performance pyramid have already been reviewed in sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.3 respectively, 
this section will address rminly the PMQ framework. 
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The PMQ focuses on the alignment between performance measurement and strategy, both 
by spelling out the definition of the alignment and proposing a pragmatic way to assess and 
enhance such alignment. In their introductory writing on the PMQ, Dixon et al. (1990) 
referred to the aligranent as: 
The extent to which a company's strategy, actions, and measures line up 
with each other (match and are mutuall supportive). y 
Dixon et al. (1990: 72) 
The authors noted that the alignment is important for the competitive potency of a strategy, 
which is realised only when actions and measures complement the strategy. The PMQ is 
claimed to have the objectives to provide a means by which an organisation can articulate 
its improvement needs, determine the extent to which its existing set of measurements is 
supportive of the necessary improvements, and establish an agenda for improving the 
measures so that they better support completion of the improvements. 
The PMQ consists of four parts. Part I provides general data used to classify the 
respondents from different managerial levels across organisational functions. Part Il 
assesses the organisations' competitive priorities and performance measurement system. 
Part III is similar to Part II, except that the focus is on performance measures. Part IV asks 
the respondents to provide performance measures that best evaluate their own performance 
and any other general comments. 
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According to the authors, the first part of the PMQ identifies general data pertaining to 
each respondent. The data on management level and ftinctional affiliation are used to 
examine the degree of consensus among managerial levels and functional areas. The latter 
parts are based on individual perceptions of what actions are important for improvement of 
the competitive effectiveness of the organisation, and the extent to which the measurement 
systems in the organisation support or inipede the achievement of these actions. 
The PMQ data are collected using seven-point Likert scales, and four types of analysis are 
conducted by using simple statistics (e. g. standard deviation). Dixon et al. (1990) noted 
that while more sophisticated statistical analyses rmy be performed, their ability to 
stimulate managerial interest is limited. In other words, if it is too complicated, managers 
tend not be interested in using it Simple statistics are then used to conduct four basic types 
of analysis, including aligrunent, congruence, consensus, and confusion analysis: 
* The alignment analysis is conducted to assess the degree of match between the 
organisation's strategies, actions and measures. 
9 Congruence analysis provides more detailed understanding of how well the 
measurement system supports the organisation's strategy and actions. 
9 Consensus analysis analyses the obtained data according to management levels or 
functional groups. 
e Confusion analysis determines the extent of consensus regarding each improvement 
area and performance measure. 
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The PMQ is regarded as a useful methodology for auditing an organisation's alignment 
between performance measurement and strategy (e. g. McAdam and Bailie, 2002; and 
Neely et al., 1994). Even though the PMQ has the advantage of providing a mechanism to 
identify areas for improvement and their associated performance measures, the 
disadvantage is that it cannot be considered a comprehensive integrated measurement 
system (Ghalayini and Noble, 1996). McAdam and Bailie (2002) also noted that the PMQ 
is indicative rather than prescriptive of a wider approach to performance measurement. 
4.6 Summary 
Concept of fit in ecology addresses living things' need for self-adaptation, in order to 
survive in their ecological enviromnent. Organisation studies appear to adopt and apply the 
concept with the organisations within their oiganisational environment, in order to survive 
in the long-term. The concept of organisational fit was noted as fundamental and relevant 
to strategic management from a variety of perspectives. 
The concept of organisational fit can be viewed from at least two perspectives: the 
conceptualisation of fit and the dormin of fit. On the one hand, the debates on 
conceptualisation of fit focused mainly on the content of fit (the elements to be fitted) and 
the process of fit (the process of achieving the fit). On the other hand, the debate with 
regard to the domain of fit revolved around either the formulation or the implementation of 
the concept. While the formulation issues focus on the organisational fit with the variables 
external to the organisations (e. g. market, and customers), the implementation issues focus 
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on the alignment of internal variables (e. g. performance measurement systems, and 
organisational structure). The notion that an organisation is a system comprised of many 
sub-units and processes within it underpins the concept of organisational fit/aligmnent. 
It was noted that a number of commentators have rccognised the importance of the 
alignment between performance measurement and strategy and thus, have put forward its 
range of benefits. Surprisingly, there appeared to be an absence of acknowledged negative 
aspects of the alignment. However, possible disadvantages of the strategy-aligned 
performance measurement can be, at least normatively, identified. 
The essence of the strategy-aligned performance measurement lies in the tendency for an 
organisation's strategy to detennine the ob ectives to be achieved to fulfil the j 
organisation's strategic choice (Slack et al., 1995). Therefore, strategy uniquely defines the 
elements of the performance measurement system, both in terms of what is measured, and 
how it is measured. 
There appears to be a few performance measurement frameworks that articulate the 
organisational alignment. These frameworks include the balanced scorecard, the 
performance pyramid, and the performance measurement questionnaire (PMQ). Since the 
former two frameworks had already been mentioned, this chapter reviewed mainly the 
PMQ. 
In comparison to other performance measurement frameworks, the PMQ tends to 
emphasise more strongly the alignment between performance measurement and strategy, 
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both by spelling out the definition of the alignment and by proposing a pragmatic way to 
assess and enhance the aligmnent. The underlying notion of aligmnent in the PMQ is that 
the competitive potency is realised only when actions and measures complement the 
strategy. Performance measurement commentators regarded the PMQ as a methodology 
possible for auditing an organisation's alignment between performance measurement and 
strategy (e. g. McAdam and Bailie, 2002; and Neely et aL, 1994). 
The literature review in the present chapter has helped to identify at least six gaps in the 
literature on the alignment between performance measurement and strategy, including: 
* There is a lack of consensus in defining organisational fit/aligninent. 
e There is a lack of analysis framework for organisational fit. 
o The existing studies on the concept of organisational fit have highlighted the 
phenomenon mainly as static rather than dynamic. 
e There is an absence of recognition of the disadvantages of misalignment between 
performance measurement and strategy. 
* There is a lack of empirical evidence with regard to how the organisational 
fit/alignment is managed in reality. 
* The study of organisational fiValignment rarely, if ever, focuses on the alignment 
between performance measurement and strategy in public sector organisations. 
These identified gaps imply the lack of understanding in the concept of organisational fit in 
general, and in the relationship between performance measurement and strategy in 
particular. Despite a number of publications in the field that reinforce the notion of the 
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alignment between performance measurement and strategy, the contentious issues have 
arisen mostly from intuitive arguments, rather than empirical evidence (see, for example, 
Langfield- Smith, 1997). The lack of understanding of the relationship between strategy 
and performance measurement can be problematic, especially since some researchers have 
begun researching into the evolution of performance measurement in organisations 
(Kennerley and Neely, 2002). 
The reviews of literature from Chapter 2 to the present chapter have been based primarily 
on for-profit/private sector performance measurement and strategic management literature. 
However, since the focus of this research is on the alignment between performance 
measurement and strategy in the public sector, it is important to review the literature in 
strategic performance measurement in the public sector in the next chapter. The main 
purpose is to verify that the research focus represents a gap in the literature and therefore, 
to ensure that the research will contribute to the body of knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Strategic Performance Measurement in the Public Sector 
5.1 Introduction 
The objectives of this final literature-review chapter are, first, to review literature in 
strategic performance measurement in the public sector, in order to identify gaps in the 
body of knowledge, and second, to present the research question for this study. This 
chapter explores four main issues in the literatureý including: 
9 Distinctions between private and public sector organisations 
* Performance measurement in public sector organisations 
9 Distinctive characteristics of strategic management in the public sector 
e Alignment between performance measurement and strategy in public sector 
organisations 
After the review of these issues, the chapter will present the research question, as well as 
sub-questions, for this study based on the overall results of the literature reviews from 
Chapter 2 to the present. 
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5.2 Distinctions between Private and Public Sector 
Organisations 
According to Perry and Rainey (1988), distinctions between organisations in the private 
and public sectors have received significant attention, as evidenced by the increasing 
number of comparative studies published in the public administration and management 
literature. Among the practical reasons for the study of the distinctions between private and 
public sector organisations is their potential relevance to the understanding of the roles of 
the organisations in each sector, the implications of imposing public purposes on private 
businesses, and the transferability of management techniques between sectors. 
In sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, the conceptual frameworks for analysing the distinctions of 
organisations across the sectors and the distinctive characteristics of the organisations in 
each sector will be reviewed. 
5.2.1 Conceptual frameworks 
A long-standing traditional argument stated that one of the major differences between 
private and public organisations is the different decision-making processes of the two 
sectors (Scott and Falcone, 1998). This argument states that decisions in private 
organisations are guided, for example, by the criteria of economy, efficiency, and monetary 
profit, whereas in public organisations, decisions are characterised, for example, by 
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bargaining, compromise, uncertainty, and the accommodation of competing political 
interests (Murray, 1975). 
Although evidence has yet to be presented which resolves this debate, three underlying 
conceptual frameworks for analysing the distinctions between organisations across the 
private and public sectors have emerged. These frameworks include the generic approach, 
the core approach, and more recently, the dimensional approach (see, for example, Scott 
and Falcone, 1998). 
Generic approach 
Scott and Falcone (1998) noted that the generic approach suggesis that management 
fimctions, organisational processes, and managerial values are essentially identical across 
sectoral boundaries. Proponents of the generic approach dismiss the aforementioned long- 
standing argument that decision-making in private organisations is fundamentally different 
from that in public organisations. 
The generic approach suggests, instead, that decisions in any type of organisation are 
subject to an economic motivation of one form or another. Generic proponents also regard 
as simplistic the notion that private organisations are driven exclusively by the financial 
incentives. Private sector decision-making is composed of an array of criteria, of which 
economic efficiency and monetary profit are central. 
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Core approach 
In contrast to the generic approach, the core approach emphasises fundamental differences 
between private and public organisations. Scott and Falcone (1998) noted two particular 
research traditions emphasising this approach i. e. the property rights theory and the public 
choice theory. 
Property rights theorists (e. g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) suggested that private managers 
have direct rights to the econornic returns of the organisation, thus providing a strong 
incentive to increase their personal gain by efficient use of resources in the organisation. 
Since there does not exist this type of incentives for public rnanagers, therefore these 
managers tend to be more tolerant of inefficiency. 
In a similar vein, public choice theorists (e. g. Niskanen, 1971) suggested that public 
organisations lack important market signals to serve as indicators for setting production 
levels of public goods and services. Without such signals, public organisations are 
compelled to rely on budgetary increases, staff growth and other non-market indicators as 
the criteria for success. 
Based on these two theories, proponents of the core approach suggested that public and 
private organisations can be distinguished acccrding to the presence or absence of market 
structures, externalities and ownership transferability. 
Additionally, Scott and Falcone (1998) also noted that researchers from other traditions 
also noted core distinctions between public and private organisations by virtue of particular 
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societal influences. For example, it was suggested that the nature of management differs 
between sectors because private and public organisations receive their support from 
different sub-sectors of society (e. g. Fottler, 1981). This, in turn, places differential 
constraints on management in responding to these influences. 
Other researchers (e. g. Rainey et al., 1976) attributed differences between public and 
I 
pnvate organisations to the presence of legal and political constraints placed on 
govenunent agencies by the courts, legislatures, executive oversight agencies and 
constituent groups. These constraints result in greater oversight less autonomy, and 
reduced authority among public managers, and they lead to higher levels of formalisation, 
red tape and bureaucratisation. Because of these differences, public organisations have 
been characterised as less innovative, less performance oriented, and more risk averse than 
private sector orgaqisations (see, for example, Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998). 
Dimensional approach 
This recent approach distinguishes organisaions according to a net outcome of political 
and economic authority influences. Bozeman (1987) suggested that an organisation can be 
considered along several dimensions of 'publicness' that are independent of each other and 
of the organisation's formal, legal status. Examples of these dimensions noted by the 
author include resource acquisition, composition of output diversity of mission and 
enviromnental transactions. 
All organisations can, thus, be considered as more public along some dimensions, and 
more private along other dimensions, based on the extent to which they exercise or are 
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constrained by political and economic authority. Organisations having a similar mix of 
political and economic authority will exhibit relatively sinilar pattems of behaviour, 
irrespective of their sectoral identification 
Bozeman (1987) assert6d that the dimensional approach is useful because it helps to 
identify political aspects of business organisations and economic aspects of government 
organisations. In addition, this approach permits the comparative study of entities, such as 
government corporations, government-sponsored enterprises and other types of 
organisations that tend to defy conventional classification. 
Table 5a surnmarises the above three conceptual frameworks for analysing the distinctions 
between public and private sector organisations. 
Generic Approach Core Approach Dimensional Approach 
Public org. = Private org. Public org. :A Private org. Public org. =,: A Private org. 
Public sector organisations Public sector organisations and While an organisalion can be more 
and private sector private sector organisations are public in some dimensions, it can be 
organisations are essentially fundamentally different. more private in other dimensions, 
identical. regardless of its sectoral 
identification. 
Table 5a: Summary of the Conceptual Frameworks 
for Analysing the Public-Private Sector Distinctions 
(Source: the author) 
As suggested by the dimensional approach, it is, thus, possible to construct a theoretical 
framework that shows that public and private organisations simultaneously differ and 
resemble each other (Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003). 
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5.2.2 Distinctive characteristics of private and public sector 
organisations 
There appear to be at least five characteristics frequently used in distinguishing private and 
public sector organisations, including (1) market and economic incentives, (2) ownership, 
(3) accountability to the stakeholders, (4) openness to the environment, and (5) rules and 
constraints. Each of these will be explained in turn. 
Market and Economic incentives 
This is the long-standing notion of a fundamental difference between organisations in the 
two sectors. It argues that businesses are guided by the market, which provides the 
economic incentives, whereas in public organisations, the market and economic incentives 
are absent, or at least are not the chief concern (Downs, 1967; and Kouzmin et al., 1999). 
Perry and Rainey (1988) argued that economists cite public goods and market failures as 
the reasons for governmental activity and therefore, as the reasons for the existence of 
public organisations. Moreover, the authors also noted that these concepts are inadequate 
for a clear explanation of how public and private organisations differ, with a number of 
public organisations producing non-public goods. 
Ownership 
Perry and Rainey (1988) argued that the most common definition of public and private 
distinguishes organisations according to ownership and funding. Ring and Perry (1985) 
noted that perhaps the most fundamental of the differences stems from the laws that 
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specify the organisations' ownership. Unlike business firms, which more typically have 
entrepreneurial roots, public organisations are often created by some higher, controlling 
body. Warwick (1975) argued that this body is composed of multiple and competing 
interests. Once created, the organisation is largely dependent on that body for the definition 
of its objectives and the provision of resources. 
Accountability to the stakeholders 
Accountability concerns are different across sectors. For businesses, the major 
accountability is between the company and its owners-the stakeholders. For public 
organisations, however, an agency's mission represents the accountability between the 
agency and society-the constituents (N. B. in the public sector, the stakeholders are often 
referred to as constituents). Kaplan (2001) regarded public agencies' accountability to 
society as the rationale for their existence. 
Benn and Gaus (1983) noted two reasons for the accountability of public organisations to a 
broader variety of constituents. First, the interest of public sector organisations' activities is 
-communal, not restricted to individuals, as is the case for private firms. Therefore, it is 
reasonable for many constituents who share the interests resulting fom those activities to 
know that such interests are fully accountable. Second, a public agency, whether referring 
to a person or an organisation, acts as an individual or as an agent for the society as a 
whole. The person or the organisation is, therefore, accountable to constituents in society. 
121 
Openness to the environment 
Organisations in the public sector are more open to social and political pressure external to 
them because they operate with a fixed public budget and consumer groups are in 
competition with each other for scarce resources (Kouzmin et al., 1999). 
Perry and Rainey (1988), and Ring and Perry (1985) also noted that public organisations 
are subject to much greater influence by external political and govemrmntal institutions, as 
well as being exposed to more external scrutiny. Additionally, Allison (1983) identified the 
diversity of external attention as a rmjor difference between the two sectors. 
Rules and constraints 
Frant (1993) addressed a common notion that public organisations are more 'bureaucratic' 
than private organisations, due to more internal rules constraining employees' behaviour. 
Those rules aim much more at restricting than at informing managerial actions. This results 
in a reduction in autonomy among public managers, owing to constraints such as civil 
service rules (Perry and Rainey, 1988). An example of such rules is that a number of 
important decisions about hiring, firing and promoting are often made by an external 
I 
conunission not under the control of the organisation's management. 
In addition to the above characteristics, there are other less-apparent characteristics 
distinguishing public from private organisations. For example, Whorton and Worthley 
(1981) identified significant organisational culture differences between the two sectors, 
including public value and the number of formal processes. 
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However, there are some who oppose the notion of distinguishing private from public 
organisations. Lachman (1985), for example, suggested that the public-private distinction 
may not be a very useful conceptual framework for explaining differences in organisation- 
enviromnent interactions, and that differentiating in ternis of other factors (e. g. task or 
technology) may account for more differences than does differentiation by sector 
affiliation. 
5.3 Performance Measurement in Public Sector Organisations 
As already mentioned, performance measurement is a critical activity for public sector 
organisations as well as for businesses. There appears to be greater emphasis on 
performance measurement in present day public management. For example, Noordegraaf 
and Abma (2003) indicated the two movements in performance measurement as a 
management approach in the public sector-the management by measurement movement 
and its counter movement. 
The authors noted that for the proponents of the 'management by measurement' 
movement, public sector organisations are entitled to get benefits from the dual roles of 
performance measurement. First this helps in establishing transparent adninistration by 
facilitating the establishment of tight objectified links between objectives, means, outputs 
and outcomes of public agencies. Second, it strengthens the effective administration by 
enabling the evaluation of organisational outputs and outcomes. In both ways, public 
management can be regarded as enjoying 'management by measurement'. Evidence of this 
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movement includes several recent trends in public management, for instance, the NPM 
(e. g. Hood, 1991), performance oriented management (e. g. Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000), 
and the rise of the audit society (e. g. Power, 1999). 
However, from the opponents' points of view, measurement of public sector performance 
faces severe difficulties. It is argued that public sector performances are difficult to 
measure, since many of them are invisible, unintended or contradictory (Noordegraaf and 
Abma, 2003). The causes of this situation possibly include problernatic preferences, 
contested knowledge, fuzzy means-ends relations and unclear relations between outputs 
and outcomes (see, for example, March and Olsen, 1979; Weick, 1995; and Wilson, 1989). 
This renders the management by measurement approach in the public sector subject to 
severe criticisms. For the opponents of management by measurement, public management 
is rather the 'management against measurement'; thus businesslike measurement models 
are rejected (Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003). Yet, the trend towards more use of 
performance measurement in public sector management has already been observed. 
Additionally, Hood (1995) noticed a move towards more explicit and measurable standards 
of perfon-nance for public sector organisations. This possibly makes performance 
measurement the topic of greatest interest in today's public management (e. g. Nyhan and 
Martin, 1999). Noordegraaf and Abma (2003) referred to the increasing popularity of 
management by measurement among public sector management in several countries as a 
'performance-oriented climate'. 
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Even though the concept and practices of performance measurement in private and public 
organisations may share common characteristics, it appears that there are some distinctive 
aspects of public organisations which make unique performance measurement in the public 
sector. In order to understand the uniqueness of the public sector perforniance 
measurement, three important topics will be reviewed, including (1) the performance 
measurement concept in the public sector, (2) problems with performance measurement in 
the public sector, and (3) transference of the performance measurement approach from the 
private to public sector. 
5.3.1 The Performance measurement concept in the public sector 
Performance measurement in the private sector seems to differ from the public sector in at 
least five important ways, as summarised in the table below. 
Private Sector Public Sector 
Measurement * Internal needs (Neely, 1999) * External requirements for control 
purpose purpose (Black et al., 2001; and 
Ittner and Larcker, 1998) 
Goals to be 9 Clearer e Amorphous 
measured e Maximisation of private value, mostly e Creation of public value (Dence, 
owners' long-term wealth (Moore, 1995) 1996; and Moore, 1995) 
Measurement e Measures of returns/profits 9 No consensus of measurement focus 
focus 9 Determine owners' long-term wealth 9 Focuses vary among different public 
et al., 1999; and Moore, 1995) agencies 
Measurement 9 Fewer groups, clear goals 9 More groups, unclear goals 
stakeholders * One central source of power * Satisfying needs of various groups 
(Mintzberg, 1973) 
Measurement 9 Between management and owners a Between agency and society 
accountability 9 Commercial focus (Black et al., 200 1) 9 Accountability focus (Hagigi, 1999) 
9 Financial measures as representative * No clear representative measures 
I measures (Kaplan, 001) 11 
Table 5b: Comparisons between Private and Public Sector 
Performance Measurement 
(Source: the author) 
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Each of these characteristics will be reviewed in turn. 
Measurement purpose 
In business firms, performance measurement is more often developed for the internal 
purpose of managing organisational. performance (Neely, 1999). It typically aims at 
helping business managers to manage activities and processes by providing the data on 
how the organisation is performing with regard to the achieving of pre-set goals. That is to 
say, the business managers need performance data to assist them in managing the 
organisation. 
In contrast, performance measurement in the public'sector has the major purpose of 
controlling. Public agencies are frequently required to collect and report performance data, 
regardless of their needs. That is to say, performance measurement in the public sector is 
developed more to fulfil external requirements for control (Black et al., 2001; and Ittner 
and Larcker, 1998). 
Goals to be measured 
In the private sector, firms can identify more clearly what their desirable goals are, for 
example, maximisation of the owners' long-term wealth (also known as private value) 
(Moore, 1995). However, for public agencies, even though they are obliged to create 
public value (Dence, 1996; and Moore, 1995) rather than private value, it is not clear what 
the public value is. 
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It was noted that in general, public organisations have greater stewardship/fiduciary 
responsibility and focus than do private sector entities (PEA, 1998). Again, such 
responsibility probably provides a vague notion of public value. As a result, public 
agencies may not be able to set their goals as clearly as businesses are able to da This 
makes the goals for public agencies coniparatively less clear, or even amorphous. Hartley 
and Allison (2000) also highlighted the point that the outcomes for public agencies cannot 
always be specified in advance, especially when the conditions of the organisations are 
becoming increasingly complex and uncertain. 
Measurement focus 
Business firms' goals seem to be rather consistent across the types of business. Normally, 
business firms attempt to maximise their owners' long-term wealth. Since it is easier for 
business managers to discern what constitutes such wealth, perfonndnce measures are thus 
, 
used. more often to emphasise business returns/profits than to determine the long-term 
wealth of the owners (Kouzrnin et al., 1999; and Moore, 1995). 
However, for public agencies, there is a lack of focus on measurement, due to the 
amorphous nature of their goals. Unlike businesses, where returns or profits can be used as 
universally representative of their goals of maximising owners' long-term wealth, public 
organisations do not have such clear representative measure(s) for their goals to use across 
different organisations. For this reason, the focus of measurement may vary among 
different public agencies. 
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Measurement stakeholders 
For businesses, there tend to be fewer groups of stakeholders whose interests depend, to a 
certain extent, on the businesses' activities. The more frequently mentioned groups of 
stakeholders in business include shareholders/owners, customers, suppliers, and 
employees. However, the shareholders/owners are normally regarded as the most powerful 
group among others, for they can influence directly business management. For example, 
they can fire a manager and then appoint another at their will and with considerable ease. 
In view of this, for a large number of business managers, the needs of shareholders/owners 
are often placed at the top of the list of management priorities to be satisfied. 
For public organisations, in contrast, there are many more groups of constituents to take 
into consideration. Public organisations not only have to consider all the stakeholder 
groups mentioned for businesses (N. B. probably in the case of public agencies, the role of 
the owners can be replaced by the politically appointed figure), they also have to consider 
other groups of constituents whose needs are also to be satisfied. Possible additional 
groups include the society as a whole, governmental level policyrnakers, media, pressure 
groups and others. The interests of different groups of constituents in the public sector are 
different and sometimes even in conflict. 
Unlike businesses, public organisations cannot identify the single most important group of 
stakeholders. Rather, they are caught in a complex web of political forces identified by 
Scott (1995) as the 'political arena' in which divergent constituencies attempt to 
institutionalise performance criteria that serve their interests. Therefore, these 
organisations are unlikely to be able to satisfy all groups of their constituencies at the sarm 
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time. Public agencies cannot make decisions to maximise any one goal; rather they must 
seek adequate solutions to their problems. Therefore, agencies arc-at bcst-trying to 
satisfice the various constituent groups' needs (Mintzbcrg, 1973). 
Measurement accountability 
Black et al. (2001) suggested that the major accountability of businesses is between the 
management and shareholders/owners. Since the shareholderslowners' primary concern is 
the long-term wealth, accountability tends to be commercially focused. 
In contrast public agencies have accountability between the agencies and society. Public 
agencies whose major accountability concern is to the society have unclear accountability 
focus and consequently, may have to -focus on accountability itself (Hagigi, 1999) 
because 
the primary concern for the society as a whole may be unclear. However, since the 
rationale for the existence of public organisations is to be accountable to the society 
(Kaplan, 2001), the reasons for performance measurement in public agency mostly centre 
upon issues of public accountability (Hagigi, 1999). 
5.3.2 Problems with performance measurement in the public sector 
Public sector organisations usually encounter at least five recurring performance 
measurement problems not found in their private sector counterparts, including. (1) the 
difficulty in identifying what is to be measured, (2) the difficulty in satisfying various 
groups of constituents, (3) the difficulty in searching for sound representative measures, 
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(4) the bias of the measurement approach, and (5) the validity of assumptions in public 
sector performance measurement philosophy. Each of these problems will be reviewed in 
tum. 
Difficulty in identifying what is to be measured 
Smith (1995) noted that public sector organislions have always encountered the difficulty 
of securing a consensus as to what the outputs and objectives should be, especially when 
considering these organisations' many and complex external demands (Audit Commission, 
2002). Moreover, having broad consequences to the wider society, a public agency's 
activities, however, are far from being independent of other agencies' activities. Since the 
activities of each individual agency seem not to be mutually exclusive, it is difficult to 
determine clearly the results from the activities of any individual agency, making it 
difficult to measure an agency's performance. 
Despite the attempts to establish results-oriented goals for public agencies, it is difficult for 
them to set such goals because they must move beyond what they control (i. e. activities) to 
focus on what they merely influence (i. e. results) (General Accounting Office, 1997). 
Therefore, measuring the agencies' performance based on results-oriented goals that are 
beyond their control is neither conducive to the gaining of an accurate view of how they 
perform, nor is it fair to the agencies being measured. 
It should be noted that-as with service-providing businesses-govenunent organisations, 
whose outputs are often intangible, also face the problem of defining the type of 
performance to be measured. This problem stems initially from the nature of the final 
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outputs of these organisations, as opposed to the manufacturing organisations whose 
products are more tangible. 
Difficulty in satisfying various groups of constituents 
Since most public agencies are-by and large-funded by goverment budget, of which 
major parts are derived from tax, it is sensible for citizens to wish to see benefits from the 
activities of these agencies. Unfortunately, this is not always possible because various 
groups of constituents appear to have diverse interests, some even conflicting. Policy- 
makers, public managers and staff, and interest groups often have different goals for the 
same public services (Wholey and Hatry, 1992). This results in difficulty for the public 
agencies to simultaneously satisfy all groups of constituents 
The measurement of an agency's performance may reflect how well it is working towards 
the interests of some constituent groups, but not all. Wholey and Hatry (1992) further 
noted that measurement of selected aspects of an agency's performance may divert 
attention from important but unmeasured activities, encouraging 'creaming' (serving those 
constituent groups for whom favourable outcomes are most likely), or tempt managers or 
staff to manipulate performance data. Moreover, as noted by Ring and Perry (1985), these 
constituents are likely to evaluate the agencies differently, often reaching conclusions that 
are difficult to reconcile. 
Difficulty in searching for sound representative measures 
As a result of the difficulty in identifying which performance aspects are to be measured in 
order to satisfy the society as a, wholeý public agencies often fail to find a sound 
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representative of the measures for such ambiguous objectives and outcomes of their 
performance. Smith (1995) noted that the difficulty extends to the interpretation of any 
measures that can possibly be developed. It is not clear whether the performance 
measurement approach for the public sector vvill help public agencies to measure what is 
most important oriust what is measurable (Audit Commission, 2002). 
Wholey and Hatry (1992), based on empirical evidence, noted that the performance of 
public sector organisations focuses more on the resource expenditure and the quantity of 
work done, and less on the quality and outcomes of that work. These authors also noted 
that the absence of adequate attention to quality and outcomes causes the government to 
become wasteful, ineffective, unresponsive and not credible. 
Bias of the measurement approach 
Black (1994) and Black et al. (2001) noted that many measurement initiatives and 
techniques developed pay little attention to uTr/consumer dimensions of public service, 
instead focusing on other dirmnsions, notably the priorities of service 'producers and others 
(e. g. government and regulatory bodies). Moreover, public performance information was 
developed more in response to the external initiatives than by the individual agency itself 
in response to its own measurement needs (Black et al., 2001). 
These could possibly cause the conflicts between auditing and improving public sector 
performance noted by Leeuw (1996). An example of these conflicts is that most public 
agencies are subject to the scrutiny of the general auditor. Auditing is norrnally 
implemented by checking if arr agency's performance complies with the established rules 
I 
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and regulations, and attains the required standard. However this may lead to excessive 
attention to formal adherence to these standards (PUMA, 1995). Leeuw (1996) noted that 
since auditors have interest in procedures and procedural effectiveness, they often are 
satisfied when-on paper-the procedural and organisational prerequisites for an effective 
policy or an effective public organisation are met. The author maintained that these 
prerequisites, nevertheless, are nothing more than articulated assumptions that may be right 
or wrong. Therefore, performance measurement, intended primarily to satisfy the external 
initiatives of controlling, are unable to provide feedback for public organisations to learn to 
carry out better its present policies and to achieve its objectives 
However, a more comprehensive and systemic learning process occurs when the policies 
and objectives are questioned, leading to the possibility of securing new and innovative 
permanent solutions to the problems (Leeuw et al., 1994). This is congruent with Argyris' 
(1982) 'double-loop learning', already discussed in section 2.5.5. The ability for 
performance measurement to provide double-loop feedback information should be 
considered as vital unless the prerequisites (rules, regulations and procedures) are proven 
right. 
Validity of assumptions in public sectDr performance measurement philosophy 
An example of this line of argument was noted by Ittner and Larcker (1998), that a number 
of recent performance measurement initiatives are based on the idea that legal 
requirements to measure and report performance will improve public performance by 
increasing the accountability of public managers. 
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However, these authors noted that from the institutional theories perspectiveý it has been 
argued that in such organisations as government agencies, whose survival depends 
primarily on the support of external constituents and only secondarily on actual 
performance, public managers will implement the mandated systems, in order to appear 
modem, rational and efficient, but will not actually use the systems for improving 
performance (see, for example, Gupta et al., 1994; and Scott 1987). 
This view, if true, implies that performance measurement is of little use for management 
purposes, and that public organisations measure performance just to fulfil the external I 
requirement for performance information reports. Moreover, it is risky to adopt 
innovations like performance measurement schemes simply to appear modem, rational and 
efficient, especially when an organisation mimics other successful adopters of performance 
measurement without realising the possible negative effects (Leeuw, 1996). 
This argument appears to be one of the most severe threats to performance measurement/ 
management in the public sector because it probes into the foundational assumptions of 
performance measurement in that sector. Therefore, if proved true, it might severely 
undermine both public sector perfonnance measurement thinking and practice. 
However, as in the business domain, where performance measurement seems problematic, 
performance measurement in the public sector is also encountering a number of problems. 
It perhaps depends on the academic and practitioner researchers alike to develop a better 
knowledge in this specific field. For this reason, it is important for research on 
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performance measurement to continue. The lessons from organisations in either sector may 
complement each other and the problems might possibly be overcome. 
5.3.3 Transference of the performance measurement approach from 
the private to public sector 
On the one hand, it has been suggested that a uniform approach to performance 
measurement in the business and private sectots may lead to some unintended and possibly 
dysfunctional consequences if it is uncritically - implemented and used in public 
management (see, for example, Johnsen, 2001; and Ring and Perry, 1985). On the other 
hand, it has been argued that the underlying management activities and processes in both 
sectors may be broadly similar, and that measures of performance may be sufficiently 
generic to permit meaningful comparison (see, for example, Black et al., 2001). 
Empirical evidence supporting this latter argument is noted by Scott and Falcone (1998). 
These authors explained the pervasiveness of the 'revolving-door' phenomenon among 
senior-level management from business to public sector organisations, or vice versa, as 
evidence that at least executive skills rmy be readily transferable between sectors. It can 
thus be assumed that neither are sectoral distinctions important nor preferable to other 
competing classification schemes. Even if the ends may be different between organisations 
in different sectors, the means of achieving them may be essentially comparable. In other 
words, the transference of management -practices, including the performance measurement 
approach, between both sectors is possibla 
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Perhaps the foundation of the debate on the tranferability of the performance measurement 
approaches between organisations in the two sectors lies in people's belief about the nature 
of public organisations, as Noordegraaf and Abma highlighted: 
Proponents of management by measurement 'believe' that public 
organisations 'are' normal production companies (and if they are not, 
that they should become so). Critics 'believe' that public organisations 
are unlike normal production companies (and ifthey are, they should not 
be). 
Noordegraaf and Abma (2003) 
Despite the fact that the discussions in section 5.2 earlier suggest that organisations in the 
private and public sectors are not identical, while some aspects of public organisations are- 
different from business firms, others are very much similar. In view of this, the application 
of the performance measurement approach learned from one sector to the other should not 
be strictly prohibited, but rather, used with caution. 
To summarise the review of performance measurement in public sector organisations in 
this section, it is important to point out that both business firms and public agencies alike 
share a very common performance measurement philosophy-despite some differences 
between sectors-that performance measurement can be used to provide performance data. 
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5.4 Distinctive Characteristics of Strategic Management in 
the Public Sector 
Strategic management for public organisations is concerned with strengthening the long- 
tenn viability and effectiveness of the organisations. Poister and Streib (1999) suggested 
that effective public administration requires public agencies to develop a capacity for 
strategic management. A strong strategic management capacity is essential because it 
provides both a short-term and long-term sense of direction for a governmental agency, 
relative to its internal and external environrmnts, which could shift continually. 
The same authors also noted that changes in societal needs, political trends, 
intergoverninental relations, fiscal conditions and citizen expectations are likely to alter the 
mix of programmatic responsibilities and resource requirements facing public 
organisations. Anticipating these possibly substantial changes and adapting to them 
productively requires the type of forward-looking, flexible, and effective responses that a 
strong strategic management capacity can help to provide. 
In a study of the distinction between strAegic management in public and private 
organisations, Ring and Perry (1985) proposed four characteristics of the public sector that 
make strategic management in that sector distinctive. These characteristics include 
policy ambiguity, (2) openness of the govenunent to the attentive public, (3) time 
problems, and (4) coalition instability. Each of these characteristics will be explored in 
tutn. 
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5.4.1 Policy ambiguity 
In the public sector, policy/strategy is often stated in a more ambiguous way than is found 
in business firms. Authors in the strategic management field offered some explanations for 
this phenomenon. Allison (1983), for example, argued that separation of functional 
responsibility in public organisations frequently contributes to vagueness and/or ambiguity 
in policy and objectives. The author noted that the separation of the management functions 
in public organisations is not intended to prormte efficiency as it does in businesses, but to 
prevent the arbitrary exercise of power. 
Additionally, Baurner (1978) explained that the public sector's lack of policy clarity is 
derived from the need to create coalitions with multiple and often competing objectives, in 
order to pass legislation. In comparison, businesses generally operate within the framework 
consisting of a more limited number of relatively stable goals, thus facilitating the 
establishment of clear business strategy. 
However, Mintzberg (1978) recognised that the conventional wisdom that emphasises the 
need to state strategy precisely may mislead public organisations that face a confusing 
reality because ambiguous policy/strategy allows public organisations to be more 
responsive to their unstable and changing goals. 
Moreover, Ping and Perry (1985) noted that the unambiguous articulation of policy/ 
strategy by public agencies can produce at least two counterproductive consequences. 
First, clearly articulated policy/strategy may serve as a rallying device for mobilising 
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political opposition Second, a clear policy directive may lead public executives to believe 
that there is less need for judgements of nuance, and less need to exercise caution and 
discretion. Ambiguity in policy/strategy-a characteristic of many public organisations- 
therefore, may be an asset. 
5.4.2 Openness of the government to the attentive public 
Compared with business companies, public agencies have been regarded as more open to 
public attention. Ring and Perry (1985), for example, argued that it has been generally 
accepted that the policy of public organisations has a tendency to be, exposed to public 
scrutiny much sooner, and to be scrutinised much more thoroughly. The media, in 
particular, has frequently been recognised as playing a major part in exposing such policy 
to the public. As a result, the relative openness of decision-making creates greater 
constraints for public sector management. 
Nevertheless, the relative openness of public sector organisations is not defined exclusively 
by the attentiveness of the media. Public sector management must also pay attention to a 
diverse public because there is a rich variety of competing interests outside public 
organisations (Rainey et al., 1976). Por example, Warwick (1975) observed the existence 
of a wide variety of 'controllers, ' 'higher authorities, ' and 'monitors' in the public 
agencies' external environment, all of which constrain the actions of the management of 
these agencies. Dereli (2003) argued that a well-founded strategy for public sector 
organisations would always have its base in public-wide opinions. Therefore, the openness 
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to the attentive public renders public sector strategic nunagement generally subject to 
more direct and sustained influence from a greater number of interest groups than that of 
businesses. 
5.4.3 Time problem 
Although time constraints in both sectors may be equally severe, the sources and nature of 
these constraints are fundamentally different. Ring and Perry (1985) noted that public 
sector management must cope with time constraints that are more artificial than those that 
confront business management. The authors argued that time becomes a major constraining 
factor in the public strategic management processes in two important ways. The first is 
associated with the tenure of public officials-their length of stay with an agency. The 
second involves time constraints that are legislatively imposed, court imposed, or created 
by the exigencies of elective political office. 
Therefore, time constraints for public organisations tend to be generated by legislatures, 
funding exigencies, or the employment length of public officials. All these time constraints 
are more common for public agencies and can affect the strategic management processes in 
these agencies. 
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5.4.4 Coalition instability 
Ring and Perry (1985) noted a distinction between public and private sector strategic 
management; public sector executives, unlike those in the private sector, ' frequently must 
create coalitions to get policy/strategy passed. This condition is exacerbated by the great 
variety of public sector constituent groups vith direct access to the policy-making process 
and direct interest in the perforniance of public agencies. Considering these constraints, 
policy formation in the public sector frequently is a process of coalition building, involving 
diverse and competing interests (Ring and Perry, 1985). 'Me authors maintained that policy 
legitimation coalitions are less stable in the public sector, and are more prone to 
disintegrate during policy implementation. 
In addition, the dynamics of politigs is also an important factor in public sector strategic 
management. In the context where politics changes frequently, public policy tends to 
change as often because newly elected officials who become the new policy-makers can 
often terininate the ongoing policies, imposing their own instead to gain political support. 
Changes in policy are likely to lead to nunagerial problems for public agencies because it 
changes the organisational context. This creates managerial constraints, which, in turn, 
require a specific response from public management. 
Ansoff (1991) and Ring and Perry (1985) noted that the strategic rnanagement issues 
confronting not-for-profit/public organisations can be characterised using Mintzberg's 
(1978) typology of deliberate (intended and realised), unrealised (intended but not 
I 
realised), and emergent (realised but not intended) strategies, already discussed in section 
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3.5 earlier. Given the previous arguments-regarding policy ambiguity, open and intense 
influence processes, coalition instability, and the frequent policy changes-public 
organisations can be characterised as low on deliberate strategy and high on emergent and 
unrealised strategy. If this characterisation is correct, any manager who is unable, for 
instance, to relinquish intended strategies in oider to pursue emergent strategies is likely to 
be unsuccessful, if not completely fail. Therefore, the most effective public managers, in 
contrast to their private counterparts, avoid rigid strategy, adapting instead to the ever- 
changing context (Porter and Van Maanen, 1970). 
This notion implies that the attention to emergent rather than intended strategies may be a 
key feature of successful strategic management in the public sector, where the contexts are 
essentially dynamic. Hartley and Allison (2000), for example, commented that public 
managers are in an environment of change, flux and 'uncertainty, where the problems and 
the solutions are not always known This requires an approach which is not only about the 
'im lementation' of pre-specified policies/strategies, but the 'enactment' or 'emergence' of T 
outcomes. Ring and Perry (1985) also argued that evidence supports the conclusion that 
strategy in the public sector tends towards the emergent, rather than the deliberate, due to 
the dynamic nature of public sector strategic management. 
Owing to its distinctive characteristics, a conclusion that can be drawn is that strategic 
management in the public sector is e. Niremely difficult (Ring and Perry, 1985). The 
constraints imposed by openness and multiple constituent groups of interest coupled with 
contingencies of time, when compounded by policy ambiguity, can create significant 
problems in the implementation of policy/strategy (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1979). 
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For example, performance measurement, as an essential integral part of strategic 
management, appears to be problematic in the public sector. As Oster (1995) noted that- 
for public agencies-goals are often typically rather diffuse, not easily quantified, and not 
always shared by all constituents. 
However, Wortman (1979) argued that these observations about the evaluation of public 
sector strategic management are not to be used as an apology for its inadequacies, but 
instead, to illustrate the subjectivity and probable biases of conventional wisdom premised 
on business sector nomis. 
5.5 Alignment between Performance Measurement and 
Strategy in Public Sector Organisations 
Overall, the reviews of the existing literature regarding performance measurement 
(Chapter 2), strategic management (Chapter 3), *alignment between performance 
measurement and strategy (Chapter 4), and strategic performance measurement in the 
public sector (Chapter 5) suggested that managers in either private or public organisations 
can employ performance measurement for a variety of purposes. However, for 
performance measurement to be 'strategically effective, it must be-to so= degree- 
aligned with the organisations' overall strategy, so that it helps to focus all activities and 
processes to achieve the common strategic objectives, not others. 
143 
Organisations that are confronting high policy/strategy volatility, such as those in the 
public sector, are more likely to experience strategic dissonance-the incongruence of 
strategic intent and actions. According to Burgelman and Grove (1996), this dissonance is 
inevitable, since it is a natural outcome of the internal and external dynamic forces that 
move and shake organisations and their enviromnent. However, such strategic dissonance 
can be viewed as an opportunity for management to, learn about the changing reality of the 
world that the organisation faces and the new opportunities generated by its own 
competencies. 
The management of these organisations, should be able to extract benefits from strategic 
dissonance, in order to create the organisational learning necessary to deal with the 
problems in the future. Strategy-aligned performance measurement can play an important 
role in helping management to recognise the incongruence of the organisation's strategy, 
as well as the way it works towards accomplishing strategic objectives. 
Considering that public sector organisatione policy/strategy tends to be highly volatile, 
learning from these organisations the way in which they manage the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy might yield considerable benefits to management 
practice. The knowledge learned from the public sector organisations not only helps in 
gaining greater understanding of strategic performance measurement in the public 
organisations subject to policy/strategy instability, it might also help to shed light on the 
private sector organisations as welL In this sense, the studies of the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy in public sector organisations seem to have the 
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potential to highlight managerial implications both for public sector and business 
management. 
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the studies promise to contribute to the body of 
knowlýdge currently available in this field. The literature review suggested that there 
appear to be a limited number of scholarly studies on the topic from the public sector 
practitioners' perspectives. This can perhaps be regarded as a weakness in the researching 
into this topic within the broader performance measurement research area. This is because 
the topical basis, both theoretically and empirically, seems yet to be settled, while the 
researchers as well as the practitioners appearto skip-too hurriedly perhaps-to apply the 
knowledge as a normative concept (e. g. the alignment has already been claimed as a 
fundamental to effective performance measurement). 
Therefore, in addition to managerial implications, the empirical research into the alignment 
between performance measurement and strategy in public sector organisations is likely 
also to make a contribution to the body of knowledge in management science. 
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5.6 Research Question 
The importance of the alignment between performance measurement and strategy in public 
sector organisations appeared to lie mainly in the following reasons: 
e Review of the literature suggests that the topic represents a gap in the perforn-ance 
measurement/management body of knowledge. 
Literature review also suggests that performance measurement should be aligned 
with strategy but there still is a lack of understanding on the topic especially within 
the public sector context. 
e Since strategies in public sector organisations appear to be volatile, researching into 
I 
the topic within this context night teach some valuable lessons to organisations in 
the context with less strategic volatility. 
* There is a lack of empirical evidence supporting the notion of the alignment. 
Considering these reasons, it is sensible to conduct a research into the topic within the 
public sector especially with the central government context being focused. In so doing, 
the aim of this research is to investigate the following question and its sub-questions: 
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How, in central government agencies, is the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy managed? 
How are performance measures, performance measurement 
systems, performance measurement, andperformance 
management understood? 
9 How is the performance measurement-strategy tension 
perceived? 
Is there performance measurement-strategy alignment? 
Following the review of research methodology in the next chapter, the justification for this 
choice of research context (i. e. central goverrunent), as well as other theoretical 
considerations underpinning the research methods of choice, will be discussed in detail 
later, in Chapter 7. 
5.7 Summary 
There exist at least three conceptual approaches in analysing private and public sector 
organisation distinctions: generic approach, core approach, and dimensional approach. 
The generic approach argues that organisations in both sectors are identical, while the core 
approach argues that they are different Alternatively, the dimensional approach maintains 
that all organisations can be considered as more public in some dimensions and more 
I 
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private in others, based on the extent to which they exercise, or are constrained by, political 
and economic authority. 
However, regardless of the conceptual framework used in analysing the distinctions of 
organisations across sectors, five more frequently cited distinguishing characteristics 
can be identified, including (1) market and economic incentives, (2) ownership, 
(3) accountability. to the stakeholders, (4) openness to the environment, and (5) rules and 
constraints. 
The concept of performance measurement in the public seýtor appears to differ from that in 
the private sector in at least five ways: (1) the measurement purpose (e. g. public 
organisations' performance measurement tends to focus more on external requirements), 
(2) the goals to be measured (e. g. public organisations have amorphous goals), (3) the 
measurement focus (e. g. public organisations lack consensus performance measurement 
focus), (4) the measurement stakeholders (e. g. public organisations have more groups of 
constituents to satisfy), and (5) measurement accountability (e. g. public organisations lack I 
sound representative measures for accountability). 
Five common problems inherent in public sector performance measurement include (1) the 
difficulty in identifying what is to be measured, (2) the difficulty in satisfying various 
constituent groups, (3) the difficulty in searching for representative measures, (4) the bias 
of the measurement approach (e. g. on public service providers 'rather than clients), and (5) 
the validity of assumptions in public sector performance measurement philosophy (e. g. 
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public agencies do not depend on their perfomiance for survival, and thus use perforinance 
measurement merely to fulfil external report requirements or to appear rational). 
Although performance measurement in the public sector appears not to be identical to that 
of the private sector, there exists no convincing evidence prohibiting the transference of the 
performance measurement approach between sectors. 
The distinctive characteristics of strategic nnnagement in the public sector are due to the 
policy ambiguity, the openness of the government to the attentive public, the problem of 
time, and the coalition instability. 
Overall, the literature review suggested. that the lack of understanding in the aligmnent 
between performance measurement and strategy in the public sector represents a gap in the 
body of knowledge. In order to provide greater understanding of the aligmnent, this 
research, therefore, investigates the following niain question: how, in'central government 
agencies, is the alignment between performance measurement and strategy managecP 
Having established the research question, it becomes important to review research 
methodologies, in order to justify the appropriate research methods for this study. 
Therefore, the research methodology and available research methods will be reviewed in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Research Methodology 
6.1 Introduction 
The review of literature in the preceding chapters led to the research question proposed in 
the last chapter. However, before moving on to explore this question in more depth, it is 
essential to understand the philosophy that underpins the research methodologies of the 
social sciences. 
The relationship between philosophy and social sciences has a long history. Hughes and 
Sharrock (1997), for example, noted that social sciences often regard themselves as 
following the natural sciences, the product of a split within philosophy. Unlike the natural 
sciences, the social sciences have not, for the most part, been able to dissociate themselves 
from philosophy. Philosophical issues continually provide the fundamental questions social 
sciences ask about the nature of their appropriate subject matter, their intellectual 
provenance, their investigation rationales, and above all, the validity and appropriateness 
of their methods. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the philosophy of social sciences and the available 
research methodologies, in order to justify the research methods of this study, which will 
be discussed in the following chapter. In so doing, six issues will be explored: 
ISO 
* Philosophical assumptions about the nature of social science 
e Differences between deduction and induction 
* The nature of research 
o Research paradigms 
* Framework for research methods 
op The nature of this research 
6.2 
. 
Philosophical Assumptions about the Nature of Social 
Science 
Much of social science thinking with regard to methodology is shaped by one or other 
conception of the general nature of science (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). All social 
science researchers approach their subject via explicit or implicit assumptions about the 
nature of the social world and the way in which it may be investigated (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). Social scientists, in conducting any research, hold at least four sets of 
assumptions-ontological, epistemological, methodological and those pertaining to human 
nature. 
Adopted from Burrell and Morgan (1979), figure 6a depicts these four sets of assumptions 
from both subjective and objective perspectives. 
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5 
The subjectivist approach 
to social science 
Nominalism 
Anti-positivism 1.4 
Voluntarism 14 
Ideogra phic 
The objectivist approach 
to social science 
Ontolqy -10. Realism 
Epistemology Positivism pI 
Human Nature ---* Determinism 
I 
Methodology -0' . 
Nomothetic 
Figure 6a: Philosophical Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 
(Source: Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 3) 
These assumptions will be reviewed in turn. 
6.2.1 Ontology 
Ontology is the theory of reality (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; and Smith, 1998) or nature of 
being in the world (Radnor, 200 1). Burrell and Morgan (1979) asserted that assumptions of 
an ontological nature are those which concern the very essence of the phenomena under 
investigation. The authors also noted basic ontological questions frequently encountered by 
social scientists, such as whether the 'realiV to be investigated is: 
e external to the individual, or the product of individual consciousness. 
e of an 'objective' nature, or the product of individual cognitiorL 
152 
*a given 'out there' in the world, or the product of one's mind. 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979),, nominalism and realism represent two polar 
assumptions regarding social reality. On the one hand, nominalists assume that the social 
world external to individual cognition is made up solely of concepts and labels which are 
used to structure reality. In other words, from the non-ýnalists' perspective, there is no 
6real' structure which may be described by concepts and labels. These concepts and labels, 
or the 'names' used, are regarded as artificial creation utilised for convenience as tools for 
describing and making sense of the external world. 
Realists, on the other hand, assume that the social world external to individual cognition is 
real and made up of hard, tangible and relatively immutable structures. According to the 
realists, regardless of the use of concepts and labels to describe the social structures, they 
still exist as empirical entities. Individuals may not even be aware of the existence of 
certain structures and therefore, may have no concepts or labels to articulate them. 
For realists, the social world exists independently of an individual's appreciation of it and 
has a reality of its own. It is not something which the individual creates-it exists 'out 
there' prior to the existence and consciousness of any individual. Therefore, the social 
world for the realists has an existence which is as concre i te as the natural world. 
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6.2.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that investigates the nature of knowledge (Radnor, 
2001; and Smith, 1998). It is the study' of knowledge construction, as distinct from 
ontology, the study of reality. 
To differentiate between these two polar epistemological perspectives, many terms have 
been used by different commentators, for example, Positivistic versus Anti-positivism 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979), Positivistic versus Henneneutic (Gummesson, 2000), 
Positivist versus Phenomenological (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991), Positivist versus 
Interpretative (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997; and Riley et al., 2000), and Positivist versus 
Interpretivist (Meredith et al., 1989). 
Perhaps Burrell and Morgan's (1979) tenns-Positivism versus Anti-positivism-convey 
more explicitly and clearly the polar meanings. The authors used the terms positivism and 
anti-positivism as distinctly different epistemological vantage points; as two extremes. 
The term positivism is used to characterise episternologies which seek to explain and 
predict what happens in the social world by searching for regularities and causal 
relationships between its constituent elenunts. The tenn 'positive' refers to 'observable' 
data, which is sensory experience of external objective reality (Meredith et al., 1989). 
The positivist approach holds -that only 
6npirically verifiable or analytic propositions are 
meaningful. 
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In contrast Burrell and Morgan (1979) asserted that anti-positivist epistemology rejects the 
utility of a search for laws or-underlying regularities in the world of social affairs. For the 
anti-positivist the social is essentially relativistic and can only be understood from the 
point of view of the individuals who are directly involved in the activities under study. 
For this reason, anti-positivists rmintain that one can only understand by occupying the 
frame of reference of the participant in action; it is necessary to understand from the inside 
rather than the outside. From the anti-positivistic perspectiveý social science is seen as 
being essentially subjective rather than objective. Anti-positivists tend to disprove the 
objective construction of knowledge of any kind. 
An example of epistemological debate is that between the rationalists (e. g. Rend Descartes 
and Baruch Spinoza)-the positivistic advocates, and the empiricists (e. g. Francis Bacon, 
John Locke, and David Hurne)-the anti-positivistic advocates. On the one hand, 
rationalists rely exclusively on the assumption that reason is the only reliable source of 
human knowledge. In the most general application, rationalism offers a naturalistic 
alternative to appeals to religious accounts of human nature and conduct. 
More specifically, rationalism is the epistemological theory that significant knowledge of 
the world can best be achieved by a priori means independent of sensory experience. 
Therefore, rationalists rely more on deductive methods in acquiring knowledge about the 
social world. ' 
Empiricists, on the other hand, rely on experience as the source of ideas and knowledge. 
The empiricists maintain that nothing can be thought without first being sensed. 
I The differences between deduction and induction will be discussed in section 6.3. 
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The central doctrine of empiricism is that 'nothing is in the understanding that was not 
earlier in the sens&. From the empiricists' point of view, knowledge about the world 
must be acquired by a posteriori means. That is to say, knowledge relies upon specific 
information derived from sense perception, leading to a more inductive approach. 
6.2.3 Human nature 
Assumptions about human nature revolve around the issue of what model of human being 
is reflected in any given social-scientific theory. At the subjective extreme, voluntarists 
view the human being as completely autonomous and free-willed. In contrast, adopting an 
objective standpoint determinists view a human being and her or his activities as being 
completely determined by the situation or environment in which s/he is placed. 
This kind of assumption is an essential element in social-scientific theory, since it defines 
in broad terms the nature of the relationships between the human being and the society in 
which s/he ives. 
6.2.4 Methodology 
The three sets of assumptions outlined above have direct implications of a methodological 
nature. Each one has an impact on the way researchers attempt to investigate social 
phenomena in order to gain knowledge about the social world. Social scientists who hold 
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different assumptions about ontology, epistemology and human nature are thus likely to 
incline towards different methodologies. 
On the one hand, at the subjective extreme, an ideographic approach to social science is 
based on the view that one can only understand the social world by obtaining first-hand 
knowledge of the subject under investigation. This approach thus emphasises the analysis. 
of the subjective accounts which one generates by 'getting inside' situations and involving 
oneself in everyday life. The ideographic method stresses the importance of letting one's 
subject reveal its nature and characteristics during the process of investigation 
On the other hand, at the objective end of the spectrum, the nomothetic approach lays 
emphasis on the importance of basing research upon systematic protocol and technique. 
This is epitornised in the approach and methods employed in the natural sciences, which 
focus upon the process of testing hypotheses in accordance with the canons of scientific 
rigour. It is also focused upon the construction of scientific tests and the use of quantitative 
techniques for the analysis of data. 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), these four sets of assumptions with Kegard to the 
nature of social science provide a considerably powerful tool for the analysis of social 
theory. The authors thus suggested that social scientists should treat these four sets of 
assumptions as analytically distinct It was also noted that while in practice there is often a 
strong relationship between the positions adopted on each of the four strands, assumptions 
about each can, in fact vary considerably. 
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However, Radnor (2001) suggested that since the purpose of social science is to understand 
social reality as different people perceive it and to demonstrate how their views shape the 
action which they take within that reality, ontological and epistemological considerations 
have especially been influential in generating the paradigm within which social science 
research is situated. 
6.3 Differences between Deduction and Induction 
The terms deduction and induction are important for an understanding of theory 
construction (see, for example, Riley et al., 2000). Nevertheless, both can also be the 
source of some confusion. This section therefore reviews differences between deduction 
and induction. 
6.3.1 Deduction 
Deduction is the process which begins with theory and proceeds through hypothesis, data 
collection, and hypothesis testing to deduce explanations of particular phenomena. Thus, a 
deductive research method begins with the development of a concept or theory prior to its 
testing through empirical observation. 
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Gill and Johnson (1991) surnmarised the process of deduction as being divided into four 
ma . or stages: i 
1) Theo ry/hypoth esis formulation 
In this stage, the researcher decides which concepts represent important aspects of the 
theory or problem under investigation. Concepts are then linked together in a causal chain 
by theory/hypothesis. 
2) Operationalisation 
In this stage, the asserted relationships between concepts provided by the theory are 
translated into observable indicators, to enable them to become empirically testable. 
I 
3) Empirical testing of theory/hypothesis 
In this stage, the assertions put forward by the theory/hypothesis are compared with the 
4 J^-- jacts' collected by observation of data from the empirical world. 
4) Falsification or verification of theor-3dhypothesis 
In this stage, a theory/hypothesis is either refuted or verified. If rejected, the 
theory/hypothesis is discarded. However, if verified, the yet falsified covering laws are 
created. 
According to Popper (1972), the refutation or verification of a theory/hypothesis is subject 
to the 'problem of induction'. This problem arises because 'the testing of a theory/ 
hypothesis inevitably involves a finite number of observations; and even if every 
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observation that is made confirms the assertions put forward by a theory, researchers can 
I never be certain whether some future observations might demonstrate instances in which 
the theory does not hold. 
Popper then eschews 'verification', in which scientists atten-pt to prove or justify their 
theories, by proposing the maxim of 'falsificatiod, in which scientists must attempt to 
refute their theories. If the falsification attempt proves unsuccessful, the hypotheses or 
theories are tentatively accepted. For Popper, knowledge grows through the above process 
of deduction-known as 'hypothetico-deductive method-whereby error is removed. This 
method is summarised in figure 6b. 
Theory/Hypothesis Formulation 
Operationalisation 
Empirical Testing of Theo ry/Hypothesis 
[-Falsificatioý 
cation 
Figure 6b: Hypothetico-Deductive Method 
(Source: Gill and Johnson, 1991: 30) 
Gill and Johnson (199 1) also noted that the hypothetico-deductive -approach 
is closely 
bound up with positivism, the main features of which are the view that, in order for social 
160 
science to advance, knowledge produced and explanations used in social science should be 
the same as those proffered by the natural sciences; and that social scientists should treat 
their subject matter (i. e. social world) as if it were the same as the natural world of the 
natural scientist 
It is out of the objections to the implications and assumptions of such a conception of 
social science offered by the deductive approaches that particular inductive approaches to 
research arise. 
6.3.2 Induction 
According to Gilbert (1993), induction is the process by which the exploration and analysis 
of related observations leads to the construction of a theory that systematically links such 
observations in a meaningful way. Inductive reasoning consists of observation leading to 
generalisation. In sharp contrast to the deductive approach, in which a conceptual and 
theoretical structure is developed prior to empirical research, theory is the outcome of 
induction. 
Inductive researchers build theory from observations and intuitive understandings gained 
from empirical evidence. In contrast to deductive researchers, who hope to find data to 
match a theory, inductive researchers hope tofind a theory that explains their data (Goetz 
and LeCompte, 1984). Typical findings are in the form or themes, categories, typologies, 
concepts, tentative hypotheses or theories which have been induced from the data. 
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Theory plays a central role in inductive empirical science, even though the role of theory in 
inductive research is different from that in deductive research. While the deductive 
approach commences research with governing theory, the inductive approach ends with 
theory because the final products of empirical science are the laws and generalisations 
which are called theory (Mouly, 1970). 
Gill and Johnson (1991) maintained that the modem justification for the use of the 
inductive approach in the social sciences tends to revolve around two related arguments: 
e Explanations of social phenomena are relatively worthless unless they are grounded 
in observation and experience. The authors noted that perhaps the most influential 
work supporting this view is Glaser and Strauss' (1967) 'The Discovery of Grounded 
Theory: Strategiesfor Qualitative ResearcY. In this, Glaser and Strauss argued that 
in contrast to the speculative and a priori nature of deductive theory, the inductively 
developed theory is more likely to fit the data and thus, is more likely to be useful, 
plausible, and accessible. 
9 The debatable philosophical assumptions embraced by positivism (including the 
hypothetico-decuctive approach). One of the main themes of positivism and of much 
of the deductive tradition in the social sciences is the conception of scientific method 
constructed from what is assumed to be the approach in the natural sciences. This 
entails the construction of covering-laws that explain past and predict future 
observations, through causal analysis and hypothesis testing. The format of this 
explanation and prediction is: 
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A causes B 
or 
variation in A causes variation in B 
that is, 
stimulus A causes response 
However, supporters of induction in the social sciences rejected the appropriateness of the 
above causal model (see, for example, Riley et al., 2000). It was claimed that social 
phenomena are the products of human action and that the study of people and their actions 
is not amenable to the research techniques most closely associated with positivism 
There are fundamental differences between the subject matter of the social sciences 
(human beings) and the subject matter of the natural sciences (physical objects), from 
which the covering-law model was created. For example, people are directed and capable 
of making choices. They are not inanimate, and their behaviour is not readily understood in 
terms of simple causal factors. 
An inductive approach to research is sometimes regarded as empiricism. For example, Sax 
(1968) noted that the basicform ofreasoning used by empiricists is induction which draws 
general conclusionsfrom specific observation& 
There are some difficulties with the deductive/inductive approach that should be noted. 
For example, it appears that the role of deduction is confined to developing theory, 
however, this is a claim also made for induction. This and related problems are 
controversial among scholars. On the one hand, the anti-inductivists have claimed that 
inductive arguments in reality proceed using the hypothetico-deductive method 
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(Riley et al., 2000). On the other hand, although called hypothetico-deductive, the method 
is, in fact, inductive (Shulver, 2001). 
6.4 The Nature of Research 
Despite the argument with regard to whether the best research is that which proposes 
knowledge or that which validates knowledge, all research investigations involve a 
continuous, repetitive cycle of description, explanation, and testing (Meredith et al., 1989). 
Thus, proposing knowledge (explanation) and validating knowledge (testing) simply are 
two stages in the ongoing cycle of research An individual research study may involve only 
one pf the stages in the cycle at a time. Figure 6c illustrates the ongoing cycle of research 
stages. 
Start 
Description 
Testing Explanation 
Figure 6c: Ongoing Cycle of Research Stages 
(Source: Meredith et al., 1989: 302) 
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Meredith et al. (1989) asserted that the description stage must precede the explanation and 
testing stage, thus discussing each stage respectively. 
6.4.1 Description 
Descriptive research seeks to report and chronicle elements of situations and events. 
The result from descriptive research is a well-documented characterisation of the subject of 
interest that may be used for generating or testing theories, frameworks and concepts 
regarding the situation. 
A finer, more detailed level of description may require an exploratory study which 
investigates a particular aspect rwre fully, based on the understanding that the prelininary 
descriptive research provided. The result of the exploratory research is more detailed 
description that may lead to further insight and understanding. 
I 
6.4.2 Explanation 
Explanation is a topically unified communication the content of which imparts 
understanding of some scientific phenomenon (Scriven, 1962). Meredith et al. (1989) 
summarised Hospers' (1956) three common interpretations of the explanation of a 
phenomenon as: 
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o Stating the phenomenon's goal or purpose 
* Showing the phenomenon to be an instance of a familiar phenomenon 
Bringing the phenomenon under a law (an existing or a new one) 
6.4.3 Testing 
This final stage in the ongoing cycle of research stages involves the detemining of which 
concepts are correct and which false, and the way to modify or expand them. The process 
commonly involves a prediction based on the explanation constructed in the previous 
stage, and then observation to determine if the prediction was correct. Alternatively, a 
prediction may be postulated and then checked against observations already made or 
included in the description. This testing stage is often claimed to be 'true research', 
perhaps because of the rigour of the commonly used tools of statistics or expefirnentation 
seemingly lend to this activity. 
Following testing of the concepts, more description follows concerning other or more 
detailed aspects of the situation, more exploratory investigation is conducted, and new 
concepts or modifications are developed to be tested in turn. Thus, the cycle of learning 
and research continues. 
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6.5 Research Paradigms 
Meredith et al. (1989) described a research paradigm as a set of methods that all exhibit the 
same pattern or element. In the same work, the authors provided examples of various ways 
of classifying research paradigms from previous studies. Among those, Beged-dov and 
Klein (1970), for example, classified research in management science in terms of 
formalism or empiricism. Reisman (1988) categorised the range of management and social 
science research strategies in terms of a Venn diagram-type of framework, and Chase 
(1980) offered a matrix framework for classifying the research conducted in operations. 
Moreover, Burrell 'and Morgan (1979) classified the analysis of social theory into four 
paradigms, including functionalist interpretive, radical structuralist and radical humanist. 
The authors regarded these paradigms as being defined by basic meta-theoretical 
assumptions which underwrite the frame of reference, mode of theorising and modus 
operandi of the social theorists who operate within them 2 Therefore, in these authors' 
view, social scientists operating in different research paradigms seem to view the world 
differently based upon different meta-theoretical assumptions with regard to the nature of 
science and of society. 
Even though social research paradigms can possibly be classified differently, it was in 
Meredith et al. (1989) that research paradigms were classified to better fit operations. 
Owing to the operations nature of this research, these authors' classification of research 
paradigms appears to be more relevant- and has, thus, been adopted. 
These assumptions have already been discussed in section 6.2. 
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According to Meredith et al. (1989), there are possibly two dimensions in classifying 
research paradigm. The first is the 'rationallexistential dimension', which concems the 
nature of truth and whether it is purely logical and independent of human being or whether 
it can only be defined relative to individual experience. The second is the 'naturallartificial 
dimension', which concerns the source and kind of information used in the research. 
Each of these dimensions will be reviewed in turn in the following two sections. 
6.5.1 The rationaVexistential dimension 
According to Meredith et al. (1989), this dimension relates to the epistemological structure 
of the research process itself It represents researchers' viewpoints of the way in which 
knowledge can be created. 
At one extreme is rationalism, which uses a formal structure and pure logic as the ultimate 
measure of truth. At the other extreme is existentialism, in which knowledge is acquired 
through the human process of interacting with the environment. From the existentialists' 
point of view, an individual's unique capabilities together with the environrmnt are 
regarded as the basis of knowledge. While rationalism conforms to the traditional 
deductive approach to research, existentialism conforms to an inductive approach. 
Meredith et al. (1989) noted four generic perspectives in the rational/existential dimension, 
by different degrees of formalism. The four perspectives-in order of degree of formal 
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structure from most to least-are axiomatic, logical positivistlempiricist, interpretive, and 
critical theory. These perspectives will be explored in turn. 
Axiomatic perspective 
The axiomatic perspective represents the theorem-proof world of research. A high degree 
of knowledge is assumed, a priori, about the goals and the socio-technical structure of the 
organisation. The key organising concepts are the presence of formal procedure 
characterised by scientific management principles. 
Logical positivist/empiricist perspective 
This perspective assumes that the phenomenon under study can be isolated from the 
context in which it occurs, and that facts or observations are independent of the laws and 
theories used to explain them Yin (1993) noted that social science research is usually 
based on this philosophical school of thought which espouses the practice of research 
based on the collection and analysis of empirical data. Findings and conclusions are then 
derived from these data. 
Interpretive perspective 
This perspective includes the context of the phenomenon as part of the object of study. 
Interpretive researchers study people rather than objects, with a focus on meanings and 
interpretations rather than behaviour. The purpose is to understand how others construe, 
conceptualise, and understand events and concepts. Interpretivist researchers consider facts 
as dependent on the theory or the observer. Interpretive researchers offer explanations by 
placing behaviour in a broader context in which the behaviour makes sense. 
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Critical theory perspective 
This perspective is an attempt to synthesise the positivist and interpretive perspective and 
overcome their dichotomy by placing knowledge in the broader context of its contribution 
to social evolution. The positivist and interpretivist perspectives are considered 
dialectically interrelated. This perspective tmnscends the contradiction between the way 
people behave in practice and the way they understand themselves to be acting. 
Measure ofthe dimension 
Meredith et al. (1989) asserted that a number of measures can be implemented in the 
rational/existential dimension to help clarify the continuum. On the one hand, the 
rationalists research process tends to be deductive, more formally structured, objective, 
methodologically prescribed, minimally interactive with environment, a priori, and in 
accord with existing theories or laws. 
In contrast, the existentialist research process tends to be inductive, less formally 
structured, subjective, more creative with less methodological prescriptions, highly 
interactive with the environment, a posteriori, and concerned more about the 
correspondence of findings to the real world than their accord with theories. 
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The rational/existential dimension can be summarised in the following figure. 
Rational Existential 
h- P, Axiomatic Logical Positivist / Empiricist Intcrpretive Critical Thcory 
Deductive 
Formal 
Objective 
Methodological 
Low interaction 
Many assumptions 
Coherence 
Figure 6d: Ration al/Existential Continuum 
(Source: adapted from Meredith et al., 1989: 306) 
Inductive 
Informal 
Subjective 
Creative 
High interaction 
Few assumptions 
Correspondence 
6.5.2 The natural/artificial dimension 
This dimension concerns the source and kind of information used in research, ranging from 
purely natural to purely artificial. At the natural end of the continuum is empiricism 
(deriving explanation from concrete, objective data), while at the artificial end is 
subjectivism (deriving explanation from interpretation and artificial reconstruction of 
reality). 
Meredith et al. (1989) noted that a researcher's perception of reality is moulded by the 
mechanisms used to study the phenomenon. The authors broadly classified these 
mechanisms into three categories, including object reality, people's perceptions of object 
reality, and artificial reconstruction of object reality. These three mechanisms will be 
reviewed in turn. 
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Object reality 
Object reality refers to direct observation by the researcher of the phenomenon. It assumes 
that an object has an independent reality detectable through human senses. The observation 
may be subjected to formal structured analysis or to interpretation using critical theory. 
People's perceptions of object reality 
The primary concern is the perception or abstract representation of the reality of 
individuals exposed to the phenomenon. This mechanism studies the phenomenon by use 
of the second source methods, 'through somebody else's eyes'. 
Meredith et al. (1989) noted that researching through people's perceptions of object reality 
is sometimes the only efficient and effective way to obtain infori-nation about the 
phenomenon of interest in operations in which a number of constructs are difficult through 
researcher's direct observation. In such situations, an assessment of people's perceptions 
may yield significant insights into the underlying explanation of the phenomenon. 
Research conducted through this mechanism is that which employs survey studies and 
interviews. 
Artificial reconstruction of object reality 
This approach recasts the object reality into another form that is more appropriate for 
testing and experimentation, such as analytical models, computer simulations, or I 
information constructs. Generally speaking, an artificial reconstruction of object reality is 
attempted in almost all the modelling and systems analytic efforts. 
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Measure ofthe dimension 
As with the rational/existential dimension, Meredith el al. (1989) proposed a number of 
measures to describe the continuum of the natural/artificial dimension. On the one hand, at 
the natural end of the continuum, the research process is more directly concerned with real 
phenomena, less concerned with reliability and more with externally generalisable validity, 
closer to reality, less controllable, less efficient, and more current. 
On the other hand, in contrast, at the artificial extreme of the continuum, the research 
process uses highly abstracted and sin-plified models, more concemed with reliability and 
internal consistency. At this extreme, the researchers are separated from the phenomenon. 
Research processes are highly controllable through the use of a priori constructs to specify 
the information to be collected, and are also highly efficient, since aberrations do not have 
any causal source. Finally, the resultant research is dated, since the specification of the 
constructs or models takes most of the researcher's time and pushes the natural 
phenomenon further into the past. 
The natural/artificial dimension can be summarised in the following figure: 
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Natural Artificial 
4 00. 
Direct Observation of People's Perceptions of Artificial Reconstruction Object Reality Object Reality of Object Reality 
" Complex 0 Simple 
" External validity 0 Internal validity 
" Small separation 0 Large separation 
" Minimal control 0 Maximum control 
Effective 0 Efficient 
Present 0 Past 
Figure 6e: Natural/Artificial Continuum 
(Source: adapted from Meredith et al., 1989: 306) 
Both the rational/exisýential dimension and the natural/artificial dimension together can be 
used to identify the approximate position of each research method within a framework of 
research paradigms. This framework will be explored next. 
6.6 Framework for Research Methods 
In the previous section, the broad range of available research paradigms proposed by 
Meredith el al. (1989) was reviewed. In this section, the position of each research method 
in the research paradigm will be identified. 
By combining the rational/existential and the natural/artificial dimensions, it is possible to 
create a matrix that identifies a meta-theory for research methods, as demonstrated in the 
following figure: 
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Natural 
4 
Artificial 
U, 
Rational Direct People's 
P- 
Artificial 
Observation of Perceptions of Reconstruction of 
Object Reality Object Reality Object Reality 
* Reason/Logicfrhcorcms 
0 Normative Modelling 
0 Descriptive Modelling 
Axiomatic 
" Field Studies 9 Structured * Prototyping 
" Field Experiments Interviewing * Physical Modelling 
Logical 0 Survey Research 0 Laboratory Experimentation 
Positivist/ 0 Simulation Empiricist 
" Action Research * Historical Analysis 9 Conceptual Modelling 
" Case Studies o Delphi e Hermencutics 
0 Intensive Interviewing 
Expert Panels Interpretive Futures/Scenarios 
Critical a Introspective 
Theory Reflection 
Existential 
Figur e 6f-. A Framewor k for Research Me thods 
(Source: Meredit h et al., 1989: 309) 
The above figure depicts the two dimensions mentioned in the previous section, with the 
methodologies available to researchers placed in their appropriate cell(s). With regard to 
this framework, Meredith et al. (1989) noted that some methodologies logically could fall 
into a number of cells, or relate to only one of the dimensions. Moreover, a number of 
Direct People's Artificial 
Observation of Perceptions of Reconstruction of 
Object Reality Object Reality Object Reality 
_ * Reason/Logicfrhcorcms 
0 Normative Modelling 
0 Descriptive Modelling 
Axiomatic 
" Field Studies Structured * Prototyping 
" Field Experiments Interviewing * Physical Modelling 
Logical 0 Survey Research 0 Laboratory Experimentation 
Positivist/ 0 Simulation Empiricist 
" Action Research * Historical Analysis 9 Conceptual Modelling 
" Case Studies o Delphi e Hermencutics 
0 Intensive Interviewing 
Expert Panels Interpretive Futures/Scenarios 
Critical a Introspective 
Theory Reflection 
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methodologies can fairly easily be used for any of the three stages of research- 
description, explanation, or testing-discussed in section 6.4 earlier. 
Brief descriptions of each methodology appearing within the above framework will be 
reviewed next. These descriptions are also based mostly on those offered by Meredith et al. 
(1989). 
Direct Observation 
Field Studies 
Field study researchers carefully select field sites to evaluate one or more factors. 
This approach is sirnilar to the classic experimental design, where variables are controlled, 
rather than manipulated, through the careful selection of field sites. However, in some 
exploratory studies, field sites can be selected as a multiple sample of case studies without 
particularly controlling for any factor. Being used in this way, field study is expected to 
yield an early understanding of the phenomena under study as well as to confirm/refute the 
existing theory. 
Field Experiments 
Using this methodology, a researcher manipulates independent variables and controls 
intervening variables, so that the resulting dependent variables can be determined. 
This method is not widely used in operations because of the difficulty in controlling 
dependent variables in the operations of real-world organisations. 
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Action Research 
In this method, the researcher attempts to influence the situation in a positive direction 
while collecting data and observing the dependent variables. Action researchers do not 
merely observe, but also work at making it happen (Gummesson, 2000). Coughlan and 
Coghlan (2002) portrayed action research as yielding both action and research, unlike 
traditional positivistic research which aims at creating knowledge only. These authors 
noted that, although originating as early as the mid-1940s, action research has scarcely 
been used as operations research methodology, possibly due to the iniprecise, uncertain, 
and unstable nature of its research activity. 
Case Studies 
This method is used to investigate a specific phenomenon through an in-depth, limited- 
scope study. The attractions of case studies are that phenomena can be studied in their 
natural settings by use of various data collection methods (e. g. interview, observation, and 
documentation), and that theories generated directly from data tend to have high validity 
with practitioners. While case studies can be used for different purposes, such as 
exploration, theory building, theory testing and theory extension/refinement (Voss et al., 
2002), it is particularly useful in the early phases of research, where there may be no prior 
hypotheses or previous work for guidance (Meredith et al., 1989). 
A case study can comprise of a single or multiple cases. However, researchers should be 
aware of a possible trade off effect, that is to say, while the inclusion of a greater number 
of cases in the study may increase its breadth, it inevitably reduces the depth of the study, 
given the limited set of research resources available to the researchers at a specific time. 
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People's Perceptions 
Structured Interviewing 
In structured interviewing, a fixed forniat is followed for the interview and the details of 
every answer are carefully noted as the interview proceeds. All questions are the same, 
so that a typically constrained answer may be compared across interviews, situations, 
organisations, and so forth. The main reason for the use of structured interview is to 
control the situation and responses from the interviewees, thereby facilitating uniformity in 
analysis. 
Structured interview data can be systematically analysed through non-quantitative means 
or subject to intensive statistical analysisý to identify factors, clusters and other such 
relationships in a statistically significant way. 
Surveying 
Like structured interviewing, this method allows for statistical analysis. Survey 
questionnaire can be sent to a large number of people with little effort. Therefore, it can be 
seen as a more time-efficient research method compared with structured interviewing. 
Stratified samples can also be predetermined to assess factors of particular interest For 
these reasons, the survey method is extremely popular among academics (Meredith et al., 
1989). 
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However, among its disadvantages are the possible poor response rate of surveys, 
the danger of answers being of little value, and the difficulty with which interesting 
responses can be followed up. 
HistoricallArchival Analysis 
This approach examines historical documents or less formally recorded data to evaluate 
factors, make comparisons, note apparent contradictions, see similarities, make inferences, 
gain insight and generally analyse a situation from a particular perspective. The coverage 
of the documents examined is frequently over a period of time. No manipulation of the 
variables is possible, and the only control the researcher can exercise is that of selecting for 
particular evidence or factors and then interpreting them 
Delphi 
This technique is a type of expert panel in which explicitly defined methods are used to 
obtain and consolidate expert opinion. The participants need not be near the object reality, 
and even more importantly, they need not be near each other, nor even respond to the 
Delphi administrator at the same time. 
Typically, only one issue is explored, and participants report a score on a measure of 
interest. They also give reasons for the scores reported and the score statistics, and those 
reasons are fed back to the participants for a second round. This process may be repeated 
with each member of the panel having a chance to re-evaluate their initial responses (Riley 
et al., 2000), following which the panel results are documented. The Delphi approach has 
been used in operations primarily for predicting alternative futures, or regular forecasts. 
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Intensive Interviewing 
Intensive interviewings are conducted using open-ended questions. As a researcher spots 
issues or points of interest they can be followed up in greater detail. Even though this 
approach is particularly suitable for descriptive and exploratory phases of research, it can 
also be used for hypotheses testing. A major advantage of intensive interviewing is that the 
informants frame the issues of which the researcher may not even have been aware. 
Expert. Panels 
In this approach, experts are selected to form a panel giving opinions, beliefs, or 
experiences with regard to a specific situation. Similarities and differences in the data 
obtained among experts are noted and statistical analyses of their responses may be 
conducted. This method is also typically. most useful in the exploratory and concept 
development stages of research. 
Futures ResearchIScenarios 
For this technique, different future scenarios are postulated. The results from each scenario 
can then be evaluated by means of a conceptual, pictorial, or abstract model. Future 
research/scenarios have gained popularity in some areas, such as forecasting and long- 
range planning, where different possible world scenarios are postulated, the effect of which 
is then evaluated. 
Introspective Reflection 
In this approach, the researcher reflects on her/his own experience to describe, explore and 
formulate concepts about, or evaluate, some situations of interest. That is, the researcher 
180 ' 
- analyses her or his own impressions rather than those of someone else. This most 
existential method allows the integration of both positivist and interpretivist approaches to 
attain a higher level of understanding. 
Artificial reconstruction 
ReasonlLogical DeductionlTheorem Proving 
This and the following two approaches are the most rational arýificial methods. For these 
approaches, a model of object reality is constructed. These approaches all involve rigorous, 
logical analysis that can be followed and replicated by other researchers. This model can 
be composed of a set of reasoned or logical statements or logico-mathernatical theorems or 
formula. This method is frequently used to construct models that are embodied in software 
for expert and decision support systems, and in mathematical models of operational 
systems. 
Normative. 4nalytical Modelling 
This approach is conducted at a relatively macro level with simple, closed-form 
mathematical representations. The model is used to produce a prescriptive result typically 
by iteratively applying the analytical equations until some desirable value, usually of one 
dependent variable, is achieved. Examples include linear programming and inventory 
modelling. 
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Descriptive Analytical Modelling 
This method also is conducted at a macro level with relatively simple, closed-form 
mathematical representations. However, unlike normative modelling, this method is used 
simply to describe-by mathematical emulation-the actual workings of a real-world 
system counterpart. Examples of quantitative models used in operations include queuing 
theory, location analysis, inventory theory and so on. 
Prototyping 
This and the following three methods-physical modelling, laboratory experimentation, 
and mathematical simulation-employ the logical positivist/empiricist tradition rather than 
the axiomatic approach. Prototyping involves the construction of a working model of a 
system. This model serves as a pilot or exemplar that includes the majority of, or a selected 
subset of, the attributes of the systern Prototyping is c0inmonly used in operations to 
evaluate the feasibility, benefits, limitations, and other aspects of potential new systems to 
be used in an organisation. 
Physical Modelling 
With physical modelling, the model is a physical representation ote real setting, like 
those made by industrial engineers when evaluating a new layout for a plant. This is a 
common approach for office remodelling, warehouse evaluation, and refinery checkout. 
A two- or three-dimensional model of the proposed system is built to determine or evaluate 
relationships, interferences, sizes and other such characteristics of the proposed system 
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Laboratory Experimentation 
In this approach, the intervening variables are controlled, while the independent variables 
are manipulated systematically to determine their effects on the dependent variables. 
This approach is norrnally adopted in physical sciences, and has also been used extensively 
in the social sciences. However, with realistic operations problems, it is difficult to conduct 
experiments, especially if they involve larger systems such as organisation as a whole. 
The Hawthorne experiments are a good example of this approach. 
Mathematical Simulation 
This method includes both a conceptual model of what is happening through equations, 
plus an element of reality through the values set for the parameters in the equations. 
On occasion, parameter values are hypothesised and evaluated in the model rather than 
being derived from real world data, which reduces the fit of the model to the actual 
phenomenon and increases the risk of irrelevance (reduces external validity). 
Conceptual Modelling 
The last two methods fall in the interpretive cell and are more existential than rational. 
With conceptual modelling, a mental model of the suspected relationships is posited, which 
may then be evaluated by means of a framework that captures the essence of the system 
under investigation. A PERT/CPM diagram is a typical conceptual model that can be tested 
and evaluated for research purposes. Similarly, Gantt charts, system models with feedback 
loops, fishbone, cause-effect diagrams, and even taxonomies and categorisations are all 
conceptual models. 
183 
Hermeneutics 
Hermeneutics is directly concerned with the itterpretation of what is being observed. It is 
used in reference to the interpreting of either reconstructions of object reality, such as texts 
or films, or the object reality directly, such as an organisation in action. The observer's 
framework and methodology are important to the description of the object of study because 
the observer is interpreting and documenting it. 
6.7 The Nature of this Research 
This section applies Meredith et al. 's (1989) research paradigms framework to the object 
of this study-the alignment between performance measurement and strategy. In so doing, 
this section answers the two fundamental questions that help to identify the paradigm of 
this research. 
1) How can knowledge be created: rationally or existentialIy9. 
Given that the knowledge on the object of study for this research is rather underdeveloped, 
this research is based upon fewer a priori assumptions. 
Moreover, since there exist limited theories or laws regarding the object of the study, it is 
of less concern that the obtained knowledge be in accord with the existing theories or laws. 
Rather, the concern is more about the way in which the findings correspond to the real 
world. Therefore, this research fits less comfortably with the axiomatic perspective of the 
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rational approach, and more with the logical positivist/empiricist and the interpretive 
perspective in the rational/existential continuum 
Tbe appropriate approach tends to be the one that is more inductive, less formally 
structured, subjective, more creative with less methodological prescriptior4 highly 
interactive with the environment, a posteriori, and in accord with the real world. 
For this reason, this research has a position closer to the existential extreme of the 
rational/existential continuum 
2) Source and kind of information: natural or artificial? 
The object of this study-the alignment-is not 'something' detectable by human senses. 
Rather the 'alignment' is an abstract representation of the reality of the individual exposed 
to the phenomenon. Therefore, the relevant data is not likely to come from the direct 
observation of the alignment per se, as proposed in the extreme natural Perspective. It is 
thus, more appropriate to study the phenomenon 'through somebody else's eyes'. 
Moreover, the alignment between performance measurement and strategy is a construct 
that is difficult through the researcher's direct observation. In this case, an assessment of 
people's perceptions is considered to be possibly the only efficient and effective way to 
obtain information about the phenomenon (Meredith et al., 1989). 
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For this reason, it is assumed that the most appropriate view of object reality for this 
research is that of the people who are directly involved within the organisational contexts 
As a result, these people will be the primary source of information for this study. 
Figure 6g shows how this research fits into the social sciences research paradigm 
discussed earlier in section 6.5. 
Rational 
'A kk 
Natural Artificial 
e% 
This 
research 
Existential 
Figure 6g: The Position of this Research 
in the Research Paradigm 
(Source: the author) 
This research, therefore, adopted an interpretive perspective aiming to understand how 
people in real-life organisational contexts construe, conceptualise and understand the 
ob ect of the study. This research then used mainly the people's view of reality as its data j 
source. 
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6.8 Summary 
This chapter aimed to review social science philosophy and research methodologies in 
order to justify the philosophical stance and rnethods of this research. 
In conducting social research, investigators-knowingly or not-hold at least four sets of 
philosophical assumptions, including ontological (nominalist or realist), epistemological 
(anti-positivist or positivist), assumptions about human nature (voluntarist or determinist), 
and methodological (ideographic or nomothetic). 
It was argued that social research can be conducted via either a deductive or an inductive 
approach. While the former begins with theory before empirical testing, the latter starts 
with the observations of empirical evidence, then generalises to theory. Typically, all 
research investigations involve a continuou!; repetitive cycle of description, explanation, 
and testing. 
Research paradigms consisting of the rational/existential and the naturallartificial 
dimensions can be used as a framework for identifying the approximate position of each 
research method. By using this framework, the position of this research in the research 
paradigms was then identified. In the next chapter, research methods for this study will be 
explained and justified accordingly in detail. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Research Methods 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed philosophical perspectives of social science research as 
well as available research methods. The position of this research in the research paradigms 
was identified. It was explained that this research would employ the interpretive 
perspective, using mainly people's views of reality as the data source. 
In this chapter, the research methods for the present study will be explored. The main 
purpose of the chapter is to integrate the backgrounds and philosophical perspectives 
reviewed earlier in the previous chapter, thereby providing a coherent justification for the 
chosen methods. In so doing, this chapter will explore five main aspects of the methods 
employed in this research: 
9 Research strategy 
9 Research design 
* Data collection 
Data processing and analysis 
Quality assurance for case study research 
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7.2 Research Strategy 
A 'research strategy' can be defined as a way of investigating an empirical topic by 
following a set of pre-specified procedures (Yin, 2003). It was these procedures, according 
to Descartes and Locke, that provided the key to the success of scientific knowledge. 
If applied with appropriate scruples and commitment, it was claimed, the production of 
knowledge of the world would be guaranteed (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997). 
The term 'research strategy' has been adopted in this research mainly to emphasise that, 
even though research methods may well be treated as simple instruments, in fact, they 
operate within sets of assumptions. The previous chapter has already reviewed the 
philosophical assumptions underpinning each particular research method for social 
sciences. 
However, each research strategy utilises different ways of collecting and analysing 
empirical evidence, following its own logic. To exploit the research strategy to the full, the 
researcher should be aware of both the advantages and disadvantages of different strategies 
before making a choice. The goal is to avoid gross misfits-that is using one type of 
strategy when another is really more advantageous (Yin, 1994). 
In his seminal book on case study research methodology entitled 'Case Study Research: 
Design and Methods', Yin (1994) identified five major research strategies, including 
(1) experiment, (2) survey, (3) archival analysis, (4) history, and (5) case study. The author 
highlightýd a common misconception, namely, that the various research strategies may be 
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viewed hierarchically-that is, case studies are appropriate for the exploratory phase of an 
investigation, surveys and histories are appropriate for the descriptive phase, and 
experiments are the only way of conducting explanatory inquiries. 
Yin not only regarded this hierarchical view as incorrect, but also suggested that a more 
appropriate view of these different strategies was a pluralistic one. Each strategy can be 
used for all three purposes-exploration, description or explanation. Therefore, what 
distinguishes research strategies are not the hierarchical purposes of the research, but three 
other conditions, namely, (1) the nature of the research questions, (2) the requirement for 
control over behavioural events, and (3) the focus on contemporary events. 
Table 7a below displays these conditions and the way each condition relates to five major 
research strategies in social science. 
Strategy Form of Research Requires Control Over 
Focuses on 
Questions Behavioural Events? Contemporary Events? 
Expcrimcnt how, why Yes Yes 
Survey who, what where, No Yes 
how many, how much 
Archival analysis who, what, where, No Yes/No 
how many, how much 
History how, why No No 
Case study how, why No Yes 
Table 7a: Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies 
(Source: Yin, 1994: 6) 
Based on Yin's (1994) argument, the rationale for adopting case study as the research 
strategy for this research will be discussed next 
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7.2.1 Case Study as the Research Strategy 
It is important to note that research strategies are not always mutually exclusive. More than 
one strategy can be used in any given study (e. g. a survey within a case study). However, it 
is possible to identify some situations in which a specific strategy has a distinct advantage 
Yin (1994) maintained that a case study strategy is preferable when: 
A 'how' or 'why' question is being asked about a contemporary set of 
events over which the investigators have little or no controZ 
In considering the relevant situations for different research strategies exhibited in table 7a, 
case study seemed to be the preferable research strategy, due to the three following 
characteristics of the present study: 
The nature of the research questions 
The 'how' question posited in this research (i. e. how, in central government agencies, is 
the alignment between performance measurement and strategy managecP) would be likely 
to lead to the use of experiments, histories and case studies as the preferred research 
strategies. 
However, when considering the topic of this research, case research strategy seemed to be 
more appropriate because performance measurement and strategy have a dynamic and 
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complex interplay within organisations. In addition, the wider taxonomy of performance 
measurement serves to increase this complexity (McAdam and Bailie, 2002). 
The requirement for control over behavioural events 
Since this research did not intend to control actual behavioural events, experiment was not 
selected as a strategy. As a result, only two plausible choices of research strategy were lefý 
i. e. either histories or case studies. 
The focus on contemporary events 
Since the interest of this research lay in contemporary events, the use of histories was not 
favoured. 
On the basis of Yin's (1994) criteria for research strategy selection, case study appeared to 
be the most suitable strategy for this particular piece of research 
It would appear that there are a number of researchers who also advocate the selection of 
case study on the basis of the above criteria. For example, Robson (1993) noted that 
whatever the researcher's epistemology, a case study is an appropriate strategy for 
answering research questions which ask how or why, and which do not require control 
over the events. In addition, Benbasat (1984) stated that the goals of the researcher and the 
nature of the research topic influence the selection of a research strategy. It has been 
claimed that case research is appropriate for certain types of problems, particularly those in 
which research and theory are in their early, fonnative stages (Roethlisberger, 1977), and 
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the sticky, practice-based problems where the experiences of the actors are important and 
the context of action is critical (Bonoma, 1983). 
Despite the existence of much literature reinforcing the notion of performance 
measurement-strategy alignment, the approach appears to have arisen largely from 
normative and intuitive arguments, rather than from empirical evidence. For this reason, 
the field case studies have been necessary to add empirically evidenced knowledge to the 
body of knowledge pertaining to performance measurement studies. 
The idea that one advantage of using the case study method is the likelihood of the 
resultant theory being empirically valid is also supported by Eisenhardt (1989). The author 
noted that the likelihood of a valid theory is high because the studying process is so tightly 
bound with evidence that it is very likely that the resultant theory will be consistent with 
empirical observation. 
Moreover, case research enriches not only theory, but also the researchers themselves 
(Voss et al., 2002). By conducting research in the field, case researchers are exposed to 
real problems, the creative insights of people at all levels of organisation, and the varied 
contexts of cases. The individual researcher will personally benefit from the experience of 
conducting case research. In view of the fact that this doctoral research is the start of the 
author's professional and research career in the public sector, exposure to the research 
contexts was considered to be beneficial. It would be of particular benefit if a multiple-case 
study strategy were adopted because this type of approach increases the chances of 
exposure to wider public organisations. 
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However, it should be noted that case study is not a perfect research strategy in itself and, 
as with any other research strategy, it has both advantages and disadvantages (see, for 
example, Benbasat et al., 1987). At the same time, by virtue of the fact that each research 
strategy has advantages in some areas and disadvantages in others, it is clear that no single 
strategy will be comprehensively more appropriate than others for all research purposes. 
This is also true of case study strategy, against which there have been arguments. 
In operations management studies, for instance, McCutcheon and Meredith (1993) noted 
that the negative view of the case study method is not unique. 
In addition to the apparent appropriateness of the case study strategy for this research 
multiple case studies were regarded as useful, in light of the underdeveloped nature of 
existing knowledge on the subject with few guiding assumptions and theories. For this 
reason, the characteristics of multiple-case study research will be reviewed next. 
7.2.2 Multiple-case study research 
Case study can provide an in-depth insight into the phenomenon studied. By using multiple 
cases in particular, the evidence is considered more compelling, and the overall study is, 
therefore, regarded as being more robust (see, for example, Eisenhardt, 1989). According 
to these authors, there seems to be a wide acceptance that a case study comprising of 
multiple cases can help researchers fully understand the phenomenon under investigation 
in a real setting, which can lead to high validity with practitioners-the ultimate users of 
research. 
194 
Eisenhardt (1991), for example, suggested that, in theory-building research especially, the 
theoretical impact from case research comes from rigorous method and multiple-case 
comparative logic. Therefore, a theory built from multiple-case research tends to be 
I 
enriched., Multiple cases are a powerful means of creating theory because they permit 
replication and extension among individual cases. The replication allows individual cases 
to be used for independent corroboration of specific propositions. The extension allows the 
use of multiple cases to develop more elaborate theory, because different cases often 
emphasise complementary aspects of a phenomenon. Therefore, by piecing together the 
individual patterns, the researcher can draw a more complete theoretical picture. 
Even though a number of authors appear to have realised the benefits of the nmltiple-case 
study method, others-if not as many- have regarded it as a drawback. For example, 
Wolcott (1994) argued that in practice, the study of multiple cases reduces the attention the 
researcher is able to direct at any one of them, and serves to weaken rather than strengthen 
the case study. Moreover, in theoretical terms, Dyer and Wilkins (1991) critiqued the merit 
of incorporating multiple cases into case study, by noting that many seminal classic case 
studies tend to rest on single cases, and that single-case research produces more and better 
theories than multiple-case research. 
However, the single-case study approach also falls under criticisn-ý for example, for its 
generalisability of the conclusions, models or theory (e. g. Eisenhardt, 1991). Other 
potential problems of such an approach include the risks of misjudging a single event and 
of exaggerating easily available data (Leonard-Barton, 1990). Although problems can arise 
I 
in either single- or multiple-case research, they tend to be lessened when events and data 
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are compared across cases. Miles and Huberman (1994), for example, generalised that the 
more cases in a study and the greater the variation across cases, the more compelling an 
interpretation can be. Thus, using multiple cases in a case study is a means of 
strengthening or broadening the analytic generalisations of the research 
Again, considering the underdeveloped nature of the knowledge pertaining to alignment 
between performance measurement and strategy, the use of a multiple-case study appeared 
to be appropriate, and was, therefore, adopted. 
In the next section, the research design of this multiple-case study will be explained and 
justified. 
7.3 Research Design 
The previous section discussed the underlying rationale for applying multiple-case study as 
the research strategy for this study. In this section, the research design of this case study 
will be described. 
Yin (1994) maintained that research design can be viewd as a 'blueprint' of the research 
providing an action plan for moving from an initial set of research questions to a set of 
conclusions. Major steps such as the collection and analysis of relevant data may also be 
found within such a plan (Yin, 1991). It has been well documented that the main purpose 
of the design is to ensure that the evidence to be collected is pertinent to the research 
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questions, and that the analytic strategies cover the critical rival hypotheses or competing 
concerns of a case study (Yin, 1993). 
This research comprised of three phases, including an exploratory study, a pilot case study, 
and a multiple-case study. Figure 7a summarises the research design of this study. 
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Figure 7a: The Design of this Research 
(Source: adapted from Yin, 1994: 49) 
The details of each phase of the research will be discussed in section 7.3.2, after a review 
of the roles of theory in interpretive case study research in the next section. 
7.3.1 Roles of theory in interpretive case study research 
Winegardner (2000) noted that typically, the development of an interpretive case study 
begins with the establishment of a theoretical framework, the set of questions to be 
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answered by the research. The way questions are asked and how the answers are sought are 
influenced by the epistemological orientation of the researcher. This is, in part, a reflection 
of the researcher's personal background, professional discipline, and review of the existing 
literature. As a result of the researcher's established focus, the framework will address the 
problem to be investigated by the study, what is known about the topic, what is not known, 
why it is important to know it, and the specific purpose of the study. 
It seems confusing, on some occasions, to regard interpretive case study research as 
beginning without underpinning theories. This is due, at least partly, to the inductive nature 
of interpretive research, which leads to constructs, hypotheses, and ultimately, the theory 
(Merriam, 1998). However, like all scientific research, for which theory provides its 
foundation (Flynn et al., 1990), theory is present in all interpretive studies because no 
study could be designed without a number of questions being asked, either explicitly or 
implicitly. The development of the problem statement and the phrasing of research 
questions reflect a theoretical foundation. 
Even in a theory building (as opposed to theory verification) study, a priori theory or 
constructs provide the foundation of an interpretive exercise designed to produce a theory 
for later testing (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Without a conscious attempt at theory building, 
research can degenerate into simply 'data gathering' or the ad hoc collection and analysis 
of data for whatever conclusions can be found. 
Generally speaking, the origin of a theory-building study is not a hypothesis, but rather, a 
number of assumptions, frameworks, a perceived problem or perhaps, very tentative 
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hypotheses (Flynn et al., 1990). In other words, case studies that generate theory grounded 
in the data of the study itself are not conducted in a theoretical vacuum. Rather, as 
Schwandt (1993) noted, they contain a complex process of induction and deduction guided 
by prior theoretical commitments and conceptual schemes. Insights that form the basis of 
the resultant theory can come from existing theory, personal experience, and the 
experience of others (Merriam, 1998). 
1 
Therefore, even though this study did not aim to Prove or disprove any particular 
hypotheses, it was not conducted in a theoretical vacuum. Rather, this study was guided by 
prior theoretical commitments and conceptual schemes derived from the existing literature. 
One of the principal reasons that this study did not aim at approval or disapproval of 
particular hypotheses was the lack of suppoilive evidence underpinning those theoretical 
commitments and conceptual schemes. As with some other fields of study, such as 
operations management, which some may perceive as being rather atheoretical (Flynn et 
al., 1990), theories on performance measurement are perhaps too often implicit or difficult 
to articulate. Much of the research into the alignment between performance measurement 
and strategy has been derived largely from intuitive thought and is, thus, prone to be more 
descriptive and normative. Consequently, supportive evidence that underpins perfon-nance 
measurement theories has been too flimsy to form hypotheses to be proved or disproved. 
I 
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7.3.2 Three phases of this 
This research comprised of three phases, including an exploratory study, a pilot study, and 
a multiple-case study, with the last phase being the principal. In this section, each phase 
vvill be explained in tum 
Phase 1: an exploratory study 
The main purpose of conducting an exploratory study was to ensure that the issue of the 
alignment between performance measurement and strategy was not only a gap in the body 
of knowledge, but also of practical interest for practitioners in public sector management. 
The exploratory study was undertaken with UK District Auditors. The methodology for 
this phase of the study was a serni-structured interview of two managers from the UK 
District Audit-an arm's length aspect of the national-level Audit Commission. 
The results from the study confirmed that the alignment between performance 
measurement and strategy was important and an issue of interest for public sector 
practitioners. Moreove, despite its importance, little was known about the issue. The results 
from the exploratory study also determined the design of a data-collection protocol for the 
next phases of the research. 
Phase 2: a pilot study 
A pilot study is a small-scale trial before the main investigation (Wilson, 1996). 
The essence of a pilot study for this particular research lies in the intention to assess the 
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adequacy of the research design and of the instruments to be used for data-collection. 
The pilot study can also facilitate further understanding of the issue in the real 
organisational setting. 
There were two'maj or purposes in conducting this phase of study. First, to take one further 
step in testing the concepts and research question, having been verified within the UK 
context from the previous phase of study, in real organisational settings. Second, to test 
data collection protocol, in. order to obtain the results that might lead to the revision of the 
protocol before conducting the main study*in the third phase. Therefore, the pilot study was 
intended to assist in the development of a relevant line of questioning-possibly providing 
some conceptual clarification for the research design as well. 
In addition, since the chosen research context for this study is the Thai public 
administration, it was sensible to gain greater understanding of the topic of this research in 
the Thai public sector context before conducting the main phase of this study (the rationale 
for research context selection and the selected cases will be explained later in sections 
7.4.1 and 7.4.2). 
The pilot study also helped the researcher to establish a connection with the officials, 
especially those of high rank, in a Thai government organisation, which might facilitate the 
study in the later phase. Additionally, since the researcher's lack of research interviewing 
experience was a concern, conducting the pilot study provided a good opportunity for him 
to master interviewing skills prior to moving on to conducting the main phase of the study. 
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By paralleling the pilot study with an ongoing review of relevant literature, the final 
research design was improved both by former theories and by a fresh set of empirical 
evidence. The dual sources of information helped to ensure that the ongoing study reflected 
significant theoretical issues as well as questions relevant to the contemporary case (Yin, 
1994). In so doing, the research framework and research protocol were improved, in order 
to match better the phenomenon being studied. According to Stroh (2000), this is the 
creativity of the qualitative research process-which implies contingent methods to capture 
the richness of context-dependant sites and situations. 
Phase 3: a multiple-case study 
After the testing of concepts, research question, and data-collection protocol in the earlier 
phases, these aspects of the research were subsequently refined, increasing the likelihood 
of their being valid and reliable enough to be used in the main phase of the study. 
In view of the fact that a multiple-case study method was chosen, an initial issue of 
concern in this phase was the number of cases to be included in the study. 
Since virtually all research often encounters the limitation of research resources (e. g. 
financial support, research staff, and time constraints) in one way or another, researchers 
are usually forced to make a decision about how many cases to include in a multiple-case 
study. Although concentrating the available resources on a study of only a few cases would 
enhance the depth or richness of the data collected, this would inevitably be a trade-off 
against the benefits of comparative insights or the breadth of data collected that could be 
generated from the studying of more cases (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991). For this reason, in 
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research design, a trade-off between the depth and the breadth of data must be an issue of 
consideration (Voss et al., 2002). 
The decision as to the number of cases to be studied in this research was based both on 
practical and theoretical considerations, and will be discussed in section 7.4.2. 
7.4 Data-collection 
Once the research strategy has been selected and the research has been designed, the next 
step is to design an approach to data-collection. This section will discuss five issues 
relevant to data-collection, including (1) research context selection criteria, (2) case 
selection criteria and selected cases, (3) pilot case selection, (4) data-collection methods 
and instruments, and (5) data sources. 
7.4.1 ý Research context selection criteria 
This research involved a multiple-case study into the alignment between performance 
measurement and strategy in the public sector context, especially in Thailand's central 
government agencies. 
On the one hand, the reasons for selecting the central government agencies included the 
following: 
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e The results from the literature reviews revealed that there existed no research into the 
topic within the central government context. The focuses of the existing public sector 
performance measurement literature have been mostly on public service providers 
and/or local governments, thus leaving the topic within the central government 
context uncharted. In view, of this, the present study aimed to counterbalance the 
overemphasis of performance measurement research on public service providers 
and/or local governments with a study in the central government context. 
* An important organisational aspect expected to influence the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy in public organisations is the organisations' 
political dependency. Tberefore, in this study, it was sensible to select the 
organisations whose political dependency was more apparent. Central government 
agencies reporting directly to the government thus seemed to meet this criterion. 
9 The performance of central government agencies seems to have wider consequences 
to the society in general than those of a particular public service provider or a local 
government. It was, therefore, considered interesting to study the phenomenon within 
this context. 
9 Central agencies are often self-contained and situated in one location. It is, therefore, 
easier to gain insights into the phenon-enon studied from an organisational holistic 
view of these agencies than to study the phenomenon in the public organisations that 
have several branches and are situated in several locations. 
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On the other hand, the reasons for selecting the Thai public sector included. 
* The absence of research into the topic (if any) conducted in the context outside the 
OECD countries, especially in developing countries. By studying this subject in the 
, Thai public sector context a supplementary perspective from the public sector in a 
developing country could be expected. 
* The Thai public sector has become more active in strategic management and 
performance measurement in recent years. This has been due partly to the country's 
recent Public Administration Refom-L Results from this research might yield 
immediate practical implications to Thai public sector management. 
* It was also the researcher's personal interest not only as a Thai citizen, but also as a 
Thai public servant, to research into the subject within the Thai public sector context 
* It was the expectation of the Royal Thai Government-the sole sponsor for the 
researcher's doctoral study-that this particular research should have some practical 
usefulness. Therefore, conducting research in the Thai public sector context was 
more likely to meet such expectation. 
* Due to the subjective nature of this research, familiarity with language and customs 
within the research context was essential As a native Thai speaker with a life-long 
familiarity with Thai customs, the researcher was likely to be able to conduct the 
research effectively within the Thai public sector context 
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41 The final reason for selecting Thai public organisations was one of a more pragmatic 
nature. Since the researcher is a Thai civil servant having established connections 
with officials in Thai public sector, these connections were likely ýo facilitate the 
negotiations for the access to the case-sites and for obtaining relevant 
data/infonnation. 
7.4.2 Case selection criteria and selected cases 
The selected cases were four Thai central government agencies, including: 
* The Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) 
e The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) 
e The Bureau of the Budget (BB) 
* The Office of the National Counter Corruption Commission (ONCCC) 
The remainder of this section will discuss case selection criteria as well as the reasons fir 
the choice of these four organisations. ' 
In selecting cases, even though they may be chosen randomly, such selection is neither 
necessary, nor even preferable (Eisenhardt, 1989). That is to say, even though the 
domain/context of the cases to be studied is identified, it is not appropriate simply to select 
any cases available within the chosen domain. 
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Yin (1994) noted the distinction between sampling logic and replication logic of case 
selection. The author explained that sampling logic demands an operational enumeration of 
the entire universe or pool of potential respondents, and a statistical procedure for selecting 
the specific subset of respondents. Sampling logic is applicable in determining the 
prevalence or frequency of a particular phenomenon'when it is impractical to study the 
entire universe. The resulting data are assumed to reflect the entire universe. However, the 
author highlighted that the application of sampling logic to multiple-case studies would be 
misplaced. 
Instead, in viewing cases in a multiple-case study, replication logic should be applied. 
Each case must be carefully selected so that it either (1) predicts similar results (a literal 
replication), or . 
(2) produces contrary results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical 
replication). If all the cases turned out as predicted, it would provide compelling support 
for the initial set of propositions. If the cases were contradictory, the propositions would 
have to be revised and retested with another set of cases. 
Yin (1994) also stressed that an important step in replication logic is the development of a 
rich, theoretical framework. The framework needs to state the conditions in which a 
particular phenomenon is likely to happen (a literal replication) as well as the conditions in 
which it is not likely to be found (a theoretical replication). The theoretical framework later 
will become helpful in generalising to new cases. Furthermore, if some of the empirical 
cases do not work as predicted, the theory must be modified. 
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In addition to replication logic, the cases were also chosen to fill theoretical categories and 
provide examples of polar types (Eisenhardt, 1989). Given the limited number of cases 
which can usually be studied, it makes sense to choose cases such as extreme situations 
and polar types in which the process of interest is transparently observable (Pettigrew, 
1988). The goal is to select cases which are likely to replicate or extend the emergent 
theory. Multiple cases within each category allow findings to be replicated within 
categories. 
Since strategies for public organisations -are often made through cooperation between 
elected politicians-acting as public policyrmkers-and the organisations' executives, it is 
to be expected that when political changes occur, these strategies are likely to change as 
well. This is because different politicians, as the policymakers, may have considerable 
differences in their public policy and their concern over society, especially their 
constituencies. Politicians who have legitirmte power by virtue of their having been 
elected by the public will utilise such power by guiding public organisations under their 
supervision to work towards fulfilling their policies, which often are different from the 
policies of the politicians who were formerly in power. 
However, the degree of political subjectivities varies among public organisations. 
Generally, public organisations directly overseen by the government are likely to be 
subject more to political changes than other public organisations (e. g. independent public 
agencies). The fortner group of organisations are thus more likely to experience more 
frequent strategic organisation changes, due to the changes in policy imposed by the 
govermnent. 
I 
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Therefore, it is possible to classify public secbr organisations into two distinct categories 
in terms of their political dependency, which can affect organisational strategic changes. 
The first category is those organisations under close supervision of the govemrrrnt, and 
the second is the independent agencies beyond the control of the government. Categorising 
public organisations in this way, the dependency of the public organisations was used in 
this research as a proxy reflecting the degree of strategic volatility of those organisations 
possibly caused by political influences. 
Since performance measurement systems are, at least, established to provide information 
about the success with which the organislion performs according to policy/strategy, 
changes in strategy will'inevitably affect the systems in one way or another. Therefore, in 
the present study, by selecting cases in this fashion, it was possible to investigate the 
alignment between performance measurement and strategy both in greater and lesser 
strategically volatile public organisations. The two groups of organisations were: 
4P Dependent public organisations more subject to political changes, presumably 
leading to greater volatility in their policy/strategy. For this category, the OCSC and 
the BB were selected. 
Independent public organisations less subject to political changes, presumably 
leading to less volatility in their polic)Atrategy- For this group, the ONCCC and the 
OAG were selected. 
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Figure 7b below shows how the chosen four organisations represent replication logic as 
well as polar-typed logic. 
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Figure 7b: Replication Logic & Polar Cases 
(Source: the author) 
Polar-typed case selection 
On the one hand, OCSC and BB, on the far-left of the boldface arrow, represent the 
organisations under more control by the government, which could, therefore, be considered 
comparatively more politically dependent. These two organisations were 'polar' or 
cexireme' cases in the sense that both were not only under governmental control, but also 
reporting directly to the Prime Minister. 
On the other hand, OAG and ONCCC, on the far-right, represent the more politically 
independent organisations subject-at least theoretically-to less control from the 
government. They could be regarded, therefore, as comparatively more independent. 
These latter two organisations were 'extreme' cases in that they appeared to have more 
autonomy (i. e. not under direct governmental control). Moreover, they were specifically 
classified as 'Independent' organisations by the present Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Thailand. 
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These two groups of organisations, therefore, represented organisations at the two different 
-poles, as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) -and Pettigrew (1988). 
Replication logic 
Following Yin's (1994) suggestion, each case was also selected so that it either 
(1) predicted similar results (a literal replication) or (2) produced contrary results but for 
predictable reasons (a theoretical replication). From figure 7b above, on the one hand, a 
literal replication can be expected from two pairs of cases (classified by political 
dependency within the same category), and represented by grey arrows: OCSC vs. BB, and 
OAG vs. ONCCC. On the other hand, theoretical replication can be expected from four 
pairs of cases (classified in different category), and represented by dotted arrows: 
OCSC vs. OAG, OCSC vs. ONCCC, BB vs. OAG, and BB vs. ONCCC. 
It is also worth noting that although the inclusion of more cases in a multiple-case study 
may help in solidifying the confidence of the findings either to other settings (as in 
replication logic) or only within this setting (as in polar-typed logic), the case study's 
intensiveness leads to inefficiencies when the study is expanded to the point at which 
further observations provide minimal incremental insight. This point is known as 
'theoretical saturatiod, using Glaser and Strauss' (1967) terminology. As both polar-typed 
logic and replication logic were adopted as the case selection criteria, the number of cases 
to be included in order to sufficiently meet these criteria had to be at least four. 
Additionally, the boundedness of the case , ýas also a concern for case selection. 
The boundedness of the chosen case determined whether the case was a case. 
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Miles and Huberman (1994) referred to the case as a phenomenon of some sort occurring 
in a bounded context, while Smith (1978) used the term 'bounded system' instead. 
Winegardner (2000) suggested a technique for assessing the boundedness of the case by 
asking if there is a limit to the number of People who could be interviewed, or to the 
observations which could be made. If there is no actual or theoretical limit, the 
phenomenon is not bounded enough to be a case. In other words, if the phenomenon is not 
intrinsically bounded, it is not a case. Therefore, by applying this technique to the selection 
of cases in the research, it became more likely that those selected four organisations would 
be all bounded enough to be cases for the study. 
Figure 7c. demonstrates a summary view of the locations of each selected case among other 
Thai public agencies. Each case selected is shown in bold and underlined. 
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7.4.3 Pilot case selection 
The OCSC was selected as the case for the pilot study phase for four following reasons 
* The OCSC is considered a central and exemplary Thai government agency, whose 
duties concern development and improvement of the public sector (Office of the 
Civil Service Commission, 2000a). For this reason, it was more likely that it would 
a 
be interested in participating in this research which might yield immediate 
managerial usefulness to the organisation. Therefore, the agency's cooperation and 
accessibility to the case site were more likely. 
o As the OCSC is the sole scholarship grarter for the researcher's doctoral study, it has 
an obligation to facilitate the researcher's ýtudying, especially in granting access for 
the purposes of conducting the study within the organisation. 
9 From previous networking with the OCSC officials, the researcher had established 
good personal relationships with sonic of the key officials who would be able to 
provide access to the data sources. 
9 Due to the fact that the OCSC is located in the central Bangkok metropolitanjarea, it 
was close and convenient for the researcher to commute to during the data-collection 
period, which he undertook alone. 
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7.4.4 Data-collection methods and instruments 
One of the major concerns in deciding what data-collection methods to be used was the 
realisation that there is no single flawless rmthod; all possible methods used in collecting 
data have both advantages and disadvantages (Gummesson, 2000). Different methods have 
different inherent strengths and weaknesses. 
Using a single particular method was tempting, for the more uniform data that it would 
produce would possibly be more convenient to analyse. However, by using only a single 
I 
method, it was more likely that the obtained data would be subject to the inherent 
I 
weakness of such a method. This was an important point of concern because the low 
degree of acceptance of the case study research method in some research areas (e. g. 
operations management) has perhaps been the result of traditional misapplications of the 
term 'case study, commonly based solely on interviews of key figures or managers 
I 
(McCutcheon and Mereditk 1993). 
In order to minimise the undesirable consequences caused by the use of any single 
particular method, this research adopted a combination of methodologies-an approaýh 
known as 'triangulation'. 
Triangulation can be defined as the combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon (Denzin, 1978). Fundamentally, triangulation is the simultaneous use of 
multiple research methods, particularly the use of multiple sources of evidence (Jick, 1979; 
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and Voss et al., 2002), to study the same phenomenon. The single most important objective 
of triangulation is an increase in the robustness and confidence of the study results. 
By using various data-collection methods, the effects of the inherent weaknesses of each 
method used are diluted (Cook and Campbell, 1979; and Ack, 1979), because different 
data-collection methods result in data with different characteristics. Therefore, the use of 
various methods tends to diminish the risk of the prejudice caused by any single method. 
For example, Jick (1979) noted that, by providing several sources of verification, 
triangulation improves the researcher's judgemental accuracy. Therefore, this multi-faceted 
approach to data-collection may help in gaining a more complete picture of the 
phenomenon being studied (Stuart et al., 2002). 
However, there exist opponents to the use of the triangulation concept in case study 
research. For example, Blaikie (2000) listed three reasons why researchers might consider 
abandoning the use of triangulation. Firstly, numerous researchers pay lip service to its 
virtue. Few of them take it seriously as a validity check (mainly because convergence is 
rare). Secondly, triangulation can have various meanings'for various users, due to the lack 
of clear operational definition. Finally, triangulation encourages a naYve view of ontology 
and epistemology in that it arbitrarily assitnes similar ontological and epistemological 
assumptions among the different methods used in triangulation. However, the author did 
not suggest that combining methods is always inappropriate. 
Despite the criticisms of triangulation, the use of multiple methods appears to be 
advantageous for this study. Considering one of the major strengths of case study is the 
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ability to use many different sources of evidence (Yin, 1994), the use of various data- 
collection methods is one way of fully exploiting the case study strategy. For this reason, 
triangulation has been adopted as an underlying principle for data-collection in this study. 
The multiple data-collection methods used were interviews (semi-structured and 
conversational), non-participant observations, and documentation, each of which will be 
reviewed in turn. 
Interview 
From the interpretive vantage point management and organisation studies should involve 
the studies of processes through which subjective experiences of organisation are created 
(Locke, 2001). A study as such is best achieved through methods that take the researchers 
close to the experiences of those being studied Since this research is also an organisation 
study, interviewing the people who play roles in the real organisational. settings provides 
insight into the perspectives of the insiders of the organisations, 
Given the underdeveloped body of knowledge into the subject and the results from 
evaluating the methodological options availableý it was decided to adopt an interpretive 
approach rath er than a formal questionnaire. Therefore, two less formal approaches to the , jr 
interviews, each differing in the level of formality and structure, were used. The first 
approach was semi-structured interviews and the second, a more informal approach, took 
the form of conversational interviews. Both approaches will be reviewed next 
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Semi-structured interview 
An interview guide (also known as interview schedule or interview protocol)-a pre- 
determined set of questions or issues that are to be explored during an interview-was 
designed and tested in the pilot study phase This guide served as a checklist during the 
interview, and ensured that basically the same information was obtained from a number of 
informants. At the same time, there was a great deal of flexibility, as the order and the 
actual working of the questions were not strictly determined in advance. Within the list of 
topics or subject areas, the interviewer was free to pursue certain questions in greater 
depth. 
Additionally, there was a concern that the interviewees might leave some important factors 
unmentioned, either deliberately or not. To avoid this problem and to provide some degree 
of consistency across interviews, a semi-structured interviewing approach was adopted, the 
resulting interview forynat being as follows (Bourne et al., 2002): 
9 Each interview started with a series of open-ended questions. 
* The responses to these questions were probed to ensure that the interviewees 
understood the points being made, and to gather specific examples. 
* The initial questions were followed by questions focused on a prompt list of possible 
factors. 
* The responses to the prompt list were probed to ensure understandin& 
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The prompt list of possible factors was developed based on the results suggested by the 
review of the existing literature, and also by the testing of the interview questions in the 
early phases of the study. ' 
The advantage of the interview guide approach is that it makes the interviewing of a 
number of different individuals more systematic and comprehensive, by delimiting the 
issues to be taken up in the interview. Logical gaps in the data collected can be anticipated 
and reduced, while the interviews remain fairly conversational and situational. The 
weakness of this approach is that it night be difficult for the interviewer to pursue topics or 
issues of interest that were not anticipated when the interview guide was compiled. 
In addition, interviewer's flexibility in the wording and sequencing of questions may result 
in substantially different responses from different participants, thus reducing 
comparability. However, as the benefits of using the interview guide appear to exceed its 
drawbacks, the interview guide was used in'this research 
The interviews were tape-recorded so that the purely verbal parts could be preserved for 
use, when needed, during data analysis. However, tape recorders were not capable of 
recording the inforrnants' non-verbal language. Thus, during the interview process, the 
researcher-acting as the interviewer-also made notes of any non-verbal statements 
detected together with the information in the recorded tapes later transcribed. 
'List ofquestions in the semi-structured interview guide, ' including probing questions and prompt list can 
be found in Appendix 1, at the end of this thesis. 
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Conversational interview 
Since one of the weaknesses of the semi-structured interview is that it has less potential to 
deal with the unexpected emerging issues raised promptly by the informants, the more 
informal conversational interview was then used as a supplementary data-collection 
method to alleviate this problem 
During the conversational interviews, the investigator informally talked in general terms 
with the informants about the issue under study. The questions based on a broad theme of 
inquiry were asked, but not strictly put in any pre-established order. The interviews relied 
primarily on the spontaneous generation of questions in. the natural flow of an interaction 
between the investigator and the informant. The aim was to help other relevant or related 
issues and topics, beyond the recognition of the researcher as an outsider, to emerge. 
Some of these emerging issues were worthy of further investigation, and were included as 
additional data. Using informal conversational interviews also helped in building rapport 
wit ndividuals inside the organisation: ý which proved to be helpful in obtaining further 
data. 
Unlike the semi-structured interviews, tape-recording and obvious note-taking were not 
used during the conversational interviews, because the intention was to rnake the 
conversation as casual as possible. If the informants had found that the conversations and 
their comments were being recorded, they might not have been willing to express their true 
views in responding to the questions asked However, the infonnation was recorded 
immediately after the conversations, so that omissions were minimised, and while the 
interviewerts prompt feedback on the information was still fresh. 
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The strength of this approach lay in the capacity for the interviewer to be flexible and 
highly responsive to individual difference4 situational changes and emerging new 
information. The weakness was that it generated less systematic data that was difficult and 
time-consuming to classify and analyse. 
For both semi-structured and conversational interviews, attention was paid to the body 
language-posture, gestures, and facial expressions-of the informants. An attempt was 
made to evaluate non-verbal as well as verbal statements. 
Non-participant Observation 
Non-participant observation involved the unobtrusive systematic noting and recording of 
activities and behaviour of the informants in the organisational settings. The main purpose 
was to obtain a thorough description of the organisational settings, including activities, 
participants and the meaning they attached to the settings. 
There are several advantages to the observational method, for example, it provides a better 
understanding of the context in which the organisational activities occur, it permits the 
investigator to present a more comprehensive view of the organisations by combining her 
or his own-an outsider of the organisation, with that of others within the organisation; it 
assists in the understanding and interpretation of the settings by providing personal 
knowledge and direct experience. 
The interview methods have strengths in that the- information obtained is derived from the 
insiders' perspectives, who understand the situations in the organisations very well. 
In contrast, the insiders may be so involved with their social setting, within the organisation 
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that they see things only from biased stakeholders' perspectives. By using the observation 
method, the investigator is allowed to experience the incidents through direct involvement 
and observation. The investigator is able to gain unmediated, first-hand insight into the 
situation. In addition, the investigator is able to detect important things which the insiders 
may ignore or ornit, either intentionally or unintentionally, in an interview. 
However, direct observation has a number of disadvantages. For example, Gurnmesson 
(2000) observed that the technique is often time-consuming, and that it is a 'shoot in the 
dark' approach, with which it is difficult for the researcher to know when and where a 
particular incident will occur. Even if the researcher can predict the likelihood of the 
occurrence of such an incident, it may be infrequent. Indeed, the researcher's very presence 
may interfere with the incident. 
For this study, non-participant observations were made by the investigator observing the 
management meeting sessions. 
Documentation 
In addition to the interviews and non-participant observation, documentation was another 
means of data-collection for this research. This included the documentary materials 
generated by the case organisations (e. g. reports, contracts, correspondence, memoranda, 
and other records) and by other parties outside the case organisations (e. g. legislation, 
regulations, newspaper reports, and newspaper editorial columns). The analysis of 
documents was intended to supplement the data obtained by ways of interviews and 
observations. 
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These kinds of documents are a useful source of information on organisational activities 
and processes, generating ideas for questions that can be pursued through observation and 
interviewing. In addition, documents can provide valuable information that may not be 
accessible by other means. For example, they can provide information about events or 
incidents that the investigator cannot observe because they took place before the 
investigation began; they provide quantitative information that is free from subjectivity. 
Another advantage of this method is that the documents have been generated 
contemporaneously with the events to which they refer. Hence, they are less likely to be 
subject to memory decay or memory distortion compared with data obtained from an 
interview. However, a significant disadvantage is that they may be subject to selective- 
deposit or selective-survival bias. 
By triangulating all three data-collection methods-interview, non-participant observation, 
and documentation-it was intended that each method would supplement the others and 
minimise the undesired' effects that might be caused by the use of any single method. 
7.4.5 Data Sources 
Even though the triangulating use of the three data-collection methods discussed in the last 
section was expected to rninimise the undesired effect caused by the use of only a single 
method, the results from the application of these methods in the pilot study revealed some 
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drawbacks with regard to the conversational interviews and non-participant observations, 
as detailed below. 
Conversational interviews 
The results of the conversational interviews did not warrant the resources spent in 
arranging the interviews, conducting the interviews, processing and analysing the 
interview data. 
* The informants were reluctant to be interviewed unless they were approached 
formallY, i. e. with a formal letter stating acknowledgement of the interviews from the 
head of the organisation. This formal process would have severely delayed the 
interview arrangements as well as the subsequent processes. 
Non-participant observations 
e Public managers regarded the issue being studied as sensitive. For this reason, they 
were reluctant to allow outsiders to participate in the meeting sessions on such 
agendas. This point was emphasised by a senior executive in the pilot case- 
[Performance measurement] details are confidential They are to be kept 
inside the agency, otherwise outsiders will know our private affairs 
* The 'shoot in the dark' nature of this method (Gummesson, 2000) made it difficult 
for the researcher to know when and where the particular incident of interest would 
occur. 
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* Even if it was possible to predict the likelihood of the incident occurring (e. g. by 
checking the upcoming meeting agendas for each case), it was found that the incident 
was infrequent and did not coincide with this research schedule. This was 
particularly the case when it was needed to compare the observations results across 
the four organisation cases. 
In view of the drawbacks of the conversational interviews and non-participant 
observations, these two data-collection methods were not included in the main phase of 
this study. Even though triangulation was adopted as the underlying principle for data- 
collection in this research, the primary method used in the main phase of the study was the 
semi-structured interviews coupled with documentation. 
Figure 7d below summarises the variation of research methods throughout all three phases 
of this study. 
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Figure 7d: Variation of Research Methods for this Research 
(Source: the author) 
In the main phase of this research (i. e. phase 111), the primary data sources were the 
officials as the interviewees in each case. The interviews focused on the managers at 
different levels in the organisational hierarchy. The reasons for this were twofold; first, the 
managers were likely to have more information regarding the constructs studied (i. e. 
strategy, and performance measurement), and second, managers were more likely to have 
served in the public sector for a longer period of time than the non-management officials, 
and so would probably have greater insight into the constructs studied within her or his 
own organisation as well as within the Thai public sector in general. 
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The selection of management involved different managerial levels, including (1) executive 
officials as top management, (2) directors/middle managers as middle management, and 
(3) supervisors as lower-level management. 
The levels of the management were defined by the informants' two characteristics, namely, 
(1) managerial duty, and (2) civil servant's Grade (from the lowest Grade 1 to the highest 
Grade 11) 
The executive officials were those overseeing above departmental level whose grade was 
not lower than 9. The middle managers were those overseeing a department (or equivalent) 
and whose grade was not lower than 8. The lower managers (supervisors) were those 
overseeing a sub-unit lower than departmental level (e. g. division, sub-division, or group) 
whose grade was not lower than 7. Other informants were classified as non-management 
officials. 
By using these classification criteria, it was possible to ensure that each informant was at 
the expected management level and had considerable work experience in the public sector 
(implied by her or his civil servant's grade). The inclusion of managers from different 
organisational. levels made it possible to assess how sitnilar/different the managers' 
perceptions of the constructs under study were, throughout the organisational hierarchy. 
After the desired characteristics of informants were identified, the researcher then proposed 
these criteria to each case site's personnel department. The department then recommended 
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the particular officials whose background met the criteria and also were likely to be able to 
answer the questions in the interview list previously disserrinated by the researcher. 
The interviews were tape-recorded at the same time as notes were taken of the 
respondents' non-verbal language and the researcher's personal feelings during the 
interviews. The recorded tapes were later transcribed into Microsoft Word documents, 
along with other qualitative data to be analyscd, with the supplementary data obtained in 
the form of documents. Data processing and data analysis are discussed in the following 
section. 
7.5 Data Processing and Analysis 
In this section, the processing of the collected data and two modes of analysis (intra-case 
and inter-case) will be explained. 
7.5.1 Data processing 
The main data for this research was derived from the interviews of the officials from four 
case organisations. In addition, this interview data was supported by documentation data. 
The audiotape-recorded interview data were transcribed into Microsoft Word documents. 
Almost all of the transcriptions were made at the end of the interviewing days to ensure the 
I 
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interviewer's fresh recall of the events. The interview transcripts were then printed out for 
easy reading and note-making. 
Supporting documents from each case were arranged for easy retrieval when needed. 
The documents were first grouped for each case. The documents from each case were then 
re-grouped according to the nature of the documents (e. g. planning documents, annual 
reports, performance evaluation reports, policy/strategy statements, study reports, and laws 
and regulations). 
The main purpose of the data processing was to assist in the developing of the case study 
database, which, in turn, would enhance the reliability of the research. 
7.5.2 Data analysis 
According to Gall et al. (1966), there seem to be three major distinct methods for analysis 
of case study data, including interpretational, structural, and reflective analysis. The 
interpretational method was adopted, as explained below. 
The interpretational analysis for this research began with several rounds of reading through 
the interview transcripts and documents collected for each case. The readings were done 
thoroughly several times. The main purpose was for the researcher to become familiar with 
all of the data before moving on to the later stages of the analysis process 
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After several readings of the transcripts, first-cut analysis attempts were made by arranging 
the data into broad topic areas. These topics were then checked against the transcripts 
again, and any necessary revisions were made. This iterative process resulted in eights 
broad topics: 
o Strategy/Plans 
* Performance measurement 
* Alignment 
* Operations 
* Approaches to management 
o Changes 
* Coordination and communication 
o Culture 
Again, from additional rounds of transcript reading, categories within each topic were 
identified based on the interview data. Although the previously established topics and 
categories by other researchers conducting a similar or relevant study can normally be 
adopted, this was not possible for this reseamh because there existed no similar studies. 
This researcher, therefore, had to develop topics and categories based on the collected data. 
The interpretational analysis of this study can thus be considered grounded in data in which 
topics and categories were derived from the data itself, and not from previously developed 
constructs or theories (Gall et al., 1966). 
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After each round of reading, the categories were modified-both in terms of wording and 
coverage-to fit better with the evidence emerging in later readings. This process was 
conducted repeatedly until appropriate categories likely to cover all of the significant data 
in the transcripts were established As a result, each topic comprised of many categories 
ready for the next analysis process-the coding stage. 
The following table demonstrates examples of categories within each topic accompanied 
by (1) a code number at the top of each cell, and (2) the number of respondents appearing 
in the bracket at the bottom of each cell. 
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Once the broad topics were formed and categories within them identified, a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet was prepared as a coding sheet for the coding in the next stage. 
The coding began with attempts to segment data, by dividing them into meaningful units- 
mainly questions and answers. The next step was to code data segments and sort them into 
each category. This was, again, very much an iterative process, referred to by Gall et al. 
(1966) as 'constant comparison', of studying the data segments, determining if they were 
in the most appropriate category, rearranging the segments, and refining and amending the 
categories. The purpose of the constant comparison was to clarify the meaning of each 
category, and create clear distinctions among them. 
The constant comparison was made until reaching 'theoretical saturatioW the point at 
which no new data emerged relevant to an established category, no new categories were 
necessary to account for the phenomena of interest, and the relationships among categories 
were well established. 
This process resulted in each category containing data segments directly extracted from the 
interview transcripts, which could be used as cited evidence in the case study report 
writing stage later. The extracts were carefully selected to fit into each category. This was 
done to ensure that the context of the accounts and reminiscences told by the interviewees 
in terms of stories-as narratives-was not lost when they were dissected into extracts 
(Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). 
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It should be noted that all 111,11ysis pi-ccesses were conducted manually. There wcrc two 
reasons that qualitative data analysis (QDA) and qualitative solutions and research (OSR) 
packages such as Nud*ist or NVivo were not used. 
Firstly, this study was conducted within the Thai public sector organisational context, M 
which the first language of' all inter\11ewces Nvls 'I'll, w, al. I lietel'ore. all inic, iews %%, ci, c 
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conducted in Thai. This resulted in almost all data being in Thai, while the available data 
analysis computer programmes were not able to support Thai characters. Even though the 
data could have been translated into one of the languages supported by such programmes, 
there would have been the risk of losing conversation points and/or perspective in the 
process of translation. 
Secondly, the translation of all the data would have taken an inordinate length of time. 
This was a particular concern considering the amount of obtained data to be transcribed, 
including (1) all interview transcripts, consisting of over three hundred and thirty thousand 
words from thirty-four interview transcripts, (2) one hundred and twenty-three documents, 
comprising of well over four thousand pages, and (3) extensive observation notes from the 
pilot study. Therefore, translations were selectively made only when it was absolutely 
necessary, for example, for data segments used in the writing-up of the post analysis case 
study report. 
The data analysis for this research was conducted at two levelsý i. e. intra-case and inter- 
case, each of which will be explained next. 
Intra-case analysis 
The above analysis processes were first applied with data from each case site, beginning 
with the OCSC, the OAG, the BB, and the ONCCC cases respectively. The importance of 
this level of analysis is deternined by one of the realities of case study research-a 
staggering volume of data. 
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Eisenhardt (1989) suggested that this level of analysis involves detailed case study write- 
ups for each case site. These write-ups are oflen simply pure descriptions, but they are 
central to the gaining of insight because they help researchers to cope early in the analysis 
process with the often enormous volume of data. Following Eisenhardt's (1989) 
suggestion, the descriptions of each case site will be reported in the next chapter. 
The overall purpose of the intra-case analysis was for this researcher to become intimately 
familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity. With intra-case analysis, the perceptions of 
people-in the same organisational contexts-with regard to the phenomenon under 
investigation were analysed. This process allowed the unique patterns of each case to 
emerge before the researcher turned to generalise patterns across cases. In addition, with 
the familiarity with each case, the researcher was able to accelerate cross-case comparison 
in the next step of the analysis-the inter-case analysis. 
Inter-case analysis 
Inter-case analysis (also known as cross-case analysis) involved the comparison of data 
from multiple case studies, in order to examine similarities and differences between cases 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The comparison was made by considering data from all four cases as 
one piece and then analysing it altogether. In this way, it was possible to investigate the 
phenomenon in different organisational contexts. This also helped in generalising the 
research findings to a wider context 
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To conclude, it is perhaps not over-exaggerating to claim that the analysis for an inductive- 
interpretive case study like this research requires the researcher's creative imagination. To 
paraphrase Hempel (1966): 
There are, then, no generally applicable 'rules of induction, by which 
hypotheses or theories can be mechanically derived or inferred ftom 
empirical data The transition from data to theory requires creative 
imagination. Scientific hypotheses and theories are not derived from 
observedfacts, but invented in order to accountfor them. 
7.6 Quality Assurance for Case Study Research 
As mentioned earlier in section 7.2, criticism of the case study approach is not uncommon. 
In light of this, quality assurance measures were taken seriously into consideration in this 
research. 
Many authors suggested various criteria for assessing the quality of case study research. 
Examples of these criteria are shown in the following table: 
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Author(s) Case Study Evaluation Criteria 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) Validity (internal and external) 
Reliability 
Objectivity 
Guba and Lincoln (1989) Credibility 
Transferability 
Dependability 
Confinnability 
Gill and Johnson (1991) Validity (internal and external) 
Reliability 
Hedrick et al. (1993) Validity (internal, external, construct, and 
statistical) 
McCutcheon and Meredith (1993) Validity (internal, external, construct, and content) 
Reliability 
Yin (1994 and 2003) Validity (internal, external, and construct) 
Reliability 
Locke(2001) Internal validity 
Generalisability 
Reliability 
Objectivity 
Stuart et al. (2002) Validity (internal and construct) 
Voss et al. (2002) Validity (internal, external, and construct) 
Reliability 
Table 7c: Range of Case Study Evaluation Criteria 
(Source: the author) 
Despite the variation among different authors, these criteria tend to fall into two groups: 
the validity and the reliability of case study. These two criteria will be reviewed in turn. 
7.6.1 Validity concern 
Generally, there are at least four types of validity requirement: internal, external, construct, 
and content validity. Each of these types of validity will be explored next. 
Internal validity 
Internal validity concerns the establishing of a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious 
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relationships (Yin, 1994). In other words, internal validity concerns whether or not what is 
identified as the 'cause(s)' or 'stimuli' actually produce what have been interpreted as the 
'effects' or 'response' (Gill and Johnson, 1991). Yin and Heald (1975) asserted that 
internal validity raises the question of whether a study's research design is adequate to 
support the study's conclusions. 
To increase internal validity, Yin (2003) suggested four tactics, namely, the use of pattern- 
matching (see also Campbell, 1975), explanation-building, rival explanations, and logic 
models. In addition, Stuart et al. (2002) asserted that to demonstrate the study's internal 
validity, the researcher needs to record evidence of other factors that might provide 
alternative eýplanations for the observed patterns. Most of all, the protocol must outline the 
site characteristics sought 
McCutcheon and Meredith (1993) noted that analysis and data triangulation can help case 
researchers acquire the most accurate picture of events. However, the researcher may face 
a very complex phenomenon which, coupled with a small number of comparison sites, 
increases the likelihood of deducing incorrect causal relationships These authors thus 
recommended that an approach for validating conclusions is through pattem-matching, 
whereby the pattern of independent versus dependent variables expected through the 
theory is compared, case by case, against the pattern of observed characteristics. Each new 
case provides another independent test of the hypothesised relationships. 
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External validity 
Extemal validity concerns the establishing of the domain to which a study's findings can 
be generalised beyond research settings (Yin, 1994). Broadly speaking, external validity is 
a concern over the general isability of the research findings. 
According to Gill and Johnson (1993), external validity is often subdivided into two 
categories: 
o Population validity concerns the generalisability from a research sample to a wider 
population. 
e Ecological validity concerns generalisability from the actual social context in which 
the research has taken place and data thereby gathered, to other contexts and settings. 
Tactics that can be used to cope with the external validity problem include the use of 
theory in single-case studies, and replication logic in multiple-case studies (Yin, 2003). 
Eisenhardt (1989) also emphasised that, in replication logic, cases that confirm emergent 
relationships enhance confidence in the validity of the relationships, On the other hand, 
cases that refute the relationships often can provide an opportunity to refine and extend the 
theory. That is, for case studies, results can be tested and extended by replication 
(McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993). 
Construct validity 
Construct validity concerns the establishing of correct operational measures for the 
construct-concepts being studied (Yin, 1994). 
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McCutcheon and Meredith (1993) portrayed construct validity as the extent to which the 
operational measure for a construct (1) reflects all of the construct's observable effects, 
(2) appears to describe a single construct and (3) correlates appropriately with operational 
measures of other related constructs. Thus, construct validity is the issue of establishing the 
theoretical territory that goes with the defined construct and ensuring consistency between 
it and other recognised constructs. 
Tactics for enhancing construct validity include using multiple sources of evidence, 
establishing a chain of evidence, and having key informants review a draft case study 
report (Yin, 2003). Voss et al. (2002) also concurred that through triangulation with 
multiple means of data-collection, validity can be increased further. Similarly, Stuart et al. 
(2002) suggested that one way to ensure construct validity was for the researcher to look 
for multiple sources" of evidence for each of the important elements or variables in the 
propositions, using triangulation. Finding sources that would be available at all sites makes 
it easier to demonstrate that the same phenomenon was measured in each situation. 
Content validity 
Content validity concerns the degree to which the operational measure accurately reflects a 
precisely defined construct (Zaltman et al., 1982). Compared with construct validity, in 
which focus is upon the correctness of the operational measures, content validity pertains 
to the way the construct is measured rather than its theoretical basis. 
McCutcheon and Meredith (1993) noted that content validity concerns whether the 
operational measure corresponds well with the construct it is supposed to 'tap'. 
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The authors also noted that content validity problems are likely to arise where constructs 
have broad potential domains, and that owing to the limitations of construct development 
and testing, researchers are likely to confront both construct and content validity problems. 
Despite the claims that content validity should be used as a criterion for assessing the 
quality of case studies, specific pragmatic techniques to enhance content validity are rare. 
7.6.2 Reliability concern 
This criterion basically refers to the extent to which the operations of a study-such as the 
data-collection procedures-can be repeated, with the same results (Yin, 1994; and Voss et 
aL, 2002). Guba and Lincoln (1989) and Lincoln and Guba (1985) maintained that 
reliability-the consistency of a given inquiry-is generally a precondition for validity, 
and it typically rests on replication. 
To satisfy this criterion, it should be possible for another researcher to replicate the original 
research, using the same subjects and the same research design under the same conditions 
(Gill and Johnson, 1991). For this purpose, McCutcheon and Meredith (1993) suggested a 
few techniques that can be used to increase reliability of case study data. These techniques 
included using a variety of data-collecting methods, having more than one researcher 
present, and using a tape-recorder in collecting interview data. 
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The authors also noted that one advantage of the case study is that if the researcher is 
sceptical about the reliability of some data, steps can be taken midstream to verify the 
suspicions and improve the data-collecting procedures. Additionally, researchers can 
increase the reliability of their research through the use -of case study protocol and the 
development of a case study database (Yin, 2003). 
In this section, the criteria for judging the quality of case study research as well as the 
possible tactics to tackle the research quality problems have been reviewed. In the next 
section, the measures taken to ensure the quality of this particular research will be 
discussed. 
7.6.3 Quality-assurance measures for this research 
Since the concerns over the quality of this case study research were not taken lightly, a 
number of quality-assurance measures were taken to increase the quality of the research. 
These measures are summarised in the following table, and will be discussed afler. 
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Research Design Data Collection Data Analysis 
Validity 
- Internal Using polar-typed logic Using multiple sources of evidence Pattern-matching 
- External Using replication logic N/A N/A 
Using exploratory, pilot study, 
- Construct and testing protocol before real Having protocol reviewed N/A 
use 
- Content N/A 
Using different questions to probe N/A 
the same phenomenon 
Reliability 
N/A 
Using case study protocol & N/A 
Developing case study database 
Table 7d: Summary of Quality-Assurance Measures for this Research 
(Source: the author) 
From the above table, it can be seen that several quality-assurance measures were applied 
throughout all three major stages of the research. Measures used for each stage will be 
discussed next. 
Research design stage 
As early as in the research design stage, validity was enhanced through rnany tactics, 
including: 
Use ofpolar-typed logicfor case selection 
To increase the internal validity, four organisations selected as case sites were categorised 
into two groups-less political independence and more political independence. The OCSC 
and the BB represented the extreme cases within the less political independence category, 
while the OAG and the ONCCC represented the extreme cases within the more political 
independence category. The main reason underpinning the application of polar-typed logic 
was to make the process of interest 'transparently observable' (see the detailed discussion 
regar ing this logic in section 7.4.2). 
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Use ofreplication logic 
To increase external validity, both literal and theoretical replications for case selection 
were used. That is, similar results were expected from each of the two pairs of literally 
replicated cases, i. e. the OCSC vs. the BB, and the OAG vs. the ONCCC. On the other 
hand, contrary results were expected from the comparison of four pairs of the theoretically 
replicated cases, i. e. the OCSC vs. the OAG, the OCSC vs. the ONCCC, the BB vs. the 
OAG, and the BB vs. the ONCCC. (see the detailed discussion regarding this logic in 
section 7.4.2 earlier). 
Use ofexploratory andpilot case study 
The purpose of conducting both an exploratory study within the UK context and a pilot 
case study within the Thai context was to validate the construct of this study. Each study 
was conducted at different times. After the research construct was initially clarified, as 
suggested by the exploratory study, it was further clarified again after the pilot study. 
Test of case studyprotocol 
The conducting of the exploratory and pilot study could also enhance the construct validity 
of this research because the case study protocol was tested to ensure the quality of any 
data-collection instruments that were to be used in the main phase of this research. 
Subsequently, the protocol was revised accordingly (e. g. wordings in the interview 
questions, breadth of the questions, sequence of the questions, length of each interview 
session, and interview data recording). 
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Data-collection stage 
In this stage, validity was increased by: 
Use ofmulliple sources ofevidence 
To increase internal validity, the concept of triangulation was then adopted. Multiple 
sources o'f evidence and data-collection methods were employed. That is to say, in addition 
to the data being collected from four different cases, the interviews for each case site were 
conducted with officials throughout the hierarchy of the organisations involved (from non- 
management to top executive). The documents were gathered both from within the 
organisations and from the outside. Tertiary data were also gathered (e. g. newspaper 
reports, newspaper editorial columns). 
Having protocol reviewed 
After the pilot case study, the case study protocol was reviewed by a doctoral student 
colleague researching into a comparable area, i. e. performance measurement from an 
accounting perspective. This review proved particularly useful, since the reviewer was also 
a Thai, and was able, therefore, to help in clarifying the protocol to suit better the Thai 
context. As a result, the enhancement of the construct validity of this study was expected 
Use ofdifferent questions to probe the same phenomenon 
To ensure content validity of the data, especially with regard to the interviews, different 
questions Yere asked to probe the same phenomenon. Alternatively, critical questions were 
rephrased and asked at a different point in time during the interviewing sessions. The main 
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purpose was to check the interviewees' understanding of the construct, and to ensure that 
the interview accurately reflected a precisely defined construct 
Reliability-enhancing tactics were also applied in this data-collection stage. These tactics 
included: 
Use ofcase studyprotocol 
To increase the study's reliability, the case study protocol, the main part of which related 
to interviewing (consisting of, for example, questions to ask in an approximate order, and 
prompt questions to help remind interviewees of the phenomena) was developed and used 
principally to guide data-collecting activities. By using the case study protocol, it is 
possible for other researchers to repeat this study and thus enhance the reliability of the 
study. Moreover, by using the protocol, it was less likely that the present researcher would 
omit signi icant questions whilst focusing on the participant during interviews 
Development ofcase study database 
Through the development of the case study database, the enhanced reliability of this study 
could also be anticipated. Detailed discussion of the development of the database for this 
study has already been provided earlier in section 7.5.1. 
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Data analysis stage 
Pattern-matching 
Finally, the validity was further enhanced by the use of pattern-matching in the data 
analysis stage. For this study, the commonalities and differences between the data analysis 
both within and across case sites were compared, and the pattern of evidence was 
established, in brder to support the claimed findings of the research. 
Even though a number of tactics were used throughout all stages of this research this was 
done simply to ininimise the effect of the inherent flaws in case study research. In spite of 
the application of the quality-assurance measures discussed, the researcher realised that 
there still were some weaknesses in this research. The weaknesses of this research will be 
I 
identified later in section 10.5, where the limitations of the research are discussed. 
7.7 Summary 
According to the nature of this research the multiple-case study approach appeared to be 
an appropriate research strategy, and was thus adopted. 
This multiple-case study research comprised of three phases: an exploratory study, a pilot 
study, and a multiple-case study as the main phase of this research. 
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The research context selection criteria and selected cases were identified. For the 
exploratory study, the selected case was the UK District Audit. For the pilot case study, the 
selected case was the Office of Civil Service Commission (OCSC) in Thailand. And for 
the main multiple-case study phase, the selected cases were four Thai central government 
agencies, including the OCSC, the Bureau of the Budget (BB), the Office of the Auditor 
General (OAG), and the Office of the National Counter Corruption Commission 
(ONCCC). 
As a result of the testing of the research protocol in the pilot study, semi-structured 
interviews and documentation were used as data sources for the main phase of the 
research. The interviewees included managers at three different managerial levels (i. e. 
lower, middle, and top management) and non-management officials within each case site. 
The document data was obtained from a range of documentation, including both internal 
documents (e. g. reports, correspondence, memoranda, and other records) and external 
documents (e. g. legislation and regulations; newspaper reports, and newspaper editorial 
columns). The triangulation concept was taken as the underlying principle both for case 
selection and for data-collection. 
The obtained data was processed to form a case study database. An interpretational 
analysis was then conducted at both intra- and inter-case levels. 
The quality assurance for case study research in general was reviewed and the quality- 
assurance measures for this research in particular were identified. It appeared that the most 
common quality-assessing criteria of case study research were its validity and reliability. 
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Therefore, tactics used to tackle validity and reliability problems throughout different 
stages of this research were developed. 
In the next chapter, the results of the application of the research methods discussed in this 
chapter will be presented, including the descriptions and the intra-case analysis results for 
each of the four case sites. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Case-Site Descriptions and Analysis 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter set out this study's research methods. Case study approach seemed 
appropriate and was chosen as the research, strategy. The research design consisted of three 
phases, including an exploratory study, a pilot study, and a multiple-case study. The 
multiple-case study, which was the main phase of this research, comprised of the studies of 
four Thai central government agencies. Data-collection, data processing, and data analysis 
were also explained. The issues of quality concerns and quality-assurance measures for this 
research were also identified. 
This chapter has two purposes: firstly, to provide case descriptions of each case site; and 
secondly, to discuss the results of in-case analyses. Tberefore, there will be two sections 
for each case: (1) case-site descriptions, and (2) case-site analysis. In the first section, the 
descriptions of the case site will be provided, including historical perspective, political 
dependency, board of commissioners, duties and responsibilities, organisation structure, 
vision, missions, strategies and objectives. Secondly, in the case-site analysis sectioR 
discussions will focus upon three topics and sub-topics as follows: 
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* Strategy 
- Meaning, purposes and functions of strategy 
- Compliance with strategy 
- Changes in strategy 
* Performance measurement 
- Performance measures 
- Performance measurement system 
- Performance measurement 
* Alignment between performance measurement and strategy 
Six-months of data-collecting fieldwork resulted in the accumulation of a considerably 
large amount of data, including thirty-four interviews (with over three hundred thousand 
words of interview transcripts) and over one hundred and twenty items of supporting 
documents (with over four thousand pages). The audio-recorded interviews were 
transcribed, qodified and analysed together with supporting documentation, and formed the 
basis of Chapter 8 and 9. 
Each of the above topics, as well as sub-topics within each, emerged from the results of the 
iterative data analysis processes explained in section 7.5. However, due to the strict 
limitation in the number of words for this thesis, not all emerging topics will be discussed. 
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The presentation of the case-site descriptions and the case-site analysis for all four cases 
will follow the aforementioned fonnat. Selective examples of interview data will be 
provided to give life-like evidence that adds substance to the discussion. Additionally, in 
order to provide linkages between data analysed and data collected, a code number based 
on Table 7b, on page 232, will be shown for each 'cluster' of the interview data quoted 
throughout the discussion in this chapter. 
The following table presents a brief overview of all four case sites. 
Characteristics OCSC OAG BB ONCCC Total 
_Dependent 
on government Yes No Yes No N/A 
_Number 
of staff 641 2,511 1,089 573 ý, 814 
_Board 
of commissioners Yes Yes No Yes N/A 
Number of commissioners 
Board term length (years) 
15-17 
2 
10 
6 
N/A 
N/A 
9 
9 
N/A 
N/A 
Budget: Fiscal year 2004 
_(million 
Thai Bahtý 1,229.0 829.5 396.6 
334.7 2,789.8 
_Location 
Bangkok Bangkok, Bangkok Bangkok NIA 
_Year 
founded 1929 1979 1959 1975 N/A 
_Number 
of interviews (55,5 ) 6 6 6 34 
Top mgmt 3 (2) 1 1 1 6 
Middle mgmt 3 (lb, I -c) 2 2 3 10 
Lower mgmt 6 (2b 2ý 2 2 2 12 
Non-mgmt 4 (2') 1 1 NIA 6 
Number of words (Thai) in 
transcripts 173,677 (113,9501 48,010 
56,506 54,603 332,796 
Number of items and pages of 
the obtained documents 
44+ items 
____769+ 
pgs 
28+ items 
479+ Rs 
23+ items 
616+ pgs 
28+ items 
2,247+ pgs 
123+items 
4.11 1+r)es 
70 Thai Baht =I British Pound (approy-) 
'denotes conversational interviews 
'denotes pilot study interviews 
Table 8a: Case Sites Overview 
(Source: data gathered by the author) 
The order of presentation of the case sites is chronological according to the first time the 
contact was made with each site, i. e. the Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC), 
the Office of the Auditor General (OAG), the Bureau of the Budget (BB) and the Office of 
the National Counter Corruption Conunission (ONCCC) respectively. 
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8.2 The Office of the Civil Service Commission 
Case-Site Descriptions and Analysis 
In this section, the OCSC case-site descriptions will be provided, and the results from the 
OCSC case-site analyses will be discussed. 
8.2.1 OCSC case-site descriptions 
Historical perspective 
In 1928, the first Thai central personnel agency-the Civil Service Commission (CSC)- 
was established to ensure that public personnel management abided by the Civil Service 
Act. The OCSC was then founded to work as the secretariat to the CSC. 
Political dependency -I 
The OCSC is a government agency under the Off ice of the'Prime Minister, headed by the 
Secretary-General, who is directly accountable to the Prime Minister. In practice, a Deputy 
Prime Minister is often appointed to chair the CSC. 
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The Civil Service Commission 
The CSC comprises of five commissioners ex officio, five elected commissioners and five 
to seven academic specialists from related fields. The ex officio members are: 
1. Prime Minister or a Deputy Prime Minister authorised by the Prime Minister as the 
chairman 
2. Permanent-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance 
3. Director of the Bureau of the Budget 
4. Secretary-General of the National Economic and Social Development Board 
5. S ecretary- General of the OCSC as Commissioner and Secretary 
Duties and responsibilities 
The OCSC's main duties and responsibilities include: 
* Carrying out duties as assigned by the CSC. 
9 Researching into civil service personnel adninistration. 
9 Developing and preparing civil service manpower policies and plans. 
41 Co-ordinating and implementing activities for the development of civil service 
personnel. 
o Administering government educational scholarships to serve manpower needs in the 
public sector. 
9 Approving educational credentials for the purpose of reinstatement and appointment 
to the civil service. 
im Maintaining civil servants' career records. 
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Organisation structure 
File OCSC comprises oftwelve I'LlIlCtIOnal departments (or equivalent). Figure 8a 
illUstrates tile OCSC organisation structurc 
Office of the Prime Minister 
I 
Civil Service. Com III issioll 
I )eptity Secrctaries-(icncralj Semor Adv is 
I 
ors 
1 Infimnation and Communication Scnior I-xecuMc Legal Affairs Division Keaminictit and %wicclion 
fcchnology Cer service Centle CentrC 
Jý Offilce ofEducational mireau ofManpower Burcau of6encral Burean of'Classification and Compensation Affairs and Position Audit Administration DCvCIOp1I1CIIt 
BureMl Ot'NlCflt Protection Bureau A'Disciplinar, 
burcan ol Persomid Policy Civil 
Standards Rescarch and Developmeni and H111C.. " I 
[I 
III stiltife 
Figure 8a: OCSC Organisation Structure 
(Source: adapted 1rom lill1): //\v\v\v. ocsc. go. tli/ýibotit/ciliotit ocsc3_liiik5. asp) 
Vision, 
OCSC sliall be an agency supporting, promoting and stimulating the public sector's 
effliciency, quality, prestige and trails parcticy I'Or the genume well-being of' the Thai 
citizens. 
Source: Bureau ol'the Budget (2002: 107) 
]'here were discrepancies in the documentation data regarding vision, inission, strategy and objectives f'or 
Therefore, in order all Imir cases. These data for each case site were stated differently in dificrent documents. 
to make the data comparable across cases, the uniformed data appearing in the Burcau Ofthe Midget's annual 
budget document I'm the fiscal year 2003 (Bureau ofthe Budget, 2002) have beef' used. 
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Missions 
Formulate public administration policies and personnel management that are 
efficient, effective and creditable. 
* Develop merit-based public administration and personnel management standards to 
be used as guidelines for public agencies. 
* Promote the use of contemporary management techniques and principles among 
public agencies. 
* Develop guidelines and incentive systems to foster the dignity of civil servants and to 
encourage society-wide confidence in civil services. 
* Install personnel development systems to enhance civil servants' capabilities, skills, 
desirabl. p attitudes and service mentality. 
41 Coordinate with public agencies to establish systems, rules and mechanisms to 
monitor and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the public administration. 
Source: Bureau of the Budget (2002: 107) 
Strategy 
Public sector management and the country's development are efficient, transparent, 
equitable, congruent with socio-economic changes and up-to-date with globalisation. 
Source: Bureau of the Budget (2002: 107) 
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Objectives 
o The OCSC carries out roles and responsibility effectively and efficiently. 
* Public personnel have knowledge and capability in line with public sector inissions 
and policies. 
* Public sector missions and operations are clear, streamlined and flexible enough to 
adjust to global changes. Public administration focuses on the citizens with 
systematic performance measurement in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and 
quality. 
* All personnel management mechanisms are appropriately reformed to ensure that 
personnel are knowledgeable, capable and determined to achieve public objectives 
with integrity and focus on public interests. 
a Public personnel have new culture and values emphasising capability, honesty, 
diligence, perseverance, responsibility, discipline and professional ethics in 
performing their duties for the benefit of the public and the nation. 
Source: Bureau of the Budget (2002: 107-8) 
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8.2.2 OCSC case-site analysis 
In addition to being one of the four cases in this multiple-case study, the OCSC was also 
the pilot study case site. Therefore, the OCSC interviews were conducted in two separate 
phases. 
The first phase of the OCSC interviews-the pilot study phase-was conducted between 
January 21 st - February 4 th 2003 with five informants: two top executives, one middle 
manager and two supervisors. On average, the informants had worked for the OCSC and 
had been in the current position for 30.60 and 4.34 years respectively. The transcripts of 
the pilot interviews comprise of 113,950 words in Thai. 
The second and main phase of the OCSC interviews was subsequently conducted during 
the period May 22 nd - June 18 th 2003, after the interview guide had been tested and 
amended, as suggested by the results of the pilot study. In this phase, six informants were 
interviewed: one top executive, one middle manager, two supervisors and two non- 
management officials. On average, the infon-nants had worked for the OCSC and had been 
in the current position for 23.17 and 3.92 years respectively. Application of the amended 
interview guide resulted in more concise interview transcripts, comprising of 59,727 words 
in Thai. 
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Strategy 
The informants widely perceived the OCSC to have a comparatively stronger strategic 
management background than other Thai public agencies. Despite strategic management 
being rather new for the Thai public sector, the OCSC strategy origin could be traced back 
to a decade or so before, when its first strategy was officially formulated. 
Meaning, purposes andfunctions ofstrategy 
According to the infon-nants, clarity was one of the fundamental characteristics of strategy. 
Without clarity with regard to the strategy's meanings, purposes and functions; officials 
would not be able to have a common understanding of the strategy. A top executive 
highlighted the point that strategy must be clear and objective yielding measurable 
working results. 
Despite the OCSC having written strategy statements, some infon-nants were not certain of 
the meaning of strategy. As a top executive stated, I am not sure if we have strategy 
[Strategy] must be definedfirst, so that we know what it actually means. It seemed that 
different officials interpreted the same written strategy statement differently. 
In spite of a need for clarity with regard to the definition of strategy in view of the diversity 
of interpretations offered by officials, an informant-a middle manager-assumed that, 
since the strategy is a shared conunon understanding, it's not necessary to write it down in 
words. The OCSCpeople would already understand 
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According to the informants, strategy can have several purposes and functions, but mainly 
to provide focus for the whole organisation. In giving focus, strategy helps building 
confidence among staff, because once the organisation's focus is known, individuals can 
readily see what they are working towards. The following interview data categorised 
within cell A2 in Table 7b highlight this point 
Strategy provides organisationalfocus. 
A middle manager 
Strategy gives direction downwards from the organisation's vision to 
day-to-day operations. 
A supervisor 
Interpreted variously, however, strategy was often generally regarded as a course of 
actions given by the top management. As a 'given', strategy was thus considered by some 
officials as inviolable, or even sacrosanct-the point highlighted by the following 
interview quote categorised within cell A2 in Table 7b. 
There should be a review of strategy But nobody dares to say the 
existing strategy is not good 
A supervisor 
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Compliance with strategy 
Once the strategy had been fonnulated, plans were to be issued accordingly. These plans 
were expected to be in compliance with the strategy. Many informants highlighted this 
point, for example, that: 
A capable agency must have plans1projects in line with strategy. 
Planning is not just guesswork ... strateSy provides a working path. 
Agencies then plan their courses ofwork in accordance with the strategy. 
A top executive 
Strategy is like a compass showing the organisation a direction. At the 
lower levels in the organisation, people must consi&r what they have to 
do to help the organisation reach its destination. 
A supervisor 
The above interview quotes were classified within cell A3 in Table 7b. 
By following these plans, the hands-on personnel can make sure that their activities have 
the same focus as that of the organisation. Therefore, plans appear to help in aligning 
organisational activities with the strategy. 
For the OCSC, the planning division-a division within the bureau of general 
administration-has a duty to find a compromise between the strategy given by the top 
management and the activities from operational perspectives. Figure 8b illustrates that the 
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planning division links top management and operating staff to ensure the compliance of all 
organisational activities with the strategy. 
Top Management 
Strategy 
Planning Division 
Strategy Activity Plans 
Operational Levels 
Figure 8b: OCSC Strategy-Plans Interaction 
(Source: the author) 
All OCSC departments/divisions were required to prepare and submit their annual 
operating plans, which were aligned with the organisational strategy, to the planning 
division. The planning division's two important activities were (1) to collect plans from all 
departments/divisions and (2) to ensure that the activities specified in these plans support 
the organisational strategy. A supervisor in the planning division explained that I have to 
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connect the top with the bottom of the otganisation. People at the bottom don't always 
have time to learn the organisation direction This interview quote fell in cell A4 in Table 
7b. 
The planning division would eventually collle all plans to produce the OCSC's overall 
plans to be proposed to the Bureau of the Budget as a supporting document requesting the 
annual budget for the coming fiscal year. 
Although all plans and activities were expected to be derived from the strategy and to 
focus on the same direction, many informants noted that the planning process was not 
always the derivative of strategy. Instead, activity plans sometimes relied heavily on what 
had been done. This point was highlighted by an official, responsible for the planning of a 
bureau, normally we begin the planning by looking at our day-to-day activities. A top 
executive shared the same opinion stating that while strategy is given downward. % the 
planning procedure is still bottom-up. These two interview quotes were examples of the 
interview data categorised within cell A4 in Table 7b. 
However, a number of officials noted that the OCSC strategy had become more influential 
in the planning process. Even though it was widely accepted that plans and activities at the 
lower organisational levels should reflect and support the strategy, aberrations were 
mentioned on occasion. Informants from all organisational levels explained this, as in the 
following examples categorised into cell A2 in Table 7b: 
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We looked only at the objectives. Iffhey were achieved, we paid little 
attention to the strategy used 
A top executive 
Nobody monitored whether the success was from following the strategy 
it was not destructive as long as objectives were accompl&hed It was 
not wrong. 
A middle manager 
There was no monitoring of the compliance with strategy ... how could 
we do that? ... sometimes our work may not be relevant to any strategies 
at alL 
A supervisor 
For some activities, when I tried to find their Enkages with the strategic 
objectives, Ijust couldn'tfind any. Some activities we don't have to do at 
all. 
A non-management official 
It can also be noted that not all officials favoured the OCSC's adoption of strategic 
management. Some informants regarded strategy more as mandatory than necessary by 
commenting that: 
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It was the Cabinet's Resolution that public agencies must adopt strategic 
management. 
A supervisor 
Therefore, even though the OCSC fulfilled the external requirements by having strategy in 
place, its operations did not always comply with the strategy. In other words, strategy 
disconnection occurred. 
Changes in strategy 
The interviewees mentioned several factors that can cause changes in the OCSC strategy, 
including mission changes, political/govenunental changes, unachieved objectives, 
external envirorunent (e. g. economic crisis), and top management changes. However, the 
mission changes resulting from the founding of the Office of the Public Development 
Commission (OPDC) were the most frequently identified factor triggering OCSC strategy 
changes. The following interview extracts-classified within cell A6 in Table 7b-are 
examples of how the informants mentioned changes in strategy due to these mission 
changes. 
.. because our roles and missions have changed, the work we used to 
do 
is now taken care of by the OPDC "at we have left is human resource 
management ... the strategy thus needs to be altered 
A top executive 
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It has been apparent since thefounding ofthe OPDC that our missions 
have changed. As a result, the OCSC must re-examine its missions, and 
change vision and strategy. 
A supervisor 
In addition, political/governmental requirements were seen as highly influential in causing 
strategic changes. The government can influence the OCSC strategy mainly through the 
Deputy Prime Minister, who chairs the Civil Service Commission (CSQ, to which the 
OCSC is the secretariat The following quotes are examples of the interview extracts 
categorised within cell A6 in Table 7b. 
Once the governmental demands change, public agencies also need to 
adjust their strategies 
A top executive 
[OCSq certainly has to observe the government policy and adjust its 
strategy. The Deputy PM, who chairs the CSC, will give the policy to the 
CSC. It affects us, because we work as the secretariat to the CSC When 
the Deputy PMgives direction to the CSC, it will cause adjustment to our 
strate, gy. 
A supervisor 
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Despite many factors mentioned as the causes of strategic changes, the informants noted 
that OCSC strategies lasted, on average, for two to five years. However, amendments were 
normally made to the existing strategies from time to time. 
Performance measurement 
The discussion regarding performance measurement for this OCSC case as well as for the 
following three cases (i. e. OAG, BB, and ONCCQ is based on the structure of the 
definitions of key tenns identified in section 2.2.4. The purpose is to distinguish the case 
sites in terms of their performance measures, performance measurement system, and 
performance measurement. 
Performance measures 
The following table illustrates the OCSC ibnnal perfon-nance indicators appearing in the 
budget documents. 
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Performance Dimensions Performance Indicators 
1. Public sector structure and personnel Number of dimensions of structure and personnel 
management management 
2. Controlling and overseeing of Thai students Number of students overseen by the offices of 
abroad educational affairs 
3. Public sector manpower planning Number of personnel prepared for public sector 
4. Development of the Management by Objective 9 Number of agencies having developed MBO 
(MBO) system in public agencies system 
_ 5. Public agencies' service standards * Number of agencies being PSO certified' 
6. Legislation, regulations, Cabinet's resolutions 9 Number of proposals approved by the Cabinet and 
and other measures related to public sector used by public agencies 
reform 
7. Development of new personnel management * Number of agencies having new personnel 
system management system 
8. Ethical, values and cultural standards in public 9 Number of agencies having standards charter 
sector management 
9. Promotions of cultural and values changes in 9 Number of civil servants participated in ethical 
public sector promotion programmes 
10. Development of systems disciplinary, * Percentage of progress in the systems development 
complaints and grievance proceedings 
Table 8b: OCSC Formally Stated Performance Indicators 
(Source: Bureau of the Budget, 2002: 108) 
From the table above, it can be seen that all the indicators were the output measures 
without the indicators capable of informing the objectives achievement. There was sole 
emphasis on output measurement, despite the recognition among officials that the 
achievement of objectives should also be measured. The following quotes provide 
examples of the supporting interview data categorised in cell B6 in Table 7b. 
We normally consider the production of outputs as achievement 
Actually, we shouldfocus on the objectives or outcomes instead 
A. middle manager 
2 PSO (Thailand International Public Sector Standard Management System and outcomes) is an ISO-typed 
standardisation for public sector management. 
269 
There should not only be measurement of what has been done; there 
should be a comparison in terms of the objectives accqmplished as well 
A non-management official 
Performance measurement system 
The use of performance measurement system was regarded as new to the OCSC and other 
Thai public agencies alike. Prior to the adoption of strategic management, the OCSC used 
the system mainly for resource control and personnel management purposes. Measurement 
of the organisational performance was not evident. 
However, since there had been more demand (mainly political) for better public sector 
performance, the OCSC had placed greater emphasis on performance measurement 
practice. The following Prime Ministerial radio address highlighted the demand for better 
public sector performance and performance measurement. 
Officials at the operational level and administrators must first clearly 
establish the outputs and outcomes before requesting a budget for a 
project The new 'result-based' system would lead to adjustments in the 
working culture, and government procedures would become shorter, 
bringing about greaterflexibility andfaster servicesfor the people. 
Source: http: //www. prd. go. th/ebook/story. php? idmag=19&idstory=123 
Even though the OCSC had formally developed a performance measurement system, the 
use of measurement was still rare. Many infon-nants noted that it was not uncommon not to 
have performance indicators. At best, it seemed enough merely to have them in place. 
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In reality, the organisational performance was hardly measured. This was evidenced by the 
following interview data from cell B 1, Table 7b. 
I can say quite categorically that we do not have [performance] 
indicators. Our work is so much routinised that we've never thought 
about measuring our performance. 
A supervisor 
Performance measures merely exist; they are not really in use. But we 
still have to have them because it is the regulations, e. g. for the budget 
request. 
non-management official 
Performance measures were used mainly to monitor the working process of output 
productions to plan. This point was highlighted, for example, by the next two quotes 
classified within cell B6 in Table 7b. 
Outputs or outcomes of my work are to have the outputs done ... what 
more do I need? It is the routine, so we don't have to set performance 
indicators. Ifwe did, it would be dead boring tautology. 
A supervisor 
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Despite the fact that the indicators were stated in budget proposal 
documents, they were not, in practice, used. It was the following up of 
working process, not the evaluating of performance. That is, if we did 
this piece of work, we would monitor its progress to see what the finished 
outputs were so far ... 
but would not check to see if the objectives were 
achieved. 
A non-management official 
Performance measurement 
The purposes of performance measurement were mentioned variously, as appeared in the 
following example interview quotes categorised into cell B6 in Table 7b, including: 
e Intemal report (We follow-up weekly performance. Staff needs to report to the 
management the progress ofwork each week-a top executive. ) 
9 External report (The government requires public agencies to report working results 
biannuall)-a top executive. ) 
4, Performance improvement (Results ftom performance measurement let us know 
where the problems are so that we canfix them-a supervisor. ) 
* Personnel management (Results ftom performance appraisal determine the 
promotions ofofficials and tasks assignment-a middle manager. ) 
9 Budget request (To request for a budget, we need to identify the quantitative 
measures ofourperformance-a middle manager. ) 
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* Financial rewards (Because performance measurement has just recently been used 
the government gives financial incentives for public agencies to use performance 
measurement-A non-management official. ) 
* Informing of intermediate success (It takes several years to realise our vision There 
need to be measuresfor intermediate success-a non-management official. ) 
The informants noted several advantages of performance measurement (cell B4, Table 7b), 
for example, that it: 
* Helps clarify the objectives because there must be an agreement over what are to be 
used as perfonnance indicators. (Measuring performance may help in clarifying 
objectives because public agencies need to understand thoroughly the objectives 
before they can be measured-a non-management official. ) 
* Makes the evaluation of success less subject to personal judgernent. (In order to say 
that the objectives are reachecl there should not bejust sayings orfeelings Thought 
must be put into how to measure if the objectives have really been reached-a 
middle manager. ) 
* Makes clear the contribution of individuals and sub-units in achieving the overall 
organisational objectives. (It will show how individual performance will influence 
organisationalperformance-a top executive. ) 
e Promotes cooperation among individuals and sub-units within the organisation, in the 
cases where they have overlapped responsibility. (It helps different units understand 
each other because sometimes, there is more than one unit responsible for an 
indicator-a supervisor. ) 
I 
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* Enables the organisation to learn from past experiences. (It enables the organisations 
continuously to learn and improve themselves--a supervisor. ) 
In the main, performance measurement was used as a management tool to help managers 
conduct their managerial jobs. Performance data inform the managers of OCSC 
performance, and also indicate areas for improvement. 
However, disadvantages of performance measurement were also noted (cell B4, Table 7b). 
These disadvantages included the following: 
9 Measuring performance was a resource-consuming activity requiring much attention 
from already-busy managers. (It would be difficult to find times to measure 
performance because we are so preoccupied with our work-a supervisor. 
9 Standardised measures that were sometimes imposed were not suitable for public 
agencies. (Sometimes the Bureau of the Budget imposed public agency indicators. 
It can do so because it's powerful If the management teams of those agencies are 
not good at negotiation they will be in trouble--a supervisor. ) 
e Measures were used inappropriately. (If the unspent budget was seen as representing 
inefficiency, when approaching the end of the fiscal year, public agencies would 
spend hurriedly without considering a thing--a top executive. ) 
* Performance measurement could be subject to the management's manipulation. 
[Some managers] set the target intentionally too low, so that itd appear that they 
were doing excellent work-a supervisor. ) 
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Since performance measurement can be either advantageous or disadvantageous, 
management should weigh the benefits the organisation might gain from the measurement 
with the undesirable consequences of the measurement. A top executive summarised that, 
Performance measurement has both pros and cons. There re, we must ! fo 
consider its worthiness after the trade-off. 
Alignment between performance measurement and strategy 
The informants recognised that measuring performance on the basis of strategy provided 
feedback on the way the OCSC was working towards its strategic objectives. Therefore, 
performance measurement should be aligned with, and supportive of, the organisation's 
strategy. The following supporting interview quote was categorised within cell Cl, Table 
7b. 
Performance measurement, ifnot aligned with strategy, would be 
completely chaotic. 
A top executive 
The alignment was assumed to occur naturally through the planning process, beginning 
with the overall strategy, followed by plans and activities. Informants saw that if activities 
I 
derived from the strategy were measured, the measures used would always align with the 
organisational strategy. The next interview excerpt taken from cell C2 in Table 7b 
highlights this point 
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[Performance] measures are supportive of strategyfor sure because the 
two are aligned naturally, due to the cascading nature [of the planning 
process]. 
A supervisor 
In other words, since the alignment was believed to exist automatically through the 
planning process, there was no need to check if the measures were aligned with strategy. 
8.3 The Office of the Auditor General 
Case-Site Descriptions and Analysis 
In this section, the OAG case-site descriptions will be provided and the results fromthe 
OAG case-site analyses will be discussed. 
8.3.1 OAG case-site descriptions 
Historical perspective 
The first enactment known in the history of Thailand on the audit and control of public 
finance dates back to the year 1875, when the Royal Audit Office, created by Royal 
Decree, was proclaimed, with independent power and responsibility over the control of 
public finance. The Royal Audit Office was responsible only to the then Absolute 
Monarch. 
276 
Soon after the change from the Absolute Monarch to the parliamentary system took place 
in 1932, the Audit Council Act B. E. 2476 was enacted. 3 This Act established the Audit 
Council of Thailand as the goverranent agency responsible for auditing government 
accounts, under the direction of its President The Audit Council was considered a body 
fully independent of other executive authority, and solely responsible for setting its own 
direction and scope of audit without interference. 
To revise the law on the Audit Council, the State Audit Act B. E. 2522 was enacted. 
The Act made several changes, including the change of the title of the office to the Office 
of the Auditor General (OAG). The head of the organisation also changed his title from the 
President to the Auditor-General. More importantly, the Act authorised the OAG to extend 
its scope beyond financial audits to assessrwnt of economy, efficiency and effectiveness of 
the audited agencies. 
Currently, the OAG organisation structure, duties and competences are set out in specific 
acts, of which the State Audit Act B. E. 2542 is central. In this latest Act three major parts 
of the organisation are specified: the State Audit Commission, the Auditor-General, and 
the Office of the Auditor General (article 6,26, and 38 respectively). 
3 In Thailand, Buddhist Era (B. E. ) is the official calendar system. To convert B. E. to Anno Domini (A. D. ), 
543 should be deducted from B. E. (e. g. B. E. 2476 is 1933 A. D. ). 
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Political dependency 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B. E. 2540 provides, in section 312, chapter 
XI, that 
The State Audit shall be carriedout by the State Audit Commission and 
the A uditor-General, who is independent and im artial T 
The OAG can thus be regarded as an independent public agency not subject to political 
supervision, at least, in theory. 
The State Audit Commission 
The State Audit Commission consists of the Chairman and 'nine other members appointed 
by the King with the advice of the Senateý from persons with expertise and experience in 
state audit, internal audit, finance and other fiel& Members of the State Audit 
Commission will hold office for a term of six years from the date of their appointment by 
the King, and will serve for only one term. 
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Duties and responsibilities 
The OAG duties and responsibilities-as stated in section 7 of the State Audit Act BE 
2542 are to: 
* Audit the statement on receipts and payments of the audited agencies. 
Audit the currency reserve account. 
Audit the custody and disbursement of money and use of other properties belonging 
to or being the responsibility of the audited agencies. 
* Examine in connection with the collection of taxes, fees and other incomes of the 
audited agencies. 
Organisation structure 
The OAG is the independent secretariat to the State Audit Commission, with the 
Auditor-General as the superior responsible directly to the Chairman of the State Audit 
Commission. The King will appoint the Auditor-General with the advice of the Senate. 
There are five Deputy Auditors-General. One of these is the Deputy Auditor-General for 
administration, the others being responsible for operations. The auditing operations are 
divided into two groups, namely, the ministerial and the regional (provincial) audits. 
There are ten ministerial and fifteen regional auditing offices. Figure 8c illustrates the 
OAG organisation structure. 
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Sol, 
A tid itor-C c nerai I 
Administrations lbr Operations IV 
-Ibr 
Operat ions Ir( )perations II I'or Operations III 
Ministerial Audit Ministerial Audit Regional Audit Regional Audit 
wi and monctaý, T-66i-,; ý'j Offilces 1-5 Ofl-ices 6-11 Of) Officcs 1-3,12-15 
Resources Office 
Figure 8c: OAG Organisation Structure 
(Source: the authot-) 
Vision 
The Ot'fice of' the Auditor General shall be an independent and impartial agency. 
The auditing results of the Off-ice sliall be credible and beneficial for the Parliament, the 
Government, related organisations, and citizens. 
Source: Bureau ofthe Budget (2002: 117) 
Missions 
o Administrative work flor the State Audit Commission. 
o General Audit 
- Financial audits including reccipts and pqIllelitS, tile CLIstody and disbursement of' 
money and other assets, tax collection, t'ces and other incomes. 
- Performance audits lor disbursement ofilloncy and otlicr assets. 
s Reporting annual performance of the OAG to the Parliament, the Senate and the 
Cabinet. 
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e Monitoring the audited agencies' performance according to the recommendations by 
the OAG. 
Source: Bureau of the Budget (2002: 117) 
Strategies 
s Development of working capability. 
e Development of information technology. 
9 Study and development research. 
* Promotion of morality. 
Source: Bureau of the Budget (2002: 117) 
Objectives 
Eighty per cent of the audited agencies will be able to improve internal control and 
performance evaluation systems by the year 2007. 
* Sixty per cent of the users of the OAG reports will be satisfied with the OAG 
performance by the year 2097. 
Source: Bureau of the Budget (2002: 118) 
8.3.2 OAG case-site analysis 
The interviews with six OAG officials were carried out during April 25h - June 9th 2003. 
The informants -were one top executive, two middle managers, two supervisors and a non- 
management official. On average, the informants had worked for the OAG and had been in 
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their current positions for 27.17 and 5.83 years respectively. The transcripts of the OAG 
interviews comprise of 48,010 words in Thai. 
Strategy 
Meaning, purposes andfunctions of strategy 
Generally, the OAG officials understood that itrategy indicates broadly the direction of the 
organisation into the long-term future. Strategy refers to 'how' the OAG is going to work, 
in order to accomplish its objectives. It helps various sub-units know the directions in 
which the overall organisation is heading. 
However, different views towards strategy were identified. For example, the distinction 
between strategy and policy was not clear to the OAG. An informant who regarded both 
terms as identical stated, 
I understand that strategy is the [OA G] auditing policy. 
A middle manager 
Another noted that the two were different. 
Strategy is what we do, but policy is a broadframework. that guides our 
actions ... poliCy is above strategy. Policy is broader. 
A supervisor 
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The preceding two quotes are examples of the interview data classified within cell Al, 
Table 7b. 
Compliance with strategy 
Once the policy/strategy has been established, operating plans are made accordingly. 
Normally, the plans comprise of activities to be done (e. g. what type of auditing will be 
done). Therefore, once the plans have been accepted, it is then assumed that carrying out 
the activities as stated in the plans will be in compliance with the strategy. The two 
following interview excerpts represents data classified within cell A4 in Table 7b. 
We prepare the annual operating plans ourselves in compliance with the 
strategicplans. 
A supervisor 
[OAG] sets the policy, then each office will prepare its annual auditing 
plans following that policy ... operating staff at the 
divisional levels 
within each office are to work upon the office's plans. These will help to 
create the office's overallpicture. 
A supervisor 
According to the informants, any activities would, presumably, comply with the strategy 
because they were components of plans derived from the strategy. 
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Changes in strategy 
Several factors were mentioned as influential to the OAG strategy, including political 
influences, past auditing experiences, rules and regulations, a number of groups of 
stakeholders in the society, IT facilities and available resources. Therefore, changes in 
these factors would be likely to result in changes in the OAG strategy. 
A non-management official gave an example (cell A6, Table 7b) of changes in strategy, 
Formerly, the strategy stressed the suppression of misconduct, for 
example, when aftaud was caught, the prosecution was then arranged. 
Now, the strategy emphasises prevention more. 
A non-management official 
Nevertheless, the changes in the OAG strategy were perceived as not frequent, as noted by 
a supervisor, the strategy does not change often. The amended versions will resemble the 
old ones. 
Performance measurement 
Performance measures 
It is a requirement that the OAG prepare documents in support of its proposal for its annual 
budget. In these documents, performance indicators for the OAG were stated formally as 
appearing in the following table. 
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Performance Dimensions Performance Indicators 
1. Financial Audit Number of audited units 
Number of financial statements audited 
2. Procurement Audit and Investigation Audit Number of procurement contracts audited 
Number of investigations audited 
3. Operations audit and others Number of operations audit cases audited 
Number of income-collecting units audited 
" Number of disbursement of money and assets 
audit cases audited 
" Number of studies programmes conducted 
Table 8c: OAG Formally Stated Performance Indicators 
(Source: Bureau of the Budget, 2002: 118) 
The documentation data in the table above shows that the existing performance measures 
focused exclusively on the working outputs to plan, and had no reference to long-term 
objectives. 
Performance measurement system 
Performance measurement system was regarded as important and as the focus of more 
attention both in the OAG and in general public management in the Thai administration. 
However, for the OAG, the system appeared to be inadequate. Measures within the system 
most frequently mentioned were input or output measures attached to the activity plans. 
This was evidenced by the following interview data fell into cell B6, Table 7b. 
... finish the job on time, do not overspend, and 
deliver outputs as 
proposed in the plan were considered salisfactorY. 
A top executive 
Performance indicators of the auditing offices are whether they can 
finish the auditingjobs according to the number planned 
supervisor 
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The measurement system tended to focus almost solely on short-term results (e. g. 
activities, inputs and outputs), while the longer-term performance (e. g. strategic objectives 
and outcomes) were assumed and overlooked. It was believed that by working as planned, 
the organisation objectives eventually would be achieved. Measuring the accomplishment 
of activities to plan was considered to be the means by which management could be 
informed of many aspects of the OAG performance, including the accomplishment of 
objectives, efficiency and effectiveness. The following examples of the interview data 
categorised into cell B6 in Table 7b highlighted this point 
We can know that we are working efficiently if we can finish the jobs 
according to the number planned and on time. 
A middle manager 
Whether the objectives were achieved or not can be seen from the work 
results. For example, we compare the target number of agencies to be 
audited with number of casesfinished 
A supervisor 
Effectiveness can be seen in the outputs producecl for example, by 
comparing what were planned with the number of contracts audited 
V.. 
Even though there is no indicator of elciency, we know if we were doing 
OK. 
A supervisor 
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Performance measurentent 
The OAG appeared to measure performance both for external and internal purposes. 
On the one hand, the external purposes were mainly to satisfy the external requirements for 
the OAG auditing report. Two major sources of external requirements were identified (cell 
D4, Table 7b) by the informants, including the Bureau of the Budget and the Parliament, as 
shown below, for example. 
In the past, there were no clearly specified indicators. Recently, the BB 
has been designated, whereby [public agencies] must have performance 
indicators in place. 
A supervisor 
According to the State A udit Act, we have to report to the Parliament. 
A supervisor 
On the other hand, the internal measurements were often for the purposes of internal report 
and control, and for providing data, in order to make an adjustment in the operating plans. 
The following two interview quotes represent examples of data categorised into cell DI 
and D2 in Table 7b, respectively. 
At the end of each month, there would he a summary of used 'manldays' 
and how much was left. Each office would key their data into the system 
so that the executives would be able to check the currentperformances. 
A supervisor 
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The control of 'man1days' showed us the work in progress. Even though 
they are yet to be finished, we are able to know the quantity of resources 
we have used in comparison to the plan. Then we can spot the problems 
and consult with the officials who are responsible ... If appropriate, we 
can reallocate resources. 
A supervisor 
It appeared that many OAG officials regarded the extensive use of 'manldays' as an 
important control mechanism. 
Perfonnance measurement was almost always regarded as being advantageous. 
Performance data helps management to know if they are working to plan and complying 
with rules and regulations. Performance data can also help to identify problems which 
might lead to appropriate adjustments. For example, the data helps to adjust plans, set 
standards for future performance and allocate better organisational resources. Moreover, 
performance data can also be used to inform different stakeholder groups of the 
accountability of the OAG to them. 
However, a few disadvantages of the measurement were also mentioned. These 
disadvantages and examples of supporting interview data-classified within cell B4, Table 
7b-are provided as follows: 
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* Inappropriately set measures are not useful (Objectives change every year but 
without corresponding changes in performance measures. This might result in that 
performance data becoming irrelevant-a middle manager. ) 
is Measurement manipulation lessens the usefulness of performance data (Sometimes, 
there were so many difficulties in one way or another, that we would state the 
indicators vague4, ---a supervisor. ) 
9 Imposed measures are not compatible with the agency's need (I am worried that the 
government needs the OAG to measure performance based on cost accounting 
principles. By nature, OAG work cannot be assessed like that-a middle manager. ) 
Moreover, a middle manager noted that the management might be misled by inappropriate 
measurement. For this manager, it seemed that the ultimate achievement was to work as 
planned, and the only way of improving performance was to try to catch up with the plan. 
The manager asserted-as categoried within cell E2, Table 7b-that: 
"at do you mean by improvement? I don't understand. I think I keep 
improving my work but still am behind the plan ... Do you think it's so- 
so, even if I could work as planned? ... 
I believe that performance 
indicators need not be changed often because we can always tell the 
success as planned 
In general, the disadvantages were the results of the misuse of performance measurement. 
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ignment between performance measurement and strategy 
It appeared that the OAG infon-nants had a vague notion of the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy. While most informants claimed that the alignment 
was of virtue, they could not make clear what benefits the alignment could bring. 
However, at least two issues regarding the alignment were agreed upon among the 
informants. 
Firstly, it was commonly assumed that performance measurement-by its nature-was 
naturally aligned with strategy. That is because almost all measures used were the 
measures of activitiestoutputs to plan which, in turn, were derived from the OAG 
policy/strategy. Therefore, the measuring of activitiesloutputs stated in the plan would, at 
least indirectly relate to the strategy. In this way, most informants assumed that the 
measurement of any activities/outputs (as long as they were planned) would automatically 
align with the organisation's strategy. 
This assumption about the natural alignment was reflected in the following interview data 
assigned to cell C2 in Table 7b. 
We measure the number of operations auditingjobs ivefinish Doing this 
one by one will gradually increase the efficiency of how the whole public 
sector spends (N. B. which is an OAG's strategic objective). 
A supervisor 
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Secondly, it was claimed that since the long-term objectives and activities hardly change, 
while policy/strategy is subject to more frequent changes, one way to maintain the 
alignment is to set the measures ambiguously. This point was supported by the following 
excerpt categorised into cell B5 in Table 7b. 
Sometimes, there are so many difficullies in one way or another, that we 
state the indicators vaguely. 
A supervisor 
By conducting performance measurement in this manner, the OAG was able to maintain to 
a certain degree the alignment between performance measurement and strategy almost 
without worrying about strategy changes. 
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8.4 The Bureau of the Budget 
Case-Site Descriptions and Analysis 
In this section, the BB case-site descriptions will be provided and the results from the BB 
case-site analyses will be discussecl. 
8.4.1 BB case-site descriptions 
Historical perspective 
Thailand's budgetary process has a long history, dating back to the time when the country 
still had an Absolute Monarch system However, the modem history of the BB can be 
divided into four main periods. 
During its first period, between 1926 and 1932, before the change from the Absolute 
Monarch to the Parliamentary system, the assignment of public fiscal budget belonged to 
the Budget Division, a division among six others in the General's Department within the 
Ministry of Finance. 
After the change in 1932, the Budget Division at the time, although overseeing the annual 
fiscal budget procedure, had the primary tasks simply of collecting the Ministries/ 
Departments' annual budget proposals and controlling budget spending by government 
agencies and state enterprises in compliance with the law. 
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However, as the whole public sector grew, so did the Budget Division, many sub-divisions/ 
sections being added into the Budget Division as well as the additional personnel being 
recruited. Therefore, in its third period, around 1958, the Budget Division was upgraded to 
the Budget Bureau, although remaining under the General's Department, Ministry of 
Financc. 
Subsequently, in the same year, the coup d'etat took place. The military government's 
Finance and Budget Commission, regarding the importance of the country's budgeting 
process as a vital governmental tool in the public administration and development, 
separated the budget preparation from public income acquisition and expenditure. 
On February 14 th 1959, the Budget Bureau was then upgraded to the Bureau of the Budget 
(BB), an organisation equivalent to a Department under the Office of the Prime Minister. 
The status of the BB has not been changed since then. 
Political dependency 
The BB is a government agency under the Office of the Prime Minister, headed by a 
Director and directly accountable to the Prime Minister. The status of the BB Director is 
equivalent to the Director-General of a Ministry's Department. 
Board of commissioners 
The BB does not have a board of commissioners. 
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Duties and responsibilities 
The Bureau of the Budget's duties and responsibilities include. 
* Developing proposals on budget policies and plans 
* Preparing and recommending the national annual budget 
* Monitoring and evaluating governmental agencies' programmes an projects 
Making recommendations on financial and budgetary matters as requested by the 
Cabinet 
e Researching and analysing activities of government departments and state 
enterprises, in order to make improvement recommendations 
e Studying ways of improving the quality and compilation of financial data decrees, 
rules or regulations relating to budget matters 
* Making recommendations on more effective coordination of work programmes, so as 
to eliminate any duplication of functions 
* Organising in-service training both for the BB personnel and for personnel of other 
Ministries and state enterprises ' 
Source: External Relations and Office Automation Development Branch, 2000 
Organisation structure 
The functions of the BB are practically divided into three areas: technical analysis, budget 
analysis and administration. The BB organisation structure is illustrated in the following 
figure 8d. 
294 
Office of' (he Prime Nfillisler 
Diredor 
I )cputý I )ircciors ý 
[I 
litidgel Advisors 
Olfice ol'Administratiori 
and I luman Resource 
Development 
Office ofTconornic 
Service Budget Analysk 
Office ofthe Province 
and Vocal Project Service 
Analysis 
lifficc of' I Illdgct Polic) 
and 1111ofillatioll 
Office of, killcallonal 
.) -vicc Anaksis Sel 
)1fice ol'Staw Fntcrpri se 
Service Am6sis 
ollice oflitidget 
"i'landalds, 
Ollice of Nal ional 
Scoinly and 
Administrative Service 
Budget Analy. Sis 
6encral All"urs Owsioll 
( )11'icc of I'lanning 
Prolco haltialion 
Olficc ol Public I Icalill 
and I )tllitlc,, scivice 
Budget 
I, cgill Division 
Figure 8d: 1111 Organisation structilre 
(Source: adapted from Ixicnial Relations and Oflice Alitolliatioll 
I)C\'CIOI)lllcllt Branch, 2000: -1-5) 
Vision 
Fhe II it reau oft lie II tic] ge ts lia IIaII oc a te bud ge t s, i it tIIc \U)'s Wt zl"c I "OS 1. be "Ic IIcIthe 
country and citizens. The allocation shall be transparellt, eLl"Itlible MILI JI List' I 1,11)lc I)Y tile 
Bureau emphasising on tile facilitating, rather than tile ýIpproving oftlic budget allocation. 
Source: Bureau ofthe Budget (2002: 79) 
Missions 
e Prepare and nianagc the budget III I-CSpoIISC to tile government policies and tile 
National F. conomic and Social Dcý, cj()pjjjcjjt Plans by cnipliasising tile ctliclent and 
efTective use ol'the resources and budgairy discipline. 
* Recommend and give opinions to tile government and public agencies raý, Irdillg 
budgeting by emphasising tile benefits to the co"Ill-Y "Id cItIzells. 
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* Develop a performance-based budgeting system to facilitate the use of the country's 
budget to achieve both outputs and outcomes in a responsible, streamlined and 
transparent manner. 
Source: Bureau of the Budget (2002: 79) 
Strategy 
* Support the improvement of public administration. 
Source: Bureau of the Budget (2002: 79) 
Objectives 
9 Public agencies are allocated budget with equitability, and are able to implement 
according to government strategies and policies. 
* Budget disbursements are in congruence with objectives and goals stated in operating 
plans. 
* Public agencies are able to use advice or consultations to guide their conduct in 
accordance with legislation. 
e Results from performance follow-ups and evaluations are used in budget allocating 
considerations. 
* Public agencies understand and act in compliance with the performance-based 
budgeting principle. 
9 Public agencies have structure and operating systems that are right and compatible 
with their tasks. 
* Public agencies are able to bring knowledge on budgeting to improve their work. 
Source: Bureau of the Budget (2002: 79) 
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8.4.2 BB case-site analysis 
The interviews with six BB officials were carried out during the period May 201h - June 
23rd 2003. The informants were one top executive, two middle managers, two supervisors, 
and one non-management official. On average, the informants had worked for the BB and 
had been in their current positions for 25.5 and 4.65 years respectively. The transcripts of 
the BB interviews comprise of 56,506 words in Thai. 
Strategy 
Meaning, purposes andfunctions ofstrategy 
There seemed to be confusion in the ways BB officials interpreted the meaning of strategy. 
While some informants regarded strategy as the same as policy, others saw it as different. 
The following two interview statements classified within cell A2 in Table 7b highlight 
these conflicting views of the similarities/differences between strategy and policy. 
While the first statement highlights the sirnilarities of the two, the second underlines the 
differences. 
In my opinion, government strategy or government policy are different 
termsfor the same thing. 
A middle manager 
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Policy identifies what to do. Strategy tells how to do, the time and money 
to spend, and the means ofdoing so. 
A top executive 
Despite some informants regarding strategy as different from policy, the two terms were 
frequently used interchangeably. 
However, whether they regarded the terms as identical, similar or different, almost all 
informants iecognised the need for BB policy/strategy to comply with that of the 
government. The next two statements, categorised within cell D4 Table 7b, emphasise 
the governmental influences on the BB policy/strategy. 
f BB takes policyftom the government and prepares the budgeting policy 
according to the government policy. 
A top executive 
[BB] should consider the government strategy, then look at how its 
missionsfit with that strategy. 
A middle manager 
For the BB, in addition to organisational strategy, there is another strategy i. e. budgeting 
strategy. While the BB organisational strategy is mainly concerned with how the BB sets 
about achieving its objectives, the budgeting strategy is specifically concerned with the 
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way in which the BB allocates the country's public budget in accordance with the 
goverrunent's policy/strategy. 
Compliance with strategy 
The BB officials at different organisational levels claimed that they could see how their 
work linked overall to that of the BB. The following three interview excerpts categorised 
in cell B6 in Table 7b highlight this point. 
Outputs were set straight down from the BB strategy. We can tell what 
outputs we are going to deliver tofulfil the strafegý. 
A middle manager 
If each office does the jobs it is supposed to, eventually, it will support 
the overall strategy ... I always ensure the posifion of my office's 
jobs 
within the whole organisationalpicture. 
middle manager 
[My division] prepared a blueprint illustrating the whole process of the 
. 0"B". This allows me to see what my division needs to do. 1 take this 
blueprint as the principle ofmy work. 
A supervisor 
However, the linkages through hierarchy do not necessarily mean that the activities at the 
sub-units support the organisation strategy. A middle manager noted that the typically clear 
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linkages of activities throughout public agencies did not always indicate that activities 
were supportive of the organisation. strategy. This manager's comment was classified into 
cell D5 in Table 7b. 
I We need to accept that what happened in reality was that operating plans 
were made bottom-up. Because public organisations are structured 
according to duties and responsibilitie. % it is obvious what each sub-unit 
needs to do. 
A middle manager 
Therefore, despite having perceived clear linkages of the activities throughout the BB 
hierarchy, there was no evidence from the officials that these activities were, in fact, in 
compliance with strategy. 
Changes in strategy 
It was claimed that changes in strategy were likely to result from many factors, including 
changes in budgeting principles, government policY, management, missions and 
organisation structure. However, changes in strategy were caused more often by 
government mandate, changed budgeting principles and the emergence of new missions. 
The following excerpts categorised within cell Fl. in Table 7b highlight causes of BB 
strategy change. 
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[The previous government] initiated results-based budgeting. The present 
government added that budgeting should also follow government 
policylstrategy. The BB thus integrated these. 
A top executive 
We, then, have to be well aware of the directions of the government 
policy so that we can serve the government well 
A middle manager 
Some agencies might be assigned more mission-s such as when the 
government says what more is to be done or which missions are to be 
changed. For example, an agency which used to emphasise Me use oflaw 
enforcement ma change to public relations. y 
A supervisor 
However, the frequency of changes was difficult to identify because the BB had recently 
adopted strategic management. As noted by a top executive, the strategybased 
management hasjust become material [in this government's time]. 
D 
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Performance measurement 
Performance measures 
The following table illustrates examples of the Bureau of the Budget's formal performance 
indicators. 
Performance Dimensions Performance Indicators 
1. Budget allocation * Number of Ministries budget allocation 
2. Budget management * Number of works/projects budget allocation 
3. Consultations on budgeting e Number of consultations given 
4. Performance follow-up and evaluation 9 Number of subjects/plans followed-up and 
evaluated 
5. Budgeting system improvement * Number of Ministries having improved budgeting 
system 
6. Structure and operating systems improvement 9 Number of services given 
7. Budgeting personnel training 9 Number of personnel trained 
Table 8d: BB Formally Stated Performance Indicators 
(Source: Bureau of the Budget, 2002: 80) 
From the above table, it can be seen that all the indicators were output measures. 
Performance measurement systent 
The formal performance measurement system in the BB had just recently been 
implemented and at the time of the study, was not fully in use-the point noted by the 
following interview data fell into cell B6 in Table 7b. 
We have recentlyformulatedperformance indicators - in 2003. 
A middle manager 
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The articulating of outputs or indicators began only in 2003. Before that, 
we did not use the word 'outputs, ' but the indicators were similar, i. e. 
they measured the number ofjobs done. 
supervisor 
The BB began only this year - 2003 [to formally set up outputs or 
indicators]. ... errors can be seen in the documents. The measurement 
system is not working yet. 
A supervisor 
The use of the system was lower than it should be (cell BI in Table 7b). 
Frankly speaking, we do not evaluate ourselves in the overall picture. 
A top executive 
We can't know about work efficiency. 
A middle manager 
We hardly measure our work performance. We never talk about what the 
outputs are. It is not measuringperformance, we have to admit. 
A supervisor 
A unique characteristic of the BB is that it can participate in other public agencies' 
performance measurement system formulation. Public agencies, in order to request for 
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annual budgets, need to specify what outputs the requested money will be used to produce 
as well as the indicators to show if these ouIputs are, indeed, produced. These data are then 
submitted in specifically formatted forms to the BB-who works as the government's 
budget allocator-to prepare the 'budget document' passed to the Parliament for scrutiny. 
Therefore, the BB can be considered as influencing the formulation of performance 
measurement system in public agencies. Many BB informants recognised the uniqueness 
of the BB's role in this respect by stating that 
[BB] goes out to help other agencies decide what their indicators should 
be. 
A middle manager 
In the budget document, [BB] specified that public agencies should 
measure four dimensions of their outputs, including quantity, quality, 
timeliness and cost. 
A supervisor 
The preceding excerpts are examples of the interview data categorised within cell GI, 
Table 7b. 
Performance measurement 
The BB measured performance for at least two purposes, including for control/report and 
for improvement. 
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The BB, as well as other public agencies, is required to prepare its perfon-nance report and 
submit it to inspectorate bodies (e. g. BB is required to report quarterly to the Cabinet). 
In doing that, the BB and other public agencies must complete the official forms (i. e. Form 
BB46-1 for regular work, BB46-2 for projects, BB46-3 for overall agency and BB46-. 4 for 
procurements) issued by the 1313, which should then be submitted to the appropriate 
inspectorate bodies. 
In addition, the measurement results could help to improve future performance by assisting 
management to identify areas for improvement. However, as a central budgeting body of 
the Thai government, the BB officials noted that in reality, public agencies' perfon-nance 
measurement results did not have much effect on the amount of money those agencies 
received because the allocated budgets were expected to be commensurate with the amount 
of work undertaken by them, not their performance. 
Moreover, the - purpose of reporting performance was more to control the money budget 
allocated to, and in turn, spent by, the public agencies. These points raised appear in the 
following examples of interview data categorised into cell D2 in Table 7b. 
The amount of money each agency will receive depends on the amount of 
its work It doesn't matter if the agency measures its performance or not 
it is still eligible to get the same amount ofmoney. 
A middle manager 
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Cost and efficiency are the things we have never considered In the past, 
we did not care how public agencies spent; we did not look at the 
outcomes. We considered only controlling the money budget they 
received. 
A supervisor 
For the 1313, there appeared to be several advantages of performance measurement, 
including the assistance it provides in: linking performance between different levels, 
improving performance, understanding success factors and enhancing organisational 
credibility. However, the advantage most frequently mentioned was that performance 
measurement helps officials to discern the linkages between sub-units and organisational 
performance as well as between organisational performance and governmental 
performance. 
The informants hardly acknowledged any disadvantages of performance measurement. The 
only disadvantage identified was that the measurement could be resource-consuming. 
Alignment between performance measurement and strategy 
According to the informants, an important characteristic of performance measurement was 
that it should be flexible, so that it can be adapted to changing situations. 
The general concept of the organisational alignment was widely accepted. That is, all plans 
and activities should be congruent with the overall long-term objectives of the 
organisation. However, there was less concern over whether performance measurement 
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was aligned with, and supportive of, the strategies. Performance measurement was 
regarded, instead, as aligning with actions or outputs, presumably leading to the long-term 
objectives. 
Even though the informants regarded plans and activities as having to be derived from 
organisational objectives, in reality, the planning process was bottom-up and operations 
oriented. Therefore, strategy appeared to be disconnected from the operations because 
plans and activities were based on functional specialisation without the inclusiveness of the 
organisation's strategic perspectives. An official's comment categorised into cell D5 
Table 7b highlights these points: 
We need to accept that what happened in reality was that operating plans 
were made bottom-up. Because public organisations are structured 
according to duties and responsibilitie. % it is obvious what each sub-unit 
needs to do. 
A middle manager 
t 
Evidence in table 8d earlier indicated that all perfortnance indicators used were attached to 
the activities/outputs. No long-term measures of performance were used to assess the *1313s 
long-term success. For example, despite the fact that the BB's stated strategy was to 
support the improvement ofpublic administration (see section 8.4.1 earlier), there existed 
no indicators informing whether the BB achieved such a strategy. In other words, the 
existing indicators were highly unlikely to identify whether the BB's work results 
supported the improvement of public administration. 
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8.5 The Office of the National Counter Corruption 
Commission 
Case-Site Descriptions and Analysis 
In this section, the ONCCC case-site descriptions will be provided, and the results from the 
ONCCC case-site analyses will be discussed. 
8.5.1 ONCCC case-site descriptions 
Historical perspective 
Resulting from the promulgation of the Counter Corruption Act B. E. 2518, the Office of the 
Counter Corruption Commission (OCCC) was established to. serve as secretariat to the 
Counter Corruption Commission (CCC). Although the CCC did not have much power. to 
combat corruption because of limitations in jurisdiction, corruption prevention and public 
relations had, so far, been carried on. 
Subsequent to the promulgation of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B. E. 2540, 
the Organic Law on Counter Corruption Act B. E. 2542 was launched. As a result, the CCC 
was upgraded to the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC), and the OCCC to 
the Office of the National Counter Corruption Commission (ONCCC). All undertakings, 
properties, rights, liabilities, government officials, employees and the budget belonging to 
the OCCC were transferred to the ONCCC. 
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The distinctions between the ONCCC and the OCCC are various; including that the 
ONCCC: 
9 is an independent organisation, while the CCC is under the Office of the Prime 
Minister. 
* has power to inspect an account and inquire into crininal proceedings of the 
unusually wealthy cases. 
* has power to inquire into cases to remove politicians from position (impeachment). 
e has power to search, seize, detain documents, arrest and keep in custody the accused 
by court approval. 
e refers the corruption file to the superior of the accused, in order to consider the 
disciplinary penalty for the offence without the appointment of the disciplinary 
inquiry committee again. 
Political dependency 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B. E. 2540 provides, in section 302, chapter 
X, that: 
The National Counter Corription Commission shall have an independent 
secretariat, with the Secretarý-General of the National Counter 
Corruption Commission as the superior responsible directly to the 
President of1he National Counter Corruption Commission 
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The Office of the National Counter Corruption Commission shall have 
autonomy in personnel administration budget and o1her activities, as 
provided by law. 
The ONCCC can thus be regarded as independent of governmental supervision. 
The National Counter Corruption Commission 
The NCCC consists of the President and eight members appointed by the King with the 
advice of the Senate, from persons of apparent integrity with qualification. The ONCCC 
Secretary-General is an ex officio member acting as the secretary of the commission. 
For the selection and election of members of the NCCC, the Select Committee was formed, 
consisting of fifteen members, namely: 
o President of the Supreme Court of Justice 
o President of the Constitutional Court 
* President of the Supreme Administrative Court 
* Rectors of all state higher education institutions, being elected among themselves to 
be seven in number 
* Representatives of all political parties, having a member in the House of 
Representatives being elected among themselves to be five in number 
Members of the commission hold the office for a term of nine years as from the date of 
their appointment, and can serve for only one term. 
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Duties and responsibilities 
As the secrctanat to the N('('(', tllc clutics and wsponsibilitics ol'thc ONCCC arc to: 
o Carry on the administrative work- oftlic N('('(' 
* Study and gather data related to tile work oftlic N('('(' 
e Study and cncoura9c the studies and rescarch HIto Corruption ill 111C goverlilliclit'll 
and political circics, and to disscminatc knovdcdgc about tills issile 
o Perform other acts as entrusted by the N('('(' 
Organisation structure 
I'lic ONCCC is structured around the NCCC's threc inalli 111,10,011,11 M'cýls Is "'cll Is Its 
administrative function. 
There are two bureaus responsible 1'01- Corruption prevention, mo bill-calls lor COI*I'Lll)tl()Il 
suppression, tlVC hLireaus l'or asscts inspection, and Six hLi"C"Ll", (01* etIL111"'Ic"t) for 
administrative work. Figure Se illustrates the ()N('('(", s 01-9,111i silt 101, structurc. 
National Counter ( 'urniplion Commission 
secri-lary-Celleral 
T 
Dpilly Depilly t Deputy 
Se re c lat-N-6encrall Secret ai eneral I Seactan-Gicneral SL, r, t,, 
L, "'\'l('icnera 
Secrclarv-Gencral 
Bureau of' Burcau of' I 11111cau of' Buicat IoI Bureau of' 
Con tiption Corruption Col ItIptioll Assets Inspcclion I Legal Atfillir" 
Prevention 1&2 1 SlIppl-css Io,, I Supprcssl oil 
Assistant Secromy-Gencral Assistallt Sccrc arN-Cmicral 
II F- 
IIIIII 
11111call of, Persomicl N CCC " liance Rep, ,, II 
h )l icN, and I )i% isloll Afflaus I )IvIsioll )[\, Isoll 
Planning IvIsI ol 
1, igure Se: ONCCC Organisation Structure 
(SOM'Ce: MCCC. all unpublished docullient) 
Vision 
The ONCCC is the principal organisation concerned with checking the accord of the 
standardised state authorities with the Constituti6n. The ONCCC shall carry out its 
missions with quality, neutrality and transparency, in order to create trust and to obtain 
cooperation from people in every sector against corruption, leading to the good governance 
of society. 
Source: Bureau of the Budget (2002: 111) 
Missions 
* Develop corruption prevention, in order to gain trust collaboration and cooperation. 
o Develop corruption suppression that is effective, prompt, transparent and 
unprejudiced. 
e Develop assets and liabilities inspections that are effiective, and expeditious. 
* Systematically and continually develop organisational and personnel management 
that is of quality. 
Source: Bureau of the Budget (2002: 111) 
Strategy 
Prevent and suppress corruption in both the civil service and politics. 
Source: Bureau of the Budget (2002: 111) 
Objective 
Prevent and suppress corruption. 
Source: Bureau of the Budget (2002: 111) 
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8.5.2 ONCCC case-site analysis 
The interviews with six ONCCC officials were carried out during the period May 30 th - 
June 17 th 2003. The . informants were one top executive, three middle managers and two 
supervisors. On average, the informants had worked for the ONCCC and had held their 
current positions for 20.83 and 2.67 years respectively. The transcripts of the ONCCC 
interviews comprise of 54,603 words in Thai. 
Strategy 
Meaning, purposes andfunctions ofstrategy 
The ONCCC informants interpreted variously the meanings, purposes and functions of 
strategy. Mostly, the strategy was regarded as comparable to policy. While some 
informants regarded strategy as similar to policy, others considered the two terms to be 
different. 
In addition, some informants understood that strategy was equivalent to plan. 
Strategy is the plan to accomplish the policy. 
A middle manager 
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Others understood strategy as carrying on the duties specified by law. 
The ONCCC has to follow the Act It is comparable to strategy we 
need to do what the law states. It is actually the strategy. 
A supervisor 
The above two interview excerpts are examples of the data categorised into cell A3 in 
Table 7b. 
Moreover, it was commonly agreed that strategy helps the ONCCC to coordinate itself and 
to form an organisational holistic view, the points highlighted by the following excerpts 
categorise nto cell A2, Table 7b. 
Strategic management is a psychological technique for promoting 
participation ftom people within the organisation It encourages people 
tofeel responsiblefor the organisation overall notjustfor their tasks at 
hand. 
A top executive 
Strategy isfor us to plan all the mechanisms in the same direction 
A middle manager 
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Compliance with strategy 
It was claimed that regardless of how the strategy was stated, work still needed to comply 
with what the law stated. Most officials focused only on their jobs in hand. The next two 
- examples of interview data, classified within cell D6 in Table 7b, highlight these points. 
The work of public agencies is fixed all the time by laws Duties and 
responsibilities do not change They still have to carry on what they are 
to do. 
A middle manager 
Like our [bureau], we are responsible for [the inspection o4 ministers' 
and other political officials' accounts We know for sure that there will 
be no more than thirtjLsix ministers in the cabinet. Each of those has to 
submit their asset accounts to us dree times. So we always know our 
workload and what we are to do. 
A middle manager 
Since the ONCCC work was always stated clearly by the laws, and since the ONCCC 
needed to comply with these laws, it was evident that strategy was likely to have little to do 
I 
with the way in which the ONCCC operated. Moreover, some officials perceived that 
strategy was irrelevant to thern, being relevant only to the staff directly responsible for the 
formulation of strategy per se. The following statement categorised within cell A6 
highlights the point 
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Issues regarding strategy were dealt with by the Bureau of Policy and 
Planning ... I don't know about [those issues]. You'd better go ask the 
director of that bureau. 
A middle manager 
At least for this manager, strategy appeared to be a working 'output' of the person/unit 
directly responsible for it. Since strategy was not the 'output' of this manager's bureau, the 
strategy was regarded as a minor matter to him. 
Changes in strategy 
Since the ONCCC strategy was linked closely to duties/responsibilities stated by law, it 
was considered that changes in strategy would be sporadic, providing that the laws were 
hardly changed. 
However, since strategy also depended on how the NCCC and the ONCCC top 
management perceived the ONCCC environment and circumstances, strategy could also be 
changed when there were changes among the executives and/or circumstances. These 
points appear in the following examples of the interview data categorised into cell FI in 
Table 7b. 
If the commissioners changed, strategy might be changed. 
A middle manager 
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The NCCC is the big boss. It can direct everything, including working 
plans, budget and targets. It is the board that controls all planninglpolicy 
aspects. The Secretary-General takes the board decision and 
communicates it to other staff 
A supervisor 
It should be noted that the ONCCC had just had its first strategy stated very recently (at the 
time the ONCCC interviews took place, the strategy was just being disseminated). 
The informants' opinions were not necessarily based on what had actually happened in the 
past, but rather, on their personal knowledge and anticipation of what the changes in 
strategy would be. 
Performance measurement 
Performance measures 
Document data in the following table suggest that for the ONCCC, the performance 
measures used were all output measures. 
Performance Dimensions Performance Indicators 
1. Inspection of the declaration of assets and e Number of accounts inspected 
liabilities 
2. Production of media and public relations to a Number of public relations events organised 
promote attitudes, values for integrity and 
cooperation among citizens 
3. Investigations of the accusation cases and * Number of cases investigated 
conduction of disciplinary and criminal 
proceedings 
Table 8e: ONCCC Formally Stated Performance Indicators 
(Source: Bureau of the Budget, 2002: 111) 
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Performance measurement system 
Most informants agreed that measuring the ONCCC's objective (i. e. to prevent and 
suppress corruption) was difficult, if not totally unmeasurable. This was evidenced by the 
following interview data classified into cell B2 in Table 7b. 
[Objectives] are unmeasurable. What are we going to use to measure 
them? 
A middle manager 
It's not possible to evaluate whether corruption has been reduced 
A supervisor 
Therefore, as many informants noted, the ONCCC measured its working outputs instead. 
The following interview extract-categorised within cell B6 in Table 7b-indicates the 
emphasis of the performance measurement system on the output measurement. 
What is tangible are working outputs Objectives and goals are abstract 
The can be mentioned but not touched At least, we must be able to show y 
what we have done. Those abstract things are intrinsic to our work 
A supervisor 
Even though it was widely accepted that measuring outputs did not indicate whether the 
organisation had achieved its objective; since the measuring of abstract objectives seemed 
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difficult, the ONCCC had to focus its performance measurement system on measuring 
work outputs. 
Measuring how many inspections were carried out is not useful ... 
but we 
can only hope that what we have done will result in the achievement of 
the objectives wished for because the ultimate results are not 
measurable. 
A supervisor 
Performance measurement 
Performance measurement was used to serve both internal and external needs. For the 
internal needs, performance measurement can help to monitor the progress of work, 
identify areas of improvement needed, and identify personnel development needs. 
Sub-units within the ONCCC needed to report regularly their performance to the Bureau of 
Policy and Planning, so that the executives would be able to monitor the overall 
performance of the organisation. Therefore, the main purpose of reporting performance 
within the organisation was to check whether the work had been progressing as planned. 
However, a seemingly more necessary measurement purpose was for external reporting, 
i. e. reporting to the Parliament. Informants noted that perhaps the essence of reporting the 
ONCCC performance to the Parliament was that the report was considered as a 
requirement for the ONCCC to qualify for requested budgets. An example of the interview 
data categorised within cell B6 in Table 7b highlights this point as follows: 
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Results ftom the performance measurement were then reported to the 
Parliament to request money ... 'we need to inform [the Parliament] in 
concrete terms what we are going to use the moneyfor. 
A supervisor 
Since a major criterion for the budget allocation was the quantification of outputs, the 
ONCCC was more likely to receive the money if more tangible performance indicators, i. e. 
working outputs (e. g. number of cases processed) were used, rather than amorphous and 
often debatable working outcomes (whether the processed cases lessened corruption). 
Considering these ONCCC performance measurement purposes, some informants regarded 
the performance measurement as of little use-the point highlighted by the following 
interview excerpt categorised within cell B4 in Table 7b. 
Performance measurement is less likely to help me manage my work 
because the managing of my work is to make sure that we can do as 
planned. Since the hierarchical control is already in place, performance 
measurement doesn't help much. 
A supervisor 
The advantages of having performance measurement were in line with the measurement 
purposes discussed earlier. The mentioned advantages of measuring performance included 
the help it provided in monitoring actual performance in comparison to what was planned. 
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The performance data indicated what improvements and adaptations were needed, thus 
helping management to better control their working performance. 
The disadvantages of performance measurement included the difficult and costly nature of 
measurement. The following examples of interview extracts (categorised in cell B4, Table 
7b) highlight these disadvantages. 
-measuring quality or satisfaction is difficult ... both are time- 
consuming and expensive. 
A middle manager 
It is difficult to measure whether corruption has been reduced. 
A supervisor 
More interestingly, for some ONCCC officials, being formally measured may be perceived 
as a humiliation. The next interview statement classified within cell H2, Table 7b 
highlights this point. 
To be measured andfollowed-up, some may regard as humiliating and 
shameful. 
A supervisor 
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Alignment between performance measurement and strategy 
Despite the majority of the ONCCC informants praising organisational alignment, 
misalignment was an obvious characteristic of the organisation. Policy/strategy 
disconnection was evidenced by the unchanged operating plans, even when there were 
changes in the policy/strategy. This meant that the policy/strategy given by the top 
management was not relevant to (or was disconnected from) the ONCCC operations. 
Officials and sub-units could still sin-ply carry on working in the way they had been 
accustomed to either before or after policy/strategy changes. 
It appeared that the ONCCC was structured for the purpose of task specialisation (e. g. 
accounts inspection or corruption investigation) and workload allocation (e. g. the Bureau 
of Corruption Suppression I undertakes half of the corruption suppression workload, while 
the Bureau of Corruption Suppression II undertakes the other halo. Therefore, each sub- 
organisation seemed to focus on its own duties, rather than working for the overall 
objectives of the organisation. Suboptimised behaviour was found to be prevalent among 
sub-organisations. 
In addition to the general perception that organisational alignment was of virtue, there 
existed virtually no perception of the alignment between performance measurement and 
strategy. Performance measures were not flexible or-to be exact-never cbanged. 
The same measures were used, regardless of how different circumstances had become. 
This was highlighted by a top executive's statement, categorised into cell B6 in Table 7b, 
that: 
322 
No matter how things have changeci we always use the number of cases 
finished compared with the plan as the performance indicator. 
A top executive 
Therefore, it was likely that the ONCCC performance measurement and strategy were 
detached. If strategy were interpreted as the 'working direction', then for the ONCCC, 
performance measurement was neither aligned with, nor linked to the strategy, because 
regardless of the 'working direction', performance measurement remained the same. 
However, working targets specified in the plans were changeable to suit the changing 
policy/strategy. It can be seen, therefore, that even though performance measurement had 
never changed, working targets and plans could be changed to support the changed 
irection. 
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8.6 Summary 
This chapter presented case descriptions and discussed results of in-case analyses for all 
four case sites: the Office of Civil Service Commission (OCSQ, the Office of the Auditor 
General (OAG), the Bureau of the Budget (BB), and the Office of the National Counter 
Corruption Commission (ONCCC) respectively. The presentation of each case comprised 
of two main sections, namely, the case-site descriptions and the case-site analysis. 
Firstly, in the case-site descriptions section for each case, the descriptions of the 
organisation. case were provided, including the historical perspectivq political dependency, 
board of commission (if any), duties and responsibilities, organisation structure, vision(s), 
-mission(s), strategies and objectives. 
Secondly, in the case-site analysis section for each case, discussions regarding the results 
from the analysis of data for each case were provided. There were three main topics in this 
section, including (1) strategy, (2) performance measurement, and (3) alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy. 
The triangulation concept underlined both data collection and case selection for this 
research. Firstly, for data collection, interview data were triangulated by documentation. 
The interview data were obtained from four data sources including top executives, middle 
managers, lower managers, and non-management officials. The documentation was 
obtained from both materials generated by the case organisations as well as by other partiqs 
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outside the organisations. Secondly, for case selection, the replication logic and polar- 
typed logic were used to triangulate data across case-sites. 
Research validity was enhanced through several quality-assurance measures including 
(1) the use of polar-typed logic, multiple sources of evidence, and pattern-matching to 
enhance internal validity, (2) the use of replication logic to enhance external validity, 
(3) the use of two prior research phases-in order to test research protocol before its 
application in the main third phase-was coupled with a review of the protocol to enhance 
construct validity, (4) the use of different interview questions to probe the same 
phenomenon during the individual interview sessions to increase content validity. 
Moreover, research reliability was also enhanced through the use of case study protocol 
and the development of case study database. 
The discussions in the case-site analysis sections included essential, rather than all, issues 
analysed, owing to the word number limitation of this thesis. Results of the intra-case 
analysis for each case can be summarised, as follows: 
OCSC case 
The meaning of strategy was not clear for the OCSC officials. Strategy can have several 
purposes, but principally, it provides focus for the organisation. Even though all 
organisational activities and processes were expected to be in line with the strategy, 
aberrations were not uncommon. It was perceived that the OCSC formulated its strategy, 
in order to fulfil a requirement from the government, and the government was the single 
most influential factor in strategy changes. 
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Performance measurement appeared to be new to the OCSC. Traditionally, it was used 
chiefly for resource control and personnel management purposes, but not for measuring 
working results perforrnance. At the time this research took place, performance 
measurement was used mainly to monitor working progress towards the plans. However, 
the use of measurement was considered rare. Almost all measures in use were output 
measures. Since performance measurement was regarded as having both advantages and 
disadvantages, it was necessary for managers to judge how to use the measurement, in 
order to enjoy the total benefits. 
It was perceived that performance measurement should be aligned with strategy, in order to 
support the accomplishment of the organisation's strategic objectives. However, the 
a ignment was assumed to occur naturally through the planning process. 
OAG case 
Here, it was not clear how strategy differed from policy, since both terms were seen as 
indicating the direction for the overall organisation into the future, and were used 
interchangeably. Since plans were supposed to be derived from policy/strategy, all 
activities stated in these plans were assumed to be in compliance with policy/strategy. 
Several factors were identified as influencing strategy, and changes in these factors would 
result in strategy changes. However, strategy changes were considered insignificant 
because the new strategy would resemble those that had existed previously. 
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Despite being regarded as important, performance measurement was considered to have 
been inadequately used. Measures in place were mostly input and output measures 
focusing on short-term results, whereas long-term outcomes were normally assumed as 
inevitable results of those short-term results. Performance measurement was used to serve 
both extemal and intemal purposes. For extemal purposes, it'was used chiefly to report to 
the inspectorate bodies (e. g. the Bureau of the Budget, and Parliament). For internal 
purposes, it was used to report to top management, to control and to be used for adjusting 
plans. Disadvantages of perfon-nance measurement were mainly result s of its misuse 
(e. g. imposed but unwanted measures, inappropriate measures and manipulation of 
measures and performance data). ^ 
There was. a vague notion of the alignment-,, between performance measurement and 
strategy. However, there were two issues normally agreed among the OAG officials, 
including (1) the natural occurrence of alignment as a result of the planning process, and 
(2) the use of ambiguous measures that suit whatever objectives and activities as a way of 
maintaining alignment. 
BB case 
For the BB informants, the meaning of strategy was not clear. The terms strategy and 
policy were usually used interchangeably. BB strategy was claimed to be compliant with 
government policy/strategy. Despite frequent mention of clear linkages of activities 
throughout organisational hierarchy, there was no evidence supporting the claim 
Changes in strategy were more often the results of changes in governmental mandate, 
changes in budgeting principles, and emergence of new missions. 
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Performance measurement was new to the BB. A formal measurement approach had only 
recently been adopted, and so was not fully in systematic use. All measures used were 
output or activity measures. Performance data were mainly used to report to -the 
inspectorate body (i. e. the Cabinet). The most obvious advantage of performance 
measurement was that it helped to discern the linkages between sub-units and organisation, 
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and between organisation and goverment, while its only perceived disadvantage was that 
it was resource-consuming. A unique characteristic of BB was that it was able to influence 
the performance measurement formulation of other Thai public agencies, which are 
require to submit their performance measures for BB approval, in order to qualify for the 
budget being requested. 
Even though there was general acceptance that all activities and processes should be 
aligned with policy/strategy, performance measurement was regarded as necessarily being 
aligned with outputs or activities. This notion probably owed to an assumption that such 
outputs/activities would eventually lead to the accomplishment of the long-term objectives 
of the organisation. Therefore, performance measurement aligned with these 
outputs/activities would always be aligned with, and supportive of, the strategy. However, 
BB strategy appeared to disconnect from operations because activity plans supposed to be 
derivatives of strategy were based on functional specialisation, rather than the strategy 
itself For this reason, BB operations appeared to lack a strategic perspective. 
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ONCCC case 
The ONCCC officials interpreted the meaning of strategy variously. Strategy was typically 
regarded as comparable to policy in so far as it provided a holistic view of the organisation. 
The ONCCC's duties and responsibilities were stated clearly in its legislation. Therefore, 
whatever the policy/strategy might be, the activities remained virtually unchanged. This 
caused policy/strategy to detach from the operations. Despite the rarity of strategy changes, 
they did occur from time to time, more often when there was change among the top 
executives, with the new executive wishing to install her/his own policy/strategy. 
However, changes in strategy were not always followed by appropriate changes in plans 
and activities. Strategy was regarded as relevant only to the officials directly responsible 
for the strategy-formulating process whose working outputs were the strategyper se. 
Measuring the accomplishment of organisational objectives was regarded as difficult and 
so the ONCCC measured working outputs instead. Output measurement was based on the 
assumption that these outputs would eventually result in the desired objectives. 
Perfon-nance measurement was used to serve both internal and external purposes. In terms 
of the internal purposes, it provided management with feedback regarding working 
progress, enabling managers to monitor ONCCC performance. However, more 
importantly, performance data was used to report externally to the Parliament. Since 
budget allocation criteria were based primarily on the quantification of public agencies' 
working outputs, the ONCCC tended to measure the more measurable aspects of 
performance. These included measuring outputs produced or input used. Despite 
performance measurement having the advantage of, for example, providing feedback 
information to the management for better control, suggesting, appropriate adaptations and 
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areas in need of improvement, performance measurement was noted by some informants as 
being of little use. Moreover, performance measurement had a number of disadvantages, 
including the difficulty in conducting measurement activities and their costliness. 
Interestingly, however, performance measurement was regarded as a possible cause of 
conflict because the officials whose performance was measured might feel humiliated by 
being monitored and measured. 
Among the ONCCC officials, there existed virtually no perception of the alignn-crit 
between performance measurement and strategy. Regardless of policy/strategy changes, 
performance measures never changed. Output measures were always used. 
From in-case analyses of all four case-sites, some interesting issues emerged, as follows: 
Issues regarding strategy: 
e Even though the clarity of strategy was regarded as essential, public agencies' 
strategies were often stated ambiguously. 
e The meaning and functions of strategy in public agencies were not clear. 
e In the main, policy and strategy were used interchangeably. 
* The planning process was considered to link activities with policy/strategy, and to 
compromise top management's perspectives with operational perspectives. 
e Frequently, the planning process did not rely on policy/strategy, but rather, on 
routine activities. 
e Strategy and strategic management was seen more as an imposition than a necessity. 
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* Political/governmental. influences appeared to be powerful on public agencies, 
regardless of their political dependency. Government could usually influence the 
agencies, especially through the budget allocating procedure. 
* Even though several factors were regarded as causing changes' in strategy, activities 
which were supposed to be congruent with strategy hardly changed. 
* Strategy appeared to be disconnected from operations because plans/activities did not 
incorporate strategic perspectives. 
e Strategy was regarded as inviolable, and even sacrosanct. 
Issues regarding performance measurement: 
e The use of performance measurement in public agencies was not considered 
rigorous. 
Performance measurement systems were imposed on the agencies mainly for 
resource-allocating and rewarding purposes. However, these systems and measures 
within them were not always useful for the agencies' management purposes because 
they were not compatible with the agencies' individualistic needs. 
Performance data were mainly used to report to the agencies' external inspectorate 
bodies (e. g. auditor, government and Parliament). 
Performance measurement was used internally to monitor working progress against 
short-term plans. 
* Long-term objectives were assumed as inevitable results of short-term performance, 
and were rarely assessed. 
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* Despite the realisation that the agencies' long-term objective accomplishment should 
be assessed, performance measurement in place emphasised solely short-term 
measurement (e. g. inputs, outputs and activities). 
* An obvious incentive for measuring short-term performance (mainly outputs and 
activities) included the fact that the budget allocating criteria were based prinurily 
on the agencies' tangible performance. Therefore, the agencies that could 
demonstrate their ability to work more would be in a better position to receive 
requested money, even if their work did not result in the desired long-term 
objectives. 
e Performance measurement was regarded as capable of promoting cooperation among 
individuals and sub-units within the organisation, especially when they shared 
responsibility for a performance area measured. 
* Performance data were not only used for informing on how well public agencies 
were doing, but also for otlier purposes such as demonstrating accountability for 
different groups of stakeholders, and enhancing organisational credibility. 
Issues regarding the alignment between performance measurement and strategy: 
* There was no formal assessment of the alignment, despite both strategy and measures 
being known. Instead, alignment was always assumed. 
eA principal reason in support of the assumed alignment was that since plans were 
assumed to be derived from policy/strategy, activities within these plans would 
naturally be aligned with policy/strategy. However, this could be a fault because-in 
practice-plans often resulted from a bottom-up or operations-oriented process, 
rather than a top-down or strategy-oriented process. 
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* Alignment was assumed, in spite of the contradiction in the nature of perspectives in 
the measure used and in the policy/strategy (i. e. while the output or activity n-casures 
used focused on short-term performance, policy/strategy focused on long-term 
results). 
* The above mentioned contradiction was likely to result in a tension when strategy- 
aligned performance measurement was preferable from a strategic perspective, while 
output- or activity-aligned performance measurement was preferable from an 
operational perspective. Therefore, if the strategy and the operations were 
disconnected, this alignment tension could be expected in practice. 
* Performance measurement was considered as a means of linking the individual 
agencies to the goverment's overall public policies. 
* While there existed several factors that could cause policy/strategy change, long-term 
objectives and activities hardly changed. Therefore, one way to maintain the 
relevance of performance measurement was to align measures with activities, on the 
assumption that these activities would result in the desired longterm objectives. 
Comparing dependent and independent agencies, it appeared that the agencies under the 
government's close supervision (i. e. the OCSC and BB) appeared to be more active in 
strategic management and performance measurement than independent agencies (i. e. the 
OAG and ONCCC). For both groups of public agencies, however, the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy was simply assumed, rather than formally assessed. 
There existed no systematic mechanisms for assessing or managing such alignment. 
For public agencies, political/governmental influences appeared to be high, even for the so- 
called independent agencies. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Findings and Discussions 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the descriptions and intra-case analyses results from the study of 
each case site were discussed. This chapter will discuss inter-case analyses results as the 
overall analysis of this multiple-case study. Therefore, this chapter aims to report and 
discuss the research findings of the study. 
From the research question and sub-questions stated in section 5.6: 
How, in central government agencies, is the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy manageR. 
* How are performance measures, performance measurement 
systems, performance measurement, andperformance 
management understood? 
o How is the performance measurement-strategy tension 
perceived? 
* Is there Performance measurement-strategy alignment? 
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There are five research findings for the study: 
* Practical meanings of strategy in public sector management 
*A missing practical view of the existing performance measurement and performance 
management definitions 
* Performance measurement-strategy alignment tensions 
* Advantages of strategy-misaligned performance measurement 
e Performance measurement-strategy alignment strategies 
Each of these findings will be presented and discussed in turn. 
9.2 Practical Meanings of Strategy in Public Sector 
Management 
By cascading its policies, the government hopes that public agencies work in the direction 
that politicians see appropriate. Throughout the history of the Thai civil serviceý policies 
have been used to provide a framework for public agencies and civil servants to follow. 
Thai public servants thus seem to be familiar with policy. Not until recently has Thai 
public sector management introduced strategic management. 
Strategy-the policy in a new cloak 
Strategic management and its components (e. g. vision, mission, strategy and strategic 
objectives) have formally been present in Thai public sector management for less than a 
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decade. Supposedly, the main purpose in adopting strategic management is for public 
agencies' top executives to identify more specific approaches for the stated policy. For this 
reasori, at least theoretically, strategy has been expected to function differently from 
policy. 
In this study, differences between strategy and policy were noted among public agencies' 
top executives, as shown in the following examples. 
Strategy is to be determined by the implementers. Policy is to be given 
ftom above. 
A top executive, OCSC 
Policy is broader. It is like the wider target Strategies must comply with 
andfacilitate the policy. 
A top executive, OA 
Policy tells what to do but strategv tells how to do, how long, and how 
much it will cost 
A top executive, BB 
The NCCC provides broad policy for the whole organisation to follow. 
Strategy is more detailed It's a ýpath' leading us to the accomplishment 
ofthe objectives. 
A tqp executive, ONCCC 
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Despite the top executives' apparent ability to differentiate policy and strategy, other civil 
servants were unable to see this difference as clearly. Evidence suggests that these civil 
servants regarded strategy as equivalent to policy. Perhaps the following interview extract 
best demonstrates this: 
Strategy andpolicy are different termsfor the same thing 
A middle manager, BB 
Therefore, in practice, the terms strategy and policy were used interchangeably when 
referring to desired working directions givenfrom the agency's top management. These 
terms were often found used, perhaps confusingly, together as policy/strategy or policy or 
strategy or policy and strategy. Despite the use of different temiinology, it was not clear as 
to how strategy differed from policy in practice. 
9.3 A Missing Practical View of the Existing Performance 
Measurement and Performance Management Definitions 
The performance measurement literature seems to offer a range of definitions of the key 
concepts relevant to performance measurement research (see section 2.2). Among the 
fundamental concepts, and also of the interest to this research, are the definitions of 
performance measurement, performance management, and alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy. 
337 
There appears to be a lack of consensus with regard to the meanings of these fundamental 
concepts. In practice, each concept was regarded differently, depending on who interpreted 
it and/or in which context and for what purposes it was used. There is the view that this 
problem is common because the same concept means different things to different people 
(Bouckaert, 1992; and Jackson, 1988). Notwithstanding, in order to seek a consistent 
interpretation of these concepts, it may be useful to take into consideration both acadernic 
and practical perspectives. 
Comparing the academic (e. g. from the literature) with the practical (e. g. from this case 
study's empirical evidence) perspectives, it was found that the acaden-ýics appeared to 
emphasise less the various purposes of performance measurement than did, the 
practitioners, especially in defining the key concepts. The evidence from the field case 
studies in this research suggested that public managers used performance measurement 
largely to satisfy various demands from different groups of stakeholders. is 
demonstrated that performance measurement, in practice, was used to satisfy stakeholders' 
requirements, a point that was little mentioned in the existing definitions of performance 
measurement in performance measurement/management literature. 
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Table 9a provides a comparison of performance measurement definitions/meanings from 
the acaden-& and practitioner perspectives. 
Performance measurement definitions 
from the academic perspective 
Performance measurement meanings 
from the practitioner's perspective 
The process of determining how successful organisations or Performance measurement needs to consider different 
individuals have been in attaining their objectives groups of stakeholders too. 
(Evangelidis, 1992). A non-managcmcnt official, OCSC 
The development of indicators and collection of data to We have to report our investigation to the parliament but 
describe, report on and analyse performance (Marshall et it's up to them how much attention they will pay to the 
at, 1999). reports. 
A supervisor, OAG 
The process of quantifying action correlates with 
performance (Neely et at, 1996). We have later changed to taking customers' satisfaction 
into considerations. Customers may comprise of 
A process of assessing progress towards achieving government cabina ministers orpublic agencies. 
predetermined goals (Amaratunga et at, 200 1). A middle manager, BB 
The regular collection and reporting of information about It is crucial to be able to inform the parliament in concrete 
the efficiency, quality and effectiveness of government terms what we did with the allocated budgets. 
programmes (Nyhan and Martin, 1999). A supervisor, ONCCC 
Table 9a: Comparison of the Academic Definitions and Practitioners' Perceptions 
of the Meanings of Performance Measurement 
(Source: the author) 
Despite both academics and practitioners regarding performance measurement as a 
management tool which provides insight into how an organisation is progressing towards 
the accomplishment of its objectives, the empirical evidence suggests that public managers 
have a broader view of performance measurement. The above table indicates a discrepancy 
in the perceptions of performance measurement between the academics who study 
performance measurement and the public managers who use it. 
In contrast to the academic interest public managers appeared to be more concerned with 
the use of performance measurement as a means of satisfying various requirements from 
various groups of stakeholders than as a mere management tool. These managers saw that 
a vital managerial task is to provide different stakeholders with the performance data that 
can serve a range of performance dimensions to suit the different demands for different 
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interests from various groups of stakeholders. The main purpose of using performance data 
was to demonstrate tangibly the accountability that public agencies hold to different groups 
of stakeholders. Performance data were used to inform the stakeholders that their interest 
was being taken into consideration and not being ignored. 
Satisfying the various requirements of different groups of stakeholders was seen as 
important because stakeholders were influential in public organisations both directly or 
indirectly. Ultimately, the stakeholders are those who justify the public agencies' 
performance. It is they, rather than the agencies themselves, who judgq the agencies' 
performance. 
It is not up to us to say whether we are doing well. It must be the 
outsiders to report about that because it's how they see our working 
results. 
A middle manager, OCSC 
We need to hear the feedback from other public agencies who use our 
standard price handbook They would tell us just how well we did our 
work 
A middle manager, BB 
Talking about efficiency, it should be people ftom the outside who see 
how we are doing. 
A middle manager, ONCCC 
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With their limited capability (e. g. resources, ability and authority), it is unlikely that public 
agencies would be able to satisfy all the requirements of all stakeholder groups, especially 
where there are several groups. Moreover, these requirements may sometimes compete 
with each other. For example, the OCSC was expected to be the initiator of new public 
management practices, with the old ones being expected to continue in tandem. Again, the 
ONCCC was expected to investigate all high-ranking officials' (both political and non- 
political) liabilities and assets accounts, while at the same time, accuracy was crucial. 
In these circumstances, public managers may need to provide overarching performance 
data that do not set out to satisfy any specific groups of interest, but rather to compromise 
between those various interests. 
The following table provides examples of how public agencies used performance 
measurement to deal with different groups of stakeholders with a variety of requirements. 
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Stakeholders and 
requirements Use of performance measurement 
Government: 
Accountability In reporting to the government, we described what had been done by referring to each 
governmentpolicyý-a top executive, OCSC. 
Modernity According to the trend in international public management practices, it becomes 
necessary to report to the public more widely about our performance-a non- 
management official, OCSC. 
Efficiency It's not always possible to calculate costs for every activity. It worries me when 
_government 
demands to see our operating cost-a middle manager, OAG. Citizen: 
Responsiveness The Bureau of the Budget chooses to assess performance, especially the projects that 
are altractive-a top executive, 1313. 
Transparency Public agencies are sub/ect to more scrutiry. They have to be more transparent and 
monitorabk--a top executive, OAG. 
Management: 
Effectiveness We report monthly to the Policy and Planning Department whether we are able to 
reach our iarget--a middle manager, ONCCC. 
Modernity We must be able to catch up with otherpublic agencies, in terms of measuring our 
r ormance-a top executive, OAG. 
Clients: 
Satisfaction In addition to quantitative Indicators, there are also qualitative ones indicating how 
satisfed our dients are-a middle manager, ONCCC. 
Other public agencies: 
Compliance with rules and Public agencies need to report to us lyfillingin theform BB46-1-a supervisor, 1313. 
regulations 
7he OAGs duty is to make sure thatpublic work has been done in compliance with the 
rules and regulations-a supervisor, OAG. 
77; e Controllers' General Department requires that we establish internal audiLs--a 
middle manager, OCSC. 
Table 9b: Evidence of Various Uses of Performance Measurement to Satisfy 
Different Groups of Stakeholders' Requirements 
(Source: the author) 
Therefore, to make performance measurement research more relevant to its practices, an 
attempt should be made to find a definition of performance measurement that includes the 
practitioners' perspectives. In order to do so, the refined definitions of performance 
measurement and performance management being proposed are: 
Performance measurement is the process of determining how the performance 
measurement systems lead to the accomplishment of the"objectives derivedfrom a variety 
ofrequirements. 
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This definition indicates that there are several requirements public agencies and public 
managers seek to fulfil. It implies that the accomplishment of formally stated objectives 
(which seem to be overemphasised in the existing performance measurement definitions) 
would appear to be insufficient since they represent only some aspects of the overall 
requirements. 
Given the refined definition of performance measurement being proposed, performance 
management can thus be defined as follows: 
Performance management is the use ofperformance measurement to assess how well the 
organisation serves its various groups of stakeholders, in order for improvementl 
development. 
From the above refined definitions of performance measurement and performance 
management, it can be seen that an important purpose of performance measurement/ 
management is to satisfy a variety of requirements from different groups of stakeholders. 
Even though public agencies are expected to. satisfy a variety of requirements from 
different groups of stakeholders, they may not be able to satisfy all the needs from every 
group. Therefore, at any particular time, a public agency needs to compromise among these 
requirements, in order to produce a commonly accepted set of objectives. Otherwise, the 
organisations would appear to be* a hotchpoich, attempting to do everything to satisfy 
ýveryone. 
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However, performance measurement/management does not exist in a vacuum. It is 
expected to support the agencies' activities governed by the policy/strategy given by the 
agencies' top management, in order to achieve pre-set objectives. That is, performance 
measurement/management should be aligned with an organisation's policy /strategy. 
As already discussed, mainly in section 4.4, despite a number of proponents of the 
alignment between performance measurement and strategy, the definition of alignment has 
not been clear. Corresponding to the definitions of performance measurement/management 
being proposed, a refined definition of the alignment between performance measurement 
and strategy is presented as follow. 
Alignment between performance measurement and strategy is the extent to which 
performance measurement is capable of providing performance data necessary to the 
supporting andfacilitating ofstrategy implementation 
With more practitioners' perspectives being brought into the defining of these fundarmntal 
concepts in performance measurement studies, it will become increasingly possible to 
investigate the interplay between performance measurement and strategy, including the 
alignment between the two. 
Since the perception that performance measurement should be aligned with organisational 
strategy was not uncommon (see section 4.4), public managers were under pressure to 
demonstrate such aligrunent. However, public managers attempting to align performance 
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measurement with policy/strategy often encountered tensions, which could be referred to 
as alignment tensions, which will be discussed in the following section 
9.4 Performance Measurement-Strategy Alignment Tensions 
For public agencies, there appeared to be various groups of stakeholders with different 
requirements. However, some groups were regarded as more influential than others. These 
stakeholder groups can thus have their interest reflected in the public agencies' strategic 
objectives more than those of other groups. However, these objectives were only part, not 
all, of the agencies' overall requirements. Working exclusively towards these objectives 
may not have been sufficient because there were other requirements from less influential 
stakeholder groups whose interests were not reflected in these objectives 
While public managers were expected to provide performance data pertaining to the way in 
which they were working towards these objectives, they were also expected to provide data 
regarding other dimensions of their work. 
There appeared to be at least two distinct demands for performance data that caused 
aligmnent tensions, including: 
9 The demand for strategy-related performance data 
e The demand for performance data beyond that of the strategic focus 
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The concurrent existence ofthe demands flor dillcrcnt types ofpcil'ormance data can CILISC 
the alignment tensions illustrated in the 101lowing figurc. 
Figure 9a: Performance Measurement Subject to Alignment Tensions 
(Source: The Author) 
In the above figure, it can be seen that even though strategic objectives are nornully 
considered the core of' public agencies' requircments, they are only part of all the 
requirements for which the agencies arc accountable. The tensions arise when there arc 
dernands t'Or performance data, indicating perl'ormance towards strategic ob . jectives 
and. at 
the same time, towards other requircrilents. 
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Requirements beyond 
strategic objectives 
Even though performance measurement is expected to align with strategy (i. e. to indicate 
how well strategic objectives have been worlxd towards), performance measurement also 
needs to provide performance data indicating how well the agencies worked towards other 
requirements. In view of this, performance measurement cannot be exclusively aligned 
with strategy. 
Public managers appear to continually struggle in dealing with these alignment tensions, . 
and to encounter a diler=a. On the one hand, if the managers choose to align performance 
measurement exclusively with strategy, they might not have sufficient performance data to 
satisfy other requirements not included in the strategic objectives. On the other hand, if 
performance measurement were to be aligned with all requirements, the agencies might be 
at nsk of having performance measure proliferation, a situation that could cause managers 
to exert too much effort into managing performance measurement, rather than using 
performance measurement as a management tool. 
Moreover, performance measurement tightly aligned with strategy may not be relevant 
ormance from a short-term focused operational perspective because strategy-aligned perf 
measurement focuses instead on long-term performance. This contradiction between the 
nature of the perspective of strategy and operations can also cause performance 
measurement-strategy alignment tensions. 
For this reason, the alignment tensions are likely to be a natural phenomenon for at least 
two reasons. Firstly, these tensions arise because public managers are always required to 
provide performance data which both focus on strategy and offer broad enough scope to 
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cover all other requirements at the same time. Secondly, the need to have strategy-aligned 
performance data from a strategic perspective may contradict the need to have operations- 
oriented performance data from an operational perspective. 
It is likely, therefore, that public rnanagers are to be subject constantly-to a greater or 
lesser degree-to alignment tensions. Public managers, especially those in the public 
agencies whose policy/strategy seems to be volatile, are likely to encounter more 
alignment 'tensions because policy/strategy can be changed more frequently. For these 
organisations, more frequent adaptation of the performance measurement process is 
needed, in order to maintain its relevance (Niven, 2002; and Parker, 2000). 
However, in addition to adapting performance measurement, this research found that 
public managers also used some other tactics to deal with alignment tensions because 
strategy-misaligned performance measurement can be more preferable on some occasions. 
These tactics can be categorised into three groups of alignment strategy. ese a igmnent 
strategies and tactics within each strategy will be discussed later in section 9.6, after 
discussion of the advantages of strategy-misaligned performance measurement in the next 
section. 
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9.5 Advantages of Strategy-Misaligned Performance 
Measurement 
Despite the notion that strategy-aligned performance measurement in the public sector 
organisations is of virtue-as discussed in section 5.5 the aligmnent between 
performance measurement and strategy in such organisations appears to be subject to some 
difficulties owing to the nature of those organisations. 
The distinctive characteristics of public sector organisations that can make the alignment 
between performance measurement and strategy difficult include (1) the difficulties of 
agreeing and identifying strategy (e. g. Oster, 1995), (2) the tendency of having emergent 
rather than planned strategy (e. g. Ring and Perry, 1985), and (3) the presence of the needs 
for performance measurement to provide double-loop feedback information (e. g. Leeuw et 
al., 1994). As a result, public managers would appear to encounter difficulties aligning 
performance measurement with strategy. 
In spite of the emphasis of the current literature on the virtues of the strategy-aligned 
performance measurement, however, this research found that misalignment can be 
advantageous in many circumstances. 
The advantages of the strategy-misaligned performance measurement fall into at least eight 
areas including that it helps to: (1) create balance between focus and scope of work, (2) 
bridge the strategy-operation disconnection, (3) create flexibility, (4) enhance 
measurability of performance measurement, (5) enhance compatibility between 
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performance measurement and personnel performance appraisal practice, (6) enhance 
legitimacy, (7) increase control over performance measurement results, and (8) encourage 
organisational Icaming. 
In the remainder of this section, each of these advantages of misalignment will be 
discussed in turn. 
9.5.1 Creating balance between focus and scope of works 
Even though strategy is generally perceived as the working direction o pu ic agencies, it 
does not cover all areas of agency requirements. Performance measurement closely tied to 
an organisation's strategy may not be able to provide perfonnance data regarding other 
requirements not included in strategic objectives. 
Despite the desirability of alignment, some degrees of misalignment between performance 
measurement and strategy can have advantages, for it helps public managers to monitor 
their organisation's performance beyond that pertaining to strategic objectives. Managers 
can thus be more answerable for a variety of requirements from different groups of 
stakeholders whose interests may not be articulated in the organisations' strategic 
obj ectives. 
While the strategy-aligned performance measurement helps public managers to focus on 
their strategic requirements, they may sometimes underemphasise, or even overlook, other 
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requirements. An appropriate degree of misalignment can help to create balance between 
strategic focus and the overall requirements of public agencies. 
9.5.2 Bridging the strategy-ope ration disconnection 
As already discussed in the case-site analysis sections as well as in the sumnary of the 
previous chapter, strategy appeared to be disconnected from the public agencies' real- 
world operations. For example, the articulated strategic intents were sometimes regarded as 
impractical and non-actionable, and thus, were not operationally accepted. 
Considering the strategy disconnection, it seems not to be sensible in the operational sense 
to align performance measurement tightly with strategy because the measurement would 
focus on strategy that is irrelevant to the oPerations. Conversely, the strategy-misaligned 
performance measurement can possibly provide more relevant performance data regarding 
the operations. Therefore, having performance measurement, to an appropriate degree, 
misaligned with strategy can be beneficial both in terms of satisfying the needs for relevant 
performance data and for organisational alignment. 
In this vein, it can be seen that the strategy-misaligned performance measurement can 
establish a compromise between the disconnected strategy and real-world operations. 
In other words, misalignment helps to bridge the strategy-operations disconnection. 
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9.5.3 Creating flexibility % 
Public agencies' working directions and requirements appear to be subject to frequent 
changes, especially in view of the fact that the causes of changes can be both from the 
agencies') executives and from the changing requirements from the government. 
As a result, performance measurement used to indicate how well the agencies worked in 
support of the given working directions is also subject to frequent changes. In practice, 
performance measurement fixed to strategy (e. g. measures of strategic objectives) requires 
enormous effort to maintain its alignment with strategy because the existing measurement 
can become less relevant once the strategy has changed. Therefore, it may not always be 
appropriate to have performance measurement tightly aligned with strategy in the 
organisational context where strategy is volatile. 
Informants agreed that performance measurement should be flexible enough that it can 
support a wider range of requirements that might be included in the future strategy. 
More flexible performance measurement system may consist of a set or sets of broad 
measures that can be used to indicate the agencies' performance, even when strategy has 
changed. For example, the outputs or activities measures can often be used even when 
strategy has changed. In view of this, for those organisations whose strategy tends to be 
volatile (such as public agencies), 'performance measurement may not only be expected to 
align with the current strategy, but also with the future strategy. 
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In this way, strategy-misaligned measurement can help to create flexibility for public 
I agencies because the broad measures used demand less attention and fewer resources to 
adapt in accordance with the changing strategy. 
9.5.4 Enhancing measurability of performance measurement 
i 
Measuring long-term strategic objectives appeared to be difficult because they were often 
vague and took a long time to attain. The need for more measurable short-term 
perfonnance thus existed, despite the unproved cause-and-effect relationship between the 
agencies' short-term performance and long-term objectives. The following interview 
extracts highlight these points: 
We are not able to measure BBs long-term objectives, and so we 
measure 'intermediate' accomplishments based on the assumption that 
our outputs will eventually result in bng-term objectives. Yet it might not 
be true in reality. 
A middle manager, BB 
We only hope that what we have been doing will result in the 
achievement of our objectives wishedfor, because the outcomes are 
unmeasurable. 
A supervisor, ONCCC 
353 
Moreover, given that performance measurement knowledge for the public sector has been 
underdeveloped, there is a lack of guidance with regard to how to measure performance 
towards long-term objectives. Therefore, the broad measures used seem more appropriate, 
owing to their reduced complexity, enabling both public managers and inspectorate bodies 
to make better use of, and to understand more fully, performance data. 
In light of this, measurement tightly aligned with long-term strategy may not be practically 
useful. In order to be able to measure the performance of public agencies, shorter-term 
measurement, which can be regarded as misaligned with strategy, might be more useful 
because they are more measurable. 
9.5.5 Enhancing compatibility between performance measurement and 
personnel performance appraisal practice 
Generally, Tbai civil servants' career development depends largely on the results of their 
performance appraisal. While outcomes from work may take years, or even decades, to 
realise, recently, performance appraisal has been conducted annually, or even biannually. 
Therefore, short-term performance measurement seems to be more suitable for short-term 
personnel performance appraisal practice. 
In the Thai administration, the civil service system relates closely the performance 
evaluation results to a civil servant's career development, including opportunities for 
appointment, professional enhancement, training and development, and salary increase. 
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Those civil servants whose performance evaluation results are better, despite less 
contribution to the longer-terin objectives, appear to have more promising career prospects. 
Thai civil servants regard their career prospects as crucial because they tend to be in 
service for a very long term. The data regarding the causes of Thai civil service manpower 
loss in the following table indicate this tendency. 
Retirement at 60 
years of age 
Early retirement Other causes 
1999 24.49 51.93 23.58 
2000 26.44 53.20 20.36 
2001 17.53 62.02 20.45 
1999-2001 average 22.82 55.72 21.46 
I including resignation, dismissal, and dealn 
Table 9c: Causes of Thai Civil Service Annual Manpower Loss 
(Source: Office of the Civil Service Commission, 2000b, 2001b, and 2002) 
From the above table, it can be seen--despite only a short period of consecutive fiscal 
years being shown (due to poor data archives)-that Thai civil servants tend to work in 
public service for very long periods of time. During 1999 and 2001, just over twenty per 
cent left the service prior to formal retirement (e. g. resigned, dismissed or died). 
In contrast, over seventy-eight per cent of them remained in the service until retirement 
(either voluntary early retirement or forced retirement at the age of sixty). 
It is, therefore, understandable that Thai civil servants, who tend to work in the civil 
service for a considerable time, avoid risking their career by attempting to achieve more 
. tangible short-term objectives. In light of this, the strategy-aligned performance 
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measurement focusing on long-term results/outcomes may not be compatible with the 
needs for short-term performance measurement results. 
9.5.6 Enhancing legitimacy 
Broad performance measurement that is not tigItly aligned with strategy can be beneficial 
for public agencies seeking legitimacy in at least two ways, i. e. the legitimacy for poor 
performance and the legitimacy to be allocated additional resources. 
Firstly, broad performance data can be used in support of the explanation for poor 
performance, as it provides extensive and overarching performance data regarding the 
agencies' activities and outputs in the main. Public managers often claimed that their poor 
performance was caused by additional requirements being constantly delegated. 
Secondly, broad performance data can be used in support of the request for more resources 
from the government. For example, it is easier to demonstrate additional activities/outputs 
by comparing present tasks with the regular tasks before the new requirements were added. 
Therefore, public agencies can have data in support of the claim that the available 
resources are insufficient, permitting them to request additional resources commensurate 
with the additional tasks. 
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Public agencies are often delegated more and more work We thus have 
to askfor more [resources]. 
A middle manager, OCSC 
For this reason, possibly contrary to expectations, it is not always undesirable for public 
managers to be delegated more tasks. Public managers can benefit from the additional 
delegation because they can use it as reasons for requesting more resources, and this, in 
turn, helps their agýncies to become larger in terms of both budget and number of 
personnel. This provides public managers with more power because they can have more 
public resources under their authority. 
9.5.7 Increasing control over performance measurement results 
Since strategic objectives or outcomes take longer to accomplish, they tend to be subject 
more to uncontrollable factors (e. g. changes in governmental requirements and available 
resources). In contrast, shorter-term. objectives (known as milestones or intermediate 
objectives) are more controllable, allowing public managers to have more control over 
short-term performance measurement results. 
For example, managers can have more control over the number of pieces of work to be 
done (short-term performance) than if the finished work eventually results in desired 
outcomes (long-term performance). 
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Because objectives cannot be spelt out clearly, it is not possible to 
measure if the objectives are met. We can only measure if we do as we 
have planned. 
A non-management official, OCSC 
In order to see if the objectives are achieved, we compare the plans with 
thefinishedjobs. 
A supervisor, OAG 
We are still not able to measure long-term objectives of the BB setfor the 
year 2013. We, therefore, measure 'intermediate' accomplishments 
based on the assumption that our ouiputs contribute to the achievement 
of1hose long-term objectives. Yet, it might not be true in reality. 
A middle manager, BB 
The outputs done are concrete, while other abstract things like outcomes 
or objectives are the things we can talk about but cannot see or touch 
At least, we have to demonstrate what we really did in concrete term 
and then the abstract objectives come together with the outpuft 
A supervisor, ONCCC 
The following figure graphically sununarises this point 
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More uncontrollable factors 
(e. g. strategic changes owing to government's 
policy changes, shortage of fund for long-tenn 
projects, and perfonnance of other agencies 
having overlapped objectives) 
Actions 
Outputs Outcomes 
(Short-Dýterm (Long-tcrin objectves) 0 ives) -<: Ibjectives) 
Figure 9b: Subjectivity of Outcomes to Uncontrollable Factors 
(Source: the Author) 
Since managers may have more control if actions lead to outputs than if the outputs result 
in desired long-term outcomes, by matching performance measurement to short-term 
performance (e. g. measure whether the outputs are done on time and to plan), managers are 
able to have more control over their performance and, in turn, performance measurement 
results. 
The managers' controllability over outputs together with the authority to choose their own 
measures, allow public managers to place emphasis on the application of shorter-term 
performance measurement. It is even easier to do so, since the framework proposed by the 
Bureau of the Budget-with which public agencies need to comply-is mostly comprised 
of short-term measure types. 
In the following table, each agency's strategy(ies) is(are) compared side-by-side with 
performance measures used. 
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Fr( 
d e. - 
am 
pei 
pei 
Strategy Measures 
OCSC 0 Public administration and country 0 Number of dimensions of public agencies' organisational 
development arc efficient structure and personnel 
transparent equitable in 0 Number of students in foreign countries who arc under the 
accordance with the country's supervision of the OCSC 
economic and social changes, and * Number of prepared officials for public sector missions 
also up-to-date with international 0 Number of public agencies adopting managcment-by-objectives 
community. scheme 
Number of public agencies having PSO certificates 
Number of cabinet approved reports/suggestions regarding 
public administrations reform 
Number of public agencies having new personnel management 
system 
Number of public agencies having moral and ethics standard 
charter 
Number of civil servants participating in moral and ethics 
promoting programmes 
Per cent of advancement in developing of civil servants rules and 
regulations, appeal, and grievance. 
OAG 0 Improve working potential 0 Number of public agencies audited 
* Develop IT competency 9 Number of public financial accounts audited 
* Increase R&D 0 Number of procurement contracts audited 
9 Emphasisc public relations and 0 Number of operational audits 
moral promotion 
BB 0 Facilitate the improvement of 9 Number of ministries budgeted 
public sector management * Number ofjobs/projects budgeted 
0 Number of consultations regarding budgetary procedure given 
0 Number of plans followed up and performance assessed 
0 Number of ministries having improved budgeting systems 
0 Number of consultations regarding working structures and 
systems given 
0 Number of trained personnel 
ONCCC Prevent and suppress public 0 Number Tf assets and liabilities accounis inspected 
corruption 0 Number of public relations events organised 
0 Number of corruption accusations cases investigated 
Table 9d: Case Sites' Stated Strategy and Performance Measures 
(Source: Bureau of the Budget, 2002) 
)m the above table, no apparent linkages between strategy and measures are evid 
pite a perception that the measures should align and support an organisation's strat 
I long-term objectives. Public managers appeared to prefer and to be able to chc 
formance measurement misaligned with strategy, for they could have more control 
formance measurement results. 
ent 
egy 
ose 
wer 
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9.5.8 Encouraging organisational learning 
Policy/strategy appears to be more given than collaborated, which mostly reflects its 
makers' perception of the nature of the agencies' working direction. Monitoring of 
performance beyond strategic objectives, then, not only frees public agencies from sole 
dependence on the policy/strategy makers' discretions, which sometimes can be flawed, 
but also enhances the ability to learn from the practical perspectives from within the 
organisation. In other words, measures n-dsaligned with strategy-if properly used-can be 
beneficial because they can provide data for organisational leaming. 
Performance measurement that is not limited to the measuring of results toward achieving 
strategic objectives can thus broaden peripheral vision by the perfornunce data fed back to 
the top management from real-world operations perspectives. Viewing through a broader 
perspective, organisations can learn more from their operations than strictly following the 
given policy/strategy from the executives and/or politicians. 
In conclusion, in addition to the suggestion in the performance measurement/management 
literature that the alignment between performance measurement and strategy could be 
beneficial to organisations, this study has found that misalignment could also be of benefit. 
361 
9.6 Performance Measurement-Strategy Alignment 
Strategies 
Public managers in the cases studied appeared to employ a number of tactics in dealing 
with the alignment tensions. While some tactics were used to deal directly with the 
aligmnent issue, others were used rather indirectly or even, surprisingly, without any 
relevance to the issue of alignment. These tactics can be categorised into three main 
strategies. 
* Do-nothing Strategy 
Managers who used a do-nothing strategy took no action to alleviate alignment 
tensions, thus leaving the tensions to continue. 
Realigning Strategy 
In this strategy, managers appeared to struggle to regain alignment, which led to the 
alleviation of the tensions. 
Distracting StrateV 
To deal with the tensions, managers also directed attention away from the alignment 
issue. 
Several tactics were found to have been used for each strategy. All these three alignment 
strategies and tactics will be discussed next 
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9.6.1 Do-nothing Strategy 
Managers can deal with alignment tensions without taking corrective measures with regard 
to alignment. Two main tactics for this alignment strategy are the form-filling, and the 
assuming-and-believing tactics. 
Form-filling tactic 
For this tactic, performance data was gathered with regard to the pre-specified areas of 
performance, and the standardised forms were then filled in without any further concern. 
Therefore, this data was unlikely to have apparent linkages to strategy. Performance 
measurement was considered a stand-alone sub-system used for satisfying reporting and/or 
controlling purposes. 
Most agencies take the Bureau ofthe Budget's [measurement] framework 
to measure, for example, if the jobs are finished on time or if the budget 
is over-spent. 
A top executive, OAG 
Public agencies have to report byfilling out the forms BB 46-1,46-2, 
and 46-3 and then sending theforms back to us. 
A non-management official, BB 
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Assuming-and-believing tactic 
Using this tactic, managers assumed that performance measurement was aligned with 
strategy by nature. In other words, the alignment between performance measurement and 
strategy was believed to happen naturally and automatically without management 
intervention. 
This tactic can be seen as complementary to the form-filling tactic. However, the 
assuming-and-believing tactic seems to be more sophisticated because it requires more 
thought than the form-filling tactic. 
Performance measures always support strategy because of their natural 
alignmentfrom the cascading nature ofthe planning processes 
A supervisor, OCSC 
9.6.2 Realigning Strategy 
In contrast to those managers who used the do-nothing strategy, some managers attempted 
to subdue alignment tensions by re-establishing the alignment between performance 
measurement and strategy. The main purpose of this strategy was to make performance 
measurement more relevant to the organisational strategy once misalignment had occurred. 
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In so doing, public managers employed four tactics, including measure-changing, nominal 
plan-changing, short-term performance measuring, and unit sub-oplimised measuring 
tactics. Each tactic will be discussed in turn. 
Measure-changing tactic 
Using this tactic, measures were changed in two major forms, i. e. the replacement of the 
existing measures with new ones, and the adjustment of the pre-set targets. 
Typically, the measures remained in use for as long as the plan/project was in progress. 
Even though some informants claimed that if the measures were found inappropriate, the 
replacement of measures would occur, there was little evidence supporting this claim 
Therefore, the more common change was target adjustment 
Public managers seemed to measure how well they performed by looking at the number of 
outputs produced: 
We normally consider the production of outputs as achievement 
A middle manager, OCSC 
To tell whether the objectives have been achieved or no4 we can look at 
the work results. For example, we can compare the target number of 
agencies needing an audit with the number of casesfinished 
A supervisor, OAG 
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Mostly, we only compared what we produced with the plan. 
A middle manager, BB 
The indicator is the number of investigated cases compared with the 
target It we can match them, it is considered an achievement. 
A top executive, ONCCC 
The number of the agreed work outputs was pre-specified in the agency's annual planning 
documents used as supporting data for a budget request proposal to the Bureau of the 
Budget. The agencies would be regarded as being successful and efficient if they could 
produce the outputs as specified in their planning documents. Therefore, producing fewer 
outputs but keeping to the plan would possibly be considered better than producing more 
outputs but being behind the plan 
The [bureau director] who doesn't want to work hard is able to set very 
easily hit targets, say 300 cases, while another one might set a target of 
400 cases. For the latter burea4 even if 390 cases were finishecl it 
would still appear asfailure to meet the target 
A middle manager, ONCCC 
However, since the level of pre-specified outputs was used is a criterion for budget 
allocation, the agencies were tempted to specify high output levels in the hope of getting 
larger budgets. Additionally, since the agencies were able to adapt their target outputs later, 
the manipulation of target setting was not uncommon because they would be able to set 
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high target outputs, in order to get a greater budget, and then lower the targets later to 
appear as if they were achieving their targets. 
Nominal plan-changing tactic 
Despite several factors being identified as influencing public agencies' polic)ýstratcgy 
changes, public managers noted that these changes were normally not substantial, and on 
occasion, merely symbolic. For this reason, in the main, operations remained unchanged, 
even though policy/strategy altered. 
Public managers thus simply nominally revised activity plans, in order to appear 
responsive to the symbolic policy/strategy changes. An experienced planner noted: 
I oftenfound that the details in the revisedplanning documents were still 
the same, even though vision, mission, work and projects had already 
been changed. It was like old wine in a new bottle. 
A supervisor, OCSC 
By means of a superficial change in the plans, public managers could reduce the alignment 
tensions caused by a demand for organisational alignment once policy/strategy change had 
occurred. 
This behaviour supports the notion of strategy disconnection in public agencies, for the 
agencies could still carry on the same operations, even when policy/strategy had changed. 
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Short-term performan ce-m casu ring tactic 
Since public agencies' objectives appeared to be vague and to require the long-term for 
their realisation, it would be difficult to measure the achievement of these objectives. 
Public managers, therefore, needed to measure shorter-term performance instead because 
shorter-term measures could be regarded as milestones to the longer-term objectives 
(Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984; and Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1986). 
Moreover, shorter-term performance measurement is also more compatible with the 
measurement needs of the Thai civil service. For example, a major criterion used when 
considering a civil servant's promotion and salary increase is her or his short-term (annual 
or iannua, ) performance appraisal results. 
It is, therefore, to be expected that civil servants would attempt to make their short-term 
performance appear excellent because it would determine their career prospects. This is 
especially the case for Thai civil servants, since the majority of them stay in the service for 
a considerable length of time, if not for a life-time. 
An informant cited an example of a civil servant's short-term performance determining her 
or his career, based on his real-life personal experience: 
Among the people who started working here the same time as I did I was 
the last one to be promoted to Grade 5. The promotion was decided by 
the number of legal proceeding cases finisheg of which I had done the 
least. I never got a double-scaled salary hike in those early years Other 
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peers who knew the trick just did as many cases as possible without 
considering other things. 
A middle manager, OCSC 
Therefore, since it seemed appropriate to measure short-term performance, public 
managers, by aligning performance measures with short-term performance, appeared to be 
able to demonstrate the relevance of the performance measurement used. The short-term 
performance-measuring tactic could, therefore, subdue, at least to some degree, alignment 
tensions. 
Unit-suboptimised measuring tactic 
To deal with alignment tensions, public managers could also emphasise the measurement 
of their working unit. The perceived linkages between working units and the overall 
organisational performance is that the sub-unit's outputs, when accumulated altogether, 
would become the organisation's overall outputs. Therefore, the maintenance of the good 
performance of the sub-units would eventually lead to satisfactory overall organisational 
performance. 
Managers using this tactic tended to focus on their own work unit performance without 
seeing the agency from a holistic view. This is comparable to a commonly known conflict 
in a business manufacturing company, i. e. conflict between production and design 
functions. For example, a product might be designed without due consideration of the 
appropriateness of the design for production (e. g. state-of-the-art designed but excessively 
costly to produce). 
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9.6.3 Distracting Strategy 
In addition, managers also dealt with alignment tensions by distracting people's attention 
from the alignment issue. In so doing, the managers used four tactics, which can be 
classified as a 'distracting' strategy. These tactics included being-alert, alignment 
obscuring, blaming and hiding. Each tactic will be explained and discussed in tum 
Being-alert tactic 
It appears that public managers' awareness of the issues in contemporary management 
practices and of their being answerable to the concerns over these issues are important. 
The awareness and the ability to acknowledge those practices portray public agencies as 
rational. Organisational alignment, including the alignment between performance 
measurement and strategy in particular, is an example of those issues. 
However, within a certain period of time, the sýpply of contemporary management 
practices is not unlimited. Therefore, public agencies continually monitoring the 
movements in management practice are able to anticipate, to a greater or lesser degree, 
which issues would become a public issue for them. 
Public managers have learned from past experience that new and popular management 
practices have been brought into Thai public sector management practice. These imported 
management practices are almost exclusively those that have gained popularity in either 
public or business in the developed countries (e. g. public administration reform 
reengineering, Total Quality Management, Management by Objectives, performance-based 
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budgeting system, good governance, public service agreement and Balanced Scorecard). 
A high-ranking official noted that: 
[The Thai public sector] is up-to-date internationally. We have results- 
based management, performance agreement and good governance. 
We also have the CEO system and others. 
A top executive, OCSC 
This informant also mentioned the knowledge sharing sessions that were held for the 
purpose of updating staff on contemporary management practices. 
Staff were selected and assigned to study new books such as those 
recommended by the Prime Minister or the Secretary-GeneraL A session 
would then be heldfor those persons to tell us about what's new. It was a 
way oflearning together. 
I A top executive, OCSC 
More often, the individuals expected to be especially alert to the new management 
practices were the planning officials who, from their responsibility, were familiar with the 
agency's activities and processes both in terms of the systemic picture and in detail. 
These officials' in-depth knowledge of the organisation's activities and processes coupled 
with their up-to-date management knowledge made it possible to help the agency to 
respond to the demand for modernity, and to defend the organisation's rationale. 
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In light of this, alignment tensions would be lessened by diversion of attention from the 
alignment issues to demonstration of awareness and acknowledgement of the alignment 
requirements. Since alignment tended to be difficult to assess, public managers who were 
alert would normally be able to talk themselves out of the problem when the concern over 
the alignment was raised. 
Alignment-obs curing tactic 
Public managers can also alleviate alignment tensions by obscuring the relationships 
between performance measurement and other organisational processes. With a rudimentary 
perception that the aligm-nent between performance measurement and other processes is of 
virtue, there is no clear idea of what the performance measurement is to be aligned with. 
While some informants claimed that performance measurement should support vision or 
missions, others claimed that it should align with objectives, outputs or policy/strategy 
instead. Others even noted that performance measurement was a stand-alone process that 
did not relate to any other processes, and thus, did not need to be changed, even when 
situations changed. The disparate nature of comments in the following examples of 
interview data illustrate this point: 
indicators demonstrate that we are in compliance with government's 
policy and the constitution. 
A middle manager, OCSC 
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All performance indicators must ultimately aim at vision. 
A supervisor, OCSC 
When objectives change, performance measurement needs to be changed 
I think the measurement does not need to be changed often because 
we can tell performance by the plan. 
A middle manager, OAG 
expect that how many units they plan to audit. The indicators were, 
therefore, the number of audited units. 
A supervisor, OAG 
Once the objectives or strategy has changed or time goes by, 
performance measurement changes too. 
A middle manager, BB 
missions may be changed ... we need to adjust performance 
indicators. 
A supervisor, BB 
No matter how time passes, the main indicator remains the same, i. e. 
number ofcasesfinished compared with the plan. 
A top executive, ONCCC 
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If activities or objectives change, performance indicators need to change 
too. 
A middle manager, ONCCC 
From these interview data, the diversity in the way public officials regarded the 
relationships between performance measurement and other organisational processes can be 
observed. This diversity was found both among the officials in the same organisation and 
among the officials across different organisations. 
By obscuring the relationships between performance measurement and other organisational 
processes/activities, public managers appeared to be able to claim the existence of any kind 
of organisational alignment, including the alignment between performance measurement 
and strategy. As a result, alignment tensions could be subdued, at least to some degree, by 
use of this tactic. 
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Blaming tactic 
Once the alignment concerns were raised, causing alignment tensions, public managers 
could blame several factors for hindering such alignment. These factors included (1) 
underdeveloped knowledge, (2) lack of management attention, (3) scarce resources, (4) 
changing requirements, and (5) performance of other units/agencies. Each of these will be 
discussed in turn next. 
Underdeveloped knowledge 
There was a common understanding among the informants that the knowledge pertaining 
to performance measurement in the public sector was underdeveloped. Examples of 
problematic issues in public sector perfonnance measurement raised by the informants 
included the issues regarding: 
- Public organisations' objectives 
- Appropriate representative indicators for the performance of public organisations 
-A public agency's performance when the same objectives were shared among 
different agencies 
- Ways of comparing the performance of public agencies with different work 
environments 
Frequently, the public sector perfon-nance measurement was compared with businesses. 
Public officials noted that the body of performance measurement knowledge for the public 
sector had been comparatively far underdeveloped, and did little to offer guidance for 
measurement practice in reality. 
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Performance measurement practice for the public sector was seen as not as easy or 
straightforward as those of business. For example, in business, it was commonly accepted 
that a company's performance could be measured in financial terms. Financial measures 
such as profit, sales or stock price were considered readily measurable. In contrast, in the 
public sector, it was claimed that there were no such sound representative measures for the 
performance of public sector organisations. 
Lack ofmanagement attention 
Mostly in practice, performance measurement activities and data were used merely for 
controlling and reporting purposes. It appeared that'monitoring the progress of work in 
terms of the outputs produced in comparison to the plan was sufficient for serving these 
purposes without considering whether the measurement was aligned with po ic strategy. 
The lack of management attention also claimed to cause public officials' inactiveness in 
using performance measurement for other purposes, such as for improving and developing. 
Public officials were required only to gather and report the data on, for example, the 
number of reports prepared, number of meetings held, and amount of budget spent. 
Since the provision of these raw performance data met the management requirements, the 
implication of the data seemed unnecessary. 
376 
Scarce resources 
Public managers claimed that perfonnance measurement could be too burdensome, since 
they were already swamped with regular tasks. These managers claimed that due to the 
limitations of available resources (e. g. money, time and human resources), they could not 
afford much to measure work performance. 
Using a Thai expression, an OCSC n-fiddle manager referred to the use of performance 
measurement as comparable to riding an elephant to catch a grasshopper, meaning that the 
cost incurred from measurement activities may not be worth the benefits resulting from the 
measurement. 
Changing requirements 
A common perception about public agencies' working environment was their ever- 
changing requirements. Factors generating the requirements could be either external or 
internal to the agencies themselves. It was noted that while the most influential external 
factor appeared to be change in government policy, the most influential internal factor was 
changing of the agencies' work direction, due mainly to changes in top management. 
On the one hand, public agencies, especially govenunent agencies, were required to 
support government policy. Frequent changes in government policy resulted in the 
constantly changing requirements that would make it difficult for public managers to 
adapt. 
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On the other hand, the changes in requirement could also come from within the agencies 
themselves. For example, the agencies' top management appeared to be able to change the 
agencies' required work directions. These changes were sometimes based on political 
rather than operational reasons. An official noted: 
[Top executives] might think that it would be good to change strategy, 
sometimes at whim. Nobody likes to follow the predecessor's footsteps 
other times, they might think that since they have become the boss, they 
can change the strategy to whatever they like. 
A supervisor, OCSC 
Changes in government policy, when coupled with changes in organisation strategy, 
resulted in frequent changes in work requirements. Therefore, if performance measurement 
was to be in line with strategy (work direction), then the change in work direction would 
inevitably affect the alignment between perf6rmance measurement and strategy. Public 
managers blamed the frequently changing requirements for making it difficult to maintain 
the aligmnent. 
Performance ofother unitslagencies 
It was noted that the perfonnance of a unit depends on other units within an agency. 
Similarly, the performance of an agency also depends on how other agencies perform. 
Public managers regarded these correlative performances as inhibiting the measurement of 
the achievement of long-term strategic objectives. The managers claimed that since the 
objectives of individual units (agencies) were often the combination of work results of 
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more than one unit (agency), and that each unit (agency) did not have authority over 
another, it was unfair to measure a unit's (agency's) performance by measuring the 
objectives shared among different units (agencies). 
[Our office] can only fell about [the office's] performance. It is not only 
we who produce all the [BB organisationafl output; there are many other 
offiCes responsiblefor doing that as well 
A supervisor, BB 
We often need to request the needed information from other agencies 
It depends on how promptly they react to our requests This inevitably 
affects our performance. 
A supervisor, ONCCC 
By blan-ýing the correlation of performance as an uncontrollable factor, public managers 
can justify the measurement of their immediate work results which may not be aligned 
with strategy. As a result, almost all measures used among public agencies are the 
measures of what they have done (activities or outputs measures) with the given amount of 
resources (inputs measures). 
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Hiding tactic 
This tactic involves avoidance of the discussion of alignment. Even though the problem of 
performance measurement misaligned with strategy was known, public officials tried to 
avoid mentioning it. The two following extracts highlight this point: 
[Iffailed], we can blame neither policy nor objectives. We can't blame 
the inefficiency of our staff either, even though these midit have caused 
the failure. The Thai civil service has been hiding these while making 
adjustments so that the work can still carry on. 
A top executive, OCSC 
lt is like criticising 1heir ownfamily; nobody would do so. 
A middle manager, OCSC 
All aligmnent strategies and tactics as well as their advantages, disadvantages and context 
of use were cited by informants and surnmarised in the following table. ' 
380 
Do-nothing 
Tactics 
orm- Ili IIi nv 
Assuming & 
11clic% ing 
Measures- 
Changing 
Noinhial-I'lans 
Changing 
Realigning Short-term 
Performance 
Measuring 
Unit-optimised 
Measuring 
AdNantages 
sincc ll)C; h[llCII)L'llI 11 
COlI', lLICrCd lii(ICI)CII(ICIII 
-Conwilicill to collipaic 
data ovcilunc & acro,,, s 
orgall 1 sat lolls 
-I: asN to iindcrland data 
-Appcar systematic & 
rational 
-No actions rcquired 
-Performance data appear 
satisfilctorý. despite 
poor pcrioniumcc 
-1: 1111alicc ficxIbilitý 
- Able to have reserved 
capacitý hidden Im 
emergent use 
-Not dcýNmg strategy 
-Appear active 
-Allo" flexibility to cope 
with ad hoc, urgent 
assignments 
-Mana,, crs appear busN 
-Adjustable for 
-On-thc-waý milestones 
are madc % isibIc 
-M, iii, i, -, cr.,, havc morc 
control ovct 
perl'ormwice 
-Internal conipc(ition 
among sub-units niaN 
rcsult in bcttcr 
performance 
-Providc targ-ct I-or 
intcrnal benchinarking 
or, -, anisat ion's ovcrall 
Being-Alert 
Alignment 
obscuring 
Distracting 
Blaming 
II Wing 
-Answcrablc 
-Fasý to do 
-Appear knowledgeabIc 
-Answerable 
-Appear sýstcniatic & 
rational 
-Time huying 
-No required c1l'ort 
-Problems are not 
revealcd and opcrations 
are not allectcd 
Disad% antages 
-NIC; mliclucill Can't 
c.,, scii al)ilitN to Icarn 
-Difficull to lind ways to 
improvc pufomiance 
-( )bicctivus are al risk ol 
ilc% er heilig 1,1111-111c(1 
-111)PC(IC 1111provonellt 
11110a(ivvý 
-I olcratc Poor 
pal'onnance 
-Incfficicncý might 
occur 
-t Indcrininc 
improvenicrit 
-I. c,,,; cnabihlN to 
improvc straMp 
-Iloor pcrformancc cm 
bc liiddcn 
-'I olcratc unsucccsslul 
Plans 
-Tradc offlon I, 
organisational 
objectivcs 
-CompOing stib-muts 
inaN causc conflicts 
-11ronc to nicasurctlicill 
manipulation cg 
collusion bct"ccn sub- 
unit.. " 
-I I ard to scc 
-10cloric 
-1 lindcr imProvement 
-Not having clear idea 
-Difficull to idmik 
areas ot problems 
-Aritaponism from the 
blamed 
-Not attcullptcd 
-Cannot idcnttfý areas of 
problems 
-I; nsol% edproblents 
-Problems might surface 
unexpcdcdlý 
Context of use 
A Illablk. it, ocatc Oml 
lllCiISlJlL'llIClII ýNSICJII 
-1 cs,, Impact of' outcollic", 
Oil 111c Public 
-( )bhgcd to takc 
incamironcrit ftamc%%ork 
-1 C, ý.,, (INIlaillic 
environnicm 
-Commonk I'ound 
fighcr units' output,, arc 
accumulation of' slib- 
-Nalurc ol %%ork is 
complicated, wnsitivc, 
and ICSS COMR)HAIC 
-Strong concans ovcr 
rcsourccs constraint. s 
-I )cnionstrate accorditil, 
changcs cvcii 
symbolicallý 
-11crionmuicc often hills 
behind plan 
-Ma joritN of lasks arc 
routinc (administrativc) 
-( )b_lect ivc.,, arc abstract 
and taking long, linic to 
accomplish 
-1 Inclcar cause-and- 
ci'l'cct relationships 
bet, A, ccii working results 
and long-tcrin oulconics 
-Diffilcull to sce how sub. - 
units' pulorniance 
results in ImIlicr 
organisational lcvcl 
perforniaricc 
-Sub , Icct more 
to cxterim 
scrutinN 
-1 favin-, 'advan(ed, ot 
, smart, imaýc 
-',, ublcct to strom, 
dcniand for cffectivc 
managenicia 
-Volatilc policy/stratc(gy 
mth constant 
-Commonlý found 
found 
Table 9e: Advantages, Disadvantages and Context of Use P-W 
for Alignment Strategies and Tactics 
(Source: the author) 
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Instead of using a particular tactic, it was more common for public managers to use a 
combination of tactics in dealing with alignment tensions. This combination of tactics was 
based on a series of questionable. /unapproved assumptions, including: 
41 An agency's performance is the accumulation of the sub-units' performance 
* Outputs guarantee the accomplishment of long-term objectives 
* The cascading nature of planning activities gives rise to natural alignnrnt 
There have also been common practices among public agencies, including: 
9 New management innovations frequently taken as a panacea 
9 Tolerance of mediocre performance 
Short-termism (e. g. focusing on short-term performance because it is a way to 
qualify for budget requested) 
Even though an agency or its sub-units may appear to use a particular alignment strategy 
more than other strategies, the combined use of different strategies as well as different 
tactics was also found. Table 9f illustrates the use of a combination of alignment 
strategies/tactics for each case site. 
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OCSC BB OAG ONCCC 
Do-nothing strategy 
" Form-filling 0 0 
" Assuming-and-belicving 0 0 
Realigning strategy 
0 Mcasurcs-changing 
Nominal plans-changing 0 
Short-term performance 
measuring 0 0 
Unit-suboptimiscd 
measuring 0 0 
Distracting strategy 
" Being-alert 
" Alignment obscuring 0 
" Blaming 0 0 0 
o Hiding 1 011 0 01 0 
Table 9f. - Alignment Strategies Used in Different Case Sites 
(Source: the author) 
From the table, an agency's emphasis of a particular alignment strategy can be observed, 
despite the use of some selective tactics from other alignment strategies. 
The three alignment strategies can also be classified into two groups as 'genuine' or 
&spurious' attempts to arrive at alignment. On the one hand, public managers who appeared 
to be genuinely attempting to recreate alignment once misalignment had occurred tended ta 
use the realigning strategy to arrive at the alignment. On the other hand, the managers who 
an eared to spuriously attempt to align performance measurement with strategy often used Up 
either do-nothing or distracting strategies 
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9.7 Summary 
This chapter aimed to present and discuss the findings from this research. The overall 
inter-case analysis from this multiple-case study resulted in five research findings, 
I 
including: 
e Practical meanings of strategy in public sector management 
aA missing practical view of the existing performance measurement and performance 
management definitions 
Performance measurement-strategy alignment tensions 
* Advantages of strategy-misaligned performance measurement 
* Performance measurement-strategy alignment strategies 
The discussions regarding the first finding were that public officials regarded strategy as 
equivalent to the traditional policy. The term 'strategy' and 'policy' were found to have 
been used interchangeably. 
The discussions regarding the second finding concerned an omitted practical view of the 
existing definitions of key concepts in performance measurement/management study. 
That is, the purpose of performance measurement to inform how well the organisation was 
working towards formally stated objectives was overemphasised, while other purposes, 
especially for indicating accountability to other requirements, were underemphasised. 
The refined definitions of key concepts based on empirical evidence from this research 
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were thus Proposed. As a result, the alignment between perfonnance measurement and 
strategy can be viewed from a different, yet somewhat more practical perspective. 
The discussions regarding the third finding were concerned with the tensions public 
managers consistently encountered when attempting to align performance measurement 
with strategy. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the measurement was expected to 
provide performance data beyond that of strategic concern. Secondly, strategy-aligned 
performance measurement contradicted the need for short-term performance data from the 
operational perspective. Therefore, having the performance measurement tightly aligned 
with strategy was not always advantageous. Conversely, misalignment was more 
preferable on many occasions. 
The discussions regarding the fourth finding revolved around the advantages of 
nusaligmnent. Misaligmnent was found capable of providing at least eiýht benefits to 
public agencies, including (1) creating balance between focus and scope of works, 
(2) bridging the strategy-operation disconnection, (3) creating flexibility, (4) enhancing 
measurability of performance measurement, (5) enhancing, compatibility between 
performance measurement and personnel performance appraisal practice, (6) enhancing 
legitimacy, (7) increasing control over performance measurement results, and 
I 
(8) encouraging organisational learning. 
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Finally, the discussions regarding the fifth finding were about how public managers dealt 
with alignment tensions in practice. It was found that they employed several tactics in so 
doing. Those tactics can be categorised into three main alignment strategies, namely, 
(1) do-nothing strategy, (2) realigning strategy, and (3) distracting strategy. 
It is interesting that when coping with the pressure to demonstrate the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy, public managers not only attempted directly to 
align measurement with strategy (as in the realigning strategy), but surprisingly, they could 
adopt a no action approach (as in the do-nothing strategy). It is perhaps even more 
surprising that public managers encountering such pressure could also divert the attention 
away from the alignment issue (as in the distracting strategy) and, in turn, cunningly 
subdue the tensions. 
In the next chapter the conclusions of this research will be drawn. 
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CHAPTER10 
Conclusions 
10.1 Introduction 
To conclude this research, the final chapter aims to summarise how the findings from the 
study answer the research question. This chapter also aims to discuss the implications of 
the research, both in terms of its academic contributions and managerial implications. 
The lin-ýitations of this research will also be identified as well as the additional issues raised 
that suggest areas for future research. 
This chapter will discuss the five following issues: 
9 The alignment between performance measurement and strategy in central 
government agencies 
9 Answers to the research question 
* Research contributions 
o Research limitations 
Additional issues raised by the research and areas for future research 
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10.2 The Alignment between Performance Measurement and 
Strategy in Central Government Agencies 
The reasons that the alignment between performance measurement and strategy in central 
govermnent agencies was worthy of study included the following: 
e The review of the literature suggested that the subject represented a gap in the body 
of knowledge pertaining to performance measurement/management. 
The literature review also suggested that performance measurement should be 
aligned with strategy (see, for example, Dixon et al., 1990; Kaplan, 1990,2001; 
Kaplan and Norton, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d; McAdam and Bailie, 2002; Neely, 
1999; Neely et al., 1994; and Parker, 2000), but there was still a lack of 
understanding of the subject especially within the public sector context 
* Sipce strategies in public sector organisaions appeared to be volatile, researching 
into the topic within this context would possibly teach somd valuable lessons to 
organisations in this context as well as to organisations in the context with less 
strategic volatility. 
e There was a lack of empirical evidence supporting the notion of performance 
measurement-stmtegy alig=ent. 
* There was a shortage of research in the field in the central government context. 
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Despite the existing literature appearing to suggest that perfornunce measurement should 
be aligned with organisational strategy, this research found that-for central goverrunent 
agencies-performance measurement and strategy were not likely to be aligned for at least 
two plausible reasons. 
Firstly, performance measurement tightly aligned with strategy might appear to be 
insufficient in terms of providing performance data on aspects of agencies' performance 
other than that of strategic concern. Secondly, a contradictory perspective between that of 
strategy and that of performance measurement rendered the alignment of performance 
measurement with strategy unlikely. That is, while strategy usually focused on public 
agencies' longer-term performance, shorter-term oriented performance measurement was 
also needed from an operational view. 
Even though the first reason mentioned above could be seen as the result of a unique 
characteristic of public agenc . ies, in which there existed several stakeholder groups for the 
agencies to satisfy, the second reason was based mainly on the strategy-operation 
disconnection. 
The literature appeared to extol the importance of the strategy-aligned performance 
measurement by normatively arguing for its advantages, while overlooking any possible 
downside. Nevertheless, this research found that strategy-misaligned performance 
measurement could have several benefits, thus making misalignment preferable on some 
occasions. 
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Although misalignment would appear to be advantageous in some circumstances, the 
requirement for organisational alignment-including the alignment between performance 
measurement and strategy-could cause alignment tensions in practice. These tensions 
could be considered a natural phenomenon occurring as the result of two competing needs 
for performance measurement focus, i. e. longer-term strategic focus and shorter-term 
operational focus. Public managers thus needed to find ways to cope with these tensions 
and to manage the alignment. 
In the next section, which aims to formally answer the research question of this study, 
conclusions will be drawn about the alignment strategies used by public managers in 
central government agencies to cope with alignment tensions, and to manage the alignment 
between performance measurement and strategy. 
10.3 Answers to the Research Question 
How, in central government agcncies, is the alignment 
between performance measurement and strategy 
managed? 
9 How are performance measures, performance measurement ., 
systems, performance measurement, and performance 
management understood? 
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* How is the performance measurcmcnt-stratcgy tension 
perceived? 
* Is there performance measurement-strategy alignment? 
Since it is not always sensible to tightly align performance measurement with strategy, 
while strategy-operation disconnection is a conunon characteristic of central government 
agencies, there still exists a requirement for such aligmnent. This can cause alignrmnt 
tensions, which public managers need to find ways to alleviate. 
In so doing, public managers appear to use several alignment strategies broadly categorised 
into two main groups: (1) genuine encleavours to create the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy, and (2) spurious attempts to align performance 
measurement with strategy. 
On the one hand, public managers who genuinely endeavour to align performance 
measurement with strategy in order to deal with alignment tensions, use the strategy called 
grealigning stratee when misalignment occurs. With this strategy, public managers 
attempt to align performance measurement by use of the many tactics discussed in section 
9.6.2. The main purpose is to make performance measurement more relevant to strategy. 
However, tight aligranent cannot be achieved because (1) it is not always beneficial, (2) it 
requires enormous resources, especially since policy/strategy for public agencies is subject 
to a number of factors that can cause policy/strategy change, (3) there is no guidance for so 
doing, owing to underdeveloped knowledge in public sector perforniance 
measurcmcnt/managcment. 
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On the other hand, public managers can spuriously attempt to align performance 
measurement with strategy by either taking no action or directing attention away from the 
alignment issues by means of a 'do-nothing stratee or a 'distracting strateg5? (see the 
detailed discussions on these strategies in sections 9.6.1 and 9.6.3 respectively). They can 
do this because (1) misalignment can be more advantageous, (2) the requirement for 
alignment is not absolute and the alignment is not easy to discem and (3) public agencies 
are prepared to talk themselves out of problems. 
Therefore, it can be summarikd that, in central government agencies, the aligmnent 
between performance measurement and strategy can be managed by using a do-nothing 
strategy, a realigning strategy or a distracting strategy. Regardless of the strategy used, the 
purpose is mainly to subdue the alignment tensions caused by a contradiction between a 
requirement for organisational alignment and a need for operations-oriented performance 
data. 
It should also be noted that, although an agency's political dependency was expected to be 
a factor affecting the alignment between its performance measurement and strategy, and, in 
turn, the way the agency manages such alignment, no conclusion as such can be drawn 
from the results of this study. Even though, among the agencies having different degrees of 
political dependency, some differences can be observed (e. g. highly dependent agencies 
tend to be more active with regard to performance measurement/management than their 
independent counterparts), commonalities are also observable (e. g. the alignment is always 
assumed and not systematically assessed). 
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In the main, public agencies, regardless of their political dependency, manage the 
aligmnent in the saine way. The reason for this is that although the so-called 'independent' 
agencies are politically dependent in theory, they are not free from political influences in 
practice. 
10.4 Research Contributions 
This research has two areas of contribution: academic contributions and managerial 
implications, each of which will be identified in tum 
10.4.1 Academic contributions 
This research appears to have academic contributions to the performance measurement/ 
management body of knowledge by helping to bridge four out of the six gaps in the 
existing literature identified in section 4.6. 
* This research adds the perspective of the practitioner on the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy to the literature where there is a lack of 
consensus in defining organisational alignment. That is, it is necessary for 
performance measurement not only to be aligned with public agencies' strategy, but 
also to be capable of providing performance data regarding other aspects of 
performance beyond that of strategic concern. 
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* This research 'contributes to knowledge pertaining to performance measurement 
studies by identifying eight advantages of strategy-misaligned performance 
measurement, including (1) creating balance between focus and scope of work, 
(2) bridging' the strategy-operation disconnection, (3) creating flexibility, (4) 
enhancing measurability of performance measurement, (5) enhancing compatibility 
between performance measurement and personnel performance appraisal practice, 
(6) enhancing legitimacy, (7) increasing control over performance measurement 
results, and (8) encouraging organisational learning. Therefore, the notion that 
performance measurement should be tightly aligned with strategy nny need to be 
refined because strategy-misaligned performance measurement instead, can be 
beneficial in many circumstances. 
o This research provides empirical evidence of how the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy-as a component of organisational 
alignment-is managed in reality by identifying three alignment strategies, as well as 
tactics within each strategy, used by public managers to manage the alignment in 
practice. These three aligmnent strategies are (1) do-nothing strategy, (2) realigning 
strategy, and (3) distracting strategy. While the realigning strategy appears to be used 
to enhance alignment, the other two strategies are used rather to subdue the 
aligmnent tensions, and not necessarily to enhance aligmnent. 
9 This multiple-case study, comprising of the studies of four central government 
agencies, provides an evidence-based insight into the alignrmnt between 
I 
performance measurement and strategy in the public sector management context, in 
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which the body of performance measurement/management knowledge appears to be 
underdeveloped. 
10.4.2 Managerial implications 
In addition to the academic contributions, this research is also likely to have at least five 
managerial implications, identified as follows: 
* The strategy-aligned performance measurement may not always be beneficial for the 
organisations in which strategy disconnection or policy volatility prevails 
e Since the misalignment can also be advantageous in some situations, managers 
should be able to gain benefits from the misalignment by weighing the pros and cons 
of alig=ent, rather than tightly aligning the measurement with strategy. 
-* If strategy is meant to be practically different from the traditional policy, public 
managers need greater clarification of, for example, the meanings and functions of 
strategy in comparison to policy. Otherwise, the confusion of commonalities and 
differences between strategy and policy are likely to continueý 
* The imposition of management innovations may not always be useful for the central 
government agencies, especially when they are commonly perceived as transient. 
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e The inclusiveness of practical perspectives on the definition of key concepts in 
performance measurement/management study makes academic research more 
relevant to practitioners' needs. 
10.5 Research Limitations 
Despite having reviewed the relevant literattre and research methodology, having carefully 
designed and conducted the research methods, and repeatedly and painstakingly analysed 
the data obtained, this study still has a number of flaws and limitations, as indicated below. 
e This research was conducted within a particular social and political context i. e. Thai 
public administration. Had it been conducted in a different context, the results might 
have been different. 
9 Since the research was conducted within a particular context, the general i sability of 
the research results to a wider context cannot be confidently claimed, unless similar 
research is conducted within another context with sirrilar results. 
* Moreover, even within the context in which this research was undertaken, the 
generalisability is still subject to debate because the data was collected from only 
four of scores of Thai public agencies. 
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e The lack of guiding theory-owing to the underdeveloped body of knowledge in the 
field-resulted in vague fundamental concepts (e. g. strategy in public agencies, and 
the alignment between performance measurement and strategy), for the same concept 
was interpreted in various ways by different people. This could be regarded as a 
limitation of this research because the main data obtained are derived from the 
respondent's perception of the meaning and the interplay of these vague concepts. 
* The fact that strategic management, including the application of performance 
measurement and strategy, was new to the cases studied can also be regarded as a 
limitation of this research This is because there existed little docunrontation data 
supporting the interview data. Moreover, changes in the constructs were also likely 
to be limited, and thus difficult to observe. 
* The political dependency of the agencies was expected to be a factor affecting the 
alignment between performance measurement and strategy in central government 
agencies. However, this could be neither proved nor disproved because the so-called 
independent agencies were found not politically independent in practice. A more 
appropriate classification scheme for the agencies' political dependency is needed, 
therefore. 
* According to the interpretive research approach taken, the researcher's bias rnight 
have affected the collection as well as the interpretation of data regarding the 
phenomenon studied. 
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10.6 Additional Issues Raised by the Research and Areas for 
Future Research 
From conducting this study, additional issues are raised, and could be suggested as 
possible areas for future research. 
*A replication study should be undertaken in the European context to verify or falsify 
the results of this study. It would also be specifically appropriate to conduct a 
replication study in the UK public sector context, as the results from the exploratory 
study, in the first phase of this research, appeared to suggest that the alignment 
between performance measurement and strategy was important and of increasing 
interest to practitioners in the context 
* Even though the recent arrival of the constructs studied in the researched context 
could be considered a limitation of this study, it also gives rise to an opportunity to 
revisit the same topic in the same context, once the constructs reach maturity, 
in order to verify or falsify the results of this research 
* Since the meanings and functions of strategy appear to be equivalent to those of 
traditional policy, a study into the commonalities and/or differences of strategy and 
policy would help to differentiate the two in practice. 
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e Empirical evidence from this research is in tune with the notion suggested by the 
existing performance literature that the measuring of public organisations' long-term 
objectives accomplishment is difficult. However, a greater understanding of this 
measurement is needed if it is important to know whether these desired ob ectives are j 
met. 
* An interesting notion was raised by a few respondents, namely, that the individuals 
whose performance is monitored or measured might feel disgraced. Whether this is a 
cultural aspect of the context in which this study was conducted or universal to other 
contexts is pe aps worthy of further investigation. 
9 Another characteristic seerningly unique to public agencies is that there often are 
many agencies whose objectives appear to overlap. In view of this, the performance 
of these agencies is likely to be interrelated and difficult to measure. In order to be 
able to measure performance of these individual agencies, the development of an 
appropriate performance measurement approach is needed. 
e Providing that public resources should be used efficiently, and that they should be 
allocated to the agencies that can make most efficient use of these resources, a 
further investigation into the relationships between public agencies' work 
performance and public resources allocation could be beneficial. 
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* It would also be interesting to investigate further performance measurement for 
independent government agencies that are reliant on government budget, but 
sometimes work against politicians' personal interests (e. g. counter-corruption 
agencies). 
* In addition, performance measurement for professional agencies subject to more 
uncontrollable factors is also a possible area for future research. An example of these 
agencies is the court of justice, which normally is not able to specify the outcome of 
an investigative trial case, as it depends on evidence-gathering which is beyond its 
control. 
e Since a commonly accepted&notion emerging from this research is that public 
agencies' policy/strategy should support govcmrnent policy/strategy, an approach for 
assessing the aligmnent between public agency's policy/strategy and govermnental 
policy/strategy is needed. 
* Further study of the similarities/differences of performance measurement in different 
public sector contexts (e. g. central versus local government agencies, professional 
versus non-professional agencies, and production versus non-production agencies) is 
also a promising research area. 
9 Finally, this research raises the issue of whether the independent agencies appear to 
be -less active with regard to strategic management and performance measurement, 
which is worthy of further investigatiom 
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10.7 Summary 
The review of the existing literature from Chapter 2 to Chapter 5 suggested that the subject 
of the alignment between performance measurement and strategy is of interest and 
importance in the performance measurement/management research community. However, 
there still is a lack of empirical evidence supporting the normative notion of the alignment. 
Therefore, this study has sought an answer to the following question: 
How, in central government agencies, is the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy managed? 
I Chapter 6 reviewed research methodology and assessed the available research methods. 
Subsequently, the philosophical stance of this research was identified, leading to the 
adoption of case study as the research strotegy. Multiple-case study research comprising 
the studies of four Thai central government agencies was then conducted by use of 
research methods explained in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 8 provided the descriptions for each case site as well as the intra-case analysis 
results. This research resulted in five research findings, discussed in Chapter 9, including: 
* The practical meanings of strategy in public sector management 
*A missing practical perspective on the existing perfornunce measurement/ 
management definitions 
e Performance measurement-strategy alignment tensions 
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9 Advantages of strategy-misaligned performance measurement 
Performance measurement-strategy alignment strategies 
The answers to the research question were that public managers used several tactics to 
manage the alignment between performance measurement and strategy. These tactics were 
classified into three alignment strategies, including realigning strategy, do-nothing 
strategy, and distracting strategy. While tactics in the first strategy involved the genuine 
endeavour to enhance aligmnent, tactics in the latter two involved spurious attenpts to 
arrive at alignment. However, in central government agencies, the alignment between 
performance measurement and strategy was mainly managed merely to subdue the 
alignment tensions caused primarily by contradictory perspectives between that of strategy 
and the performance measurement in place. 
Also in this final chapter were presented the research contributions, research limitations, 
and suggested areas for future research. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
BE Buddhist Era 
BB Bureau of the Budget 
BSC Balanced Scorecard 
EFQM European Foundation for Quality Management 
NCCC National Counter Corruption Commission 
NPM New Public Management 
OAG Office of the Auditor General 
OCSC Office of the Civil Service Commission 
OECD Organisations for Economic Cooperation and Developrmnt 
ONCCC Office of the National Counter Corruption Comnission 
OPDC Office of the Public Sector Developrwnt Commission 
PMQ Performance Measurement Questionnaire 
SMART Strategic Management Analysis and Reporting Technique 
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APPENDIX I 
List of questions in the semi-structured interview guide 
To ensure that the interviewees understood the purpose ofeach question, probing questions 
and a prompt list of possible factors, bracketed and italicised, were used to supplement the 
main questions. 
Below, in the left-hand column, is a list of actual questions asked in the interviews, 
conducted in the medium of Thai. In the right-hand colurnn is the English translation of 
each question. 
Questions asked in Thai Questions translated into English 
TOO DI 111i I 4-lu I ý01%6 ]I I IIIJ I Name, position, time in position, 
VI uný-Tm I Vil 114 1 10tj ýýl III I 
length oftime with the oroamsation, 
' and briet job description. 
1. Questions regarding strategy 
I G). 6) 1.1 How does your organisation 
(department) set its goals? 
olpm it) ill If/[I 1ý- V3UT1 7gril Ifunip II r1i Ito (Explain the goal-setting process. 
6) LC9 ildqVili"11 J-4ittl 1-5%fl 15115WA jjjMrjVUflO 1.2 What are the strategies used to 
achieve those goals? 
W4 ýA PI"50ý 11 n 15 TI ti fi, l ýo 111 V1 In a0 111,5 1 .3 
I-low are those strategies tormulated" 
(4u Mi i-mi'mINi m 7u miAnu/Vjn7t- u) Uri 1ý od, 4 (e. g. participants infiormululingýprocess, 
arguments) length o 'time, settlement o' 
1.4 How do your department's strategies 
v wu itluat naqTl 11 lu a INfl n15 lom -ni 061ý 15 
support the organisat Ion's overall 
strategies? 
IN. B. This question applies to Inter\ lc\\ccs 
VV other than senior executives. 
1.5 In setting goals and stratc,, Ics. \\ hose 
opinions do you need to consider'. 
(e. g. government, ministers, other relalcil 
OV11 agencies, public opinion, superiors, I 
subordinates, niedia, international 
lf VY0 15 organisations) 
L4 
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", URj11IJq 111,11un F5 1.6 I-low are those strategi ics 
-, A. qMMMM, Uq implemented? 
10 nI 5 ffl'a vu t1d aI na v 11,1j, a titl 5 lud IM U 1.7 I-low often do strategies change'? 
1.8 What are the factors causing those 
.44 changes'? 
lffý poll 11MAVU11 1104 11M)IR0 
(e. g. government policj,, socio-economic 
00 71011"'Myl=ý1 an tru ? 0ý7471g_-Inff) 
changes, henchinarking) 
1.9 How does your organisation 
(department) make changes in 
strategies'? 
G). G)o 1.10 What are the unexpected 
consequences resultino trom the 
changes'. ) 
,,, wive CIO/ IICj (e. g. 1)ositive cmd nc 
G. G)G) 15 111 'Witil 111il A11411ru 
ý 1.11 1 low are the changes communicated 
throughout the organisation 
(department)? 
o, iu 1? 17111,14 (e. g. jbrinal communication, iqlbrinal 
communication, ivayso ensuringol, 
tire underslootý 
0 in JJAýfjtj JfjiJfj 11 )OW', f) l1q, 1-v)4 lvýuo Jjjý LJj IW IM 2. Questions regarding performance t-ý 
measurement 
Lo. G) I How do you know if your 
organisation (department) is working 
towards achievino pre-set pals? 
2 For what are the rneasures/indicators 
Otru 
used? 
or Iqlormal 
such cis norin (117(IPCCI- 171-CSSUI-C, CIC, 
4U 7Y; 5,0 
I I- __ 9-- __ v--. ------ 
2.3 Where do these measures/indicators 
If Oh If up plýw 
come from? 
f. II Im, (Provide examples o fiic'filal 
factors in determining those 
ineasureslindicalors. ) 
(Provide examples 
fiictors in the implemenotion of those 
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kLc 
l)dl-jk"ljl-ýalj 
-1 
(JlrnJflflffl 11Th L1tU Thi J1J1 )) 
M5 I HIJ M ifjj 0a 1100 1011ju 
v l? Fjj7ý-ajj 4u ýp 70,7111404 non UP 3 Mp 04 01 OJ; 1310) 
'14 1 low do you know those 
measures/indicators are appropriate 
(Arc Ihey alwayssuilah1c. fin- any 
Circull/s/1 mcc (lilt/ 111 (111.1, lime? ) 
(How do You delennine ýflhefiwinerl. v 
appropriate measures have become 
inappropriate (insql -elevalli, 
ýficielll, 
not I 
useless, no longerfinanciallY viable, etc. )? ) 
2.5 What prompts you to reasscss the 
appropriateness ofthose 
measures/indicators'? 
4 (e. g. straiegies changedfixed schedule, 
inanagemeni inilialives, or breakdown in 
-J, aspects of a s1ralegry, e1c. 
lull IýIjji! 947u) 
migio 4ý-Aiflýii ý11! u 2.6 How often do you assess the 
appropriateness of those 
measures/indicators? 
2.7 What would you do ifthe 
measures/indicators in use appear to 
be inappropriate? 
(Iflial changes ivill he made? ) 
On what are those decisions based'. ) 
]fif) lei lunanmot) m, 
1) 7 (If 
ý-)04 7u)) 
Lo 6- 
LGf). n, o 
Ifladill-, 
1c. G6,1iIJiJ 
ADA iflim. - 410,111 ed 0ý aM til nil lmq% 
(flW WJflëJd) 
(i. e. information and its sourcefirom 
internal qf andlor external to the 
organisation (department)) 
2.9 1 low do you react to such 
information? 
2.10 How do you make the decision as to 
the final solution for the chan, (Ie" 
I Are there measures/indicators sti IIin 
use that you consider to be 
inappropriate? Why are they still in 
use? 
(Please give examples offhose measures, 
e. g. imposed measures. ) 
43) 1 
kD-c, )kD 2.12 What do you do in such situations'? 
(e. g. in winsupcriors, simph, compli, ivith 
VU-M) 15 
them, etc-. ) 
V JV1 -V UVO 911 VO 
2.11 Are the mcasurcs/indicators and 
performance data used for purposes 
other than telling how well your 
wv organisation (department) has been 
(viu iahjo i-, perl'orming? 
31 IWO 1'ý-) 71J (C' g. exhibiling accounlabiliw crewini, 
num4m, 
unily, reporling puipmv, %, recei I v/ . /I, <,, 
rcivards, etc. ) 
-4 
ar. il If) IJAMH 101.114 Am ý"'Vllru 0 4fi m CY00A a0 3. Questions regarding the consequences 
of the align men t/m isalign ment 
between performance measurement 
and strategy 
A N dij 01 f) 15 Tili A 15 WN an 15 flýlyý I lvvlýl -'-uo 3.1 What are (lie consequences ofhavino 
performance measurement al I ý, ncd 
vq with strategy? nIW 7v T1 Od7 j )ým a R'N 01 F-rv) (Please give examples ofholh posilive anil 
negative consequences. ) 
1.2 In contrast, what would result from 
A misalignment? 
(Please provide examples (ýI'hoih posiiivc 
antl negalivc consequences. ) 
w1w 
3.3 Is It always necessary to maintain 
tiolit alignment? \Vhy/why not'., 
in ý ou identi fy and give examliles, 41 
ot'circumstanccs in which alignmcni 
is more desirable, and in contrast. 
IMT)l misalignment is morc cicsirable'. ) 
wiw 1014-md1j) (Please give examples. ) 
an 33 .5 
Who would prefer alignment and who 
A 4111ý1-j lim. Ifl 5 Inq ainl5mufl -)Ili U'a aqfl aa1 
WOUld pi-c1'er inisalignment" Why? Z7- 
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IDificilfilin Ili flj ni'lutl -3 Ili (Toon cl a Ali 0 An 113 10 
wanildn'l-JOA 11461ificipt 
lljlfladI117ý In 15iflyllto t; aaq tlk)lllflý; v 
qq 
(" . t") 
hfn l]jljln'W'-c)tjll (I Ifl') IIJ 'fý (A 
LlitJ1 J 
lu oljdl'lilt=ý Ij'jq-j Ili aoqfld, t) lvl3o 1ý cloo 
UhN I UP I 017W 
lit) Iý I] 5-ý ýýljwj Ili aaflfl ? 'I alýlfld nad 114u 
bi 'bi 'bi' 
11n1 t'I11J n irniu iw tn i'in iii 
bi ' 9/ 
FItJ1 L11fiUfl1.1 
9) 
( ii flh11UT1 lJ3Jfl1 
Ný 15 tu A5 ý- Lijuflllljef 0 fififial 
. flll I )'Iifll ii 11i11 i14iT)11O 
v 51 -Av 
A', - G) 
flfi aaI ýlf)ý I 
W1.0pod II 10 
et. Lo 0. -1511uýt]6 I-vilm I) ýI Ifi-IOWU ,I, 0 1110 ýA 114) 
II, 31 
JJniI fl 
i) 
('t Gl) "I flAltil-ill'i till I In 15 5man I 5dýllý I Ili 
filinavii, alfvý Ili 
n1Nni it 
4. Questions regarding the assessment of 
alignment 
4.1 1 low do you know it'perf'ormance 
measurement supports in(] is dwmcd 
with strategy? 
4.2 1 low can vou assess the dco rce () f 
alignment'. ' 
(c. g. how could. vou IcIl ýflncaslirc A is 
moi-e tiligned wifhslralcgý, Ilitin inctisure 
13. ý) 
4. What are your sources ofinflormation 
on alignment/misalignment9 
(How do you get such iqlbrmalion -jrom 
wilhin or oulside Me 
ot-, iýani. vatioWdel? ai-fineiii? ) 
4.4 Is alignment fon-nally assessed? 11'so, 
how often" It'not. how is 11 assessed? 
4.5 What factors influence the need to 
assess alionment? WhN, are they 
influential? 
5. Questions regarding the creation and 
maintenance of alignment 
5.1 1 low can all gninctit be created 1n the 
tirst place'? 
-5.2 
\vk'hat are the factors afTecting 
alignment/misalignment? 
(11'hj, and hoiv do lhesefin-lors qffýcl 
alignmenillmisalignn7ent? ) 
In terms of performance measurement 
or strategy, which is more often the 
cause ofmisalignment? 
(H71Y. ' ) 
An qmblj Inn iI 
unq 70 i')AU4-ljau) 
i)t Zfllj I 5tl If) ld I fl ý iliamidol'alil 11 ý'l mi III-, 
tnit iu1J 
5.4 1 low can all,, 11,11c, 11 1,, 
over time" 
4-3) 3 
&A 5.5 If misalignment is sometimes more 
desirable, have you ever intentionally 
misaligned measures with strategy for 
any particular reason? 
VDAMINniffinqVIS (Provide examples ofsucý measures and 
reasons. ) 
4 d. b 5.6 What made measures formerly aligned 
finmnw nItAUUrfewl" unaqviz -on r184 with strategy 
become misaligned at a 
later date? 
(nliu7vngi'2vd74wo4inw, n"9)4nd7-7) (Give examples ofsuchfactors. ) 
5.7 How did you cope with such an 
(nj W Vnq'ii i9did2riu. - uF ir) emergent-misalignment situation? 
I (Provide examples and explanations. ) 
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